# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-112
Monday
10 June 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

# Daily Report
East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-96-112* *10 June 1996*

CONTENTS

**NOTICE:** This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.


**INTER-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS**

Central Europe: Czech, Slovak Presidents Meet at Summit *[Prague Radio]* ..... 1
Central Europe: Kuchma Addresses Central European Summit *[Kiev INTELNEWS]* ..... 1
Central Europe: Ukrainian, Polish Presidents Reach Accord *[UNIAN 7 Jun]* ..... 1
Central Europe: Kwasniewski on Talks With Germany at Summit *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 2
Central Europe: Kwasniewski, Klestil Discuss Cooperation, NATO *[PAP]* ..... 2
Central Europe: Polish President Summarizes Summit *[PAP]* ..... 2

**ALBANIA**

Albania: Opposition To Boycott Vote Rerun Despite Advice *[ATA]* ..... 4
Albania: PS Leaders Call For Boycott of Election Rerun *[ATA]* ..... 4
Albania: Opposition Calls Election Rerun 'Haughtiness' *[ATA]* ..... 4
Albania: PS Claims Irregularities in 107 Constituencies *[ZERI I POPULLIT 7 Jun]* ..... 5
Albania: KQZ Decides on Measures for 16 Jun Election Rerun *[Tirana TV]* ..... 6
Albania: KQZ Chief Says Opposition Filed No 'Complaints' *[ATA]* ..... 6
Albania: Parliamentary Speaker Interviewed on May Elections *[ATA]* ..... 7
Albania: Press Reacts to BBC Interview With EU Official *[ATA]* ..... 7
Albania: Opposition Leaders' Visit to Brussels Analyzed *[ATA]* ..... 8
Albania: PS's Pellumbi States Conditions for Dialogue *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 7 Jun]* ..... 8
Albania: German Director Calls Vote Rerun 'Mature Step' *[ATA]* ..... 9
Albania: Ministry Shakeup Follows Violence Against Opposition *[REPUBLIKA 7 Jun]* ..... 9
Albania: Conference on Multinational Exercise Starts 11 Jun *[ATA]* ..... 10

**BULGARIA**

Bulgaria: Assembly Approves Cabinet Changes *[Sofia Radio]* ..... 11
Bulgaria: Six More Votes Needed To Defeat Cabinet *[STANDART NEWS 10 Jun]* ..... 11
Bulgaria: Marinov Discusses Videnov's Responsibility *[STANDART NEWS 8 Jun]* ..... 12
Bulgaria: Lilov, Lukanov Attack Videnov at BSP Plenum *[KONTINENT 10 Jun]* ..... 13
Bulgaria: Videnov Admits 'Weaknesses' in Plenum Address *[DUMA 10 Jun]* ..... 14
Bulgaria: BSP Official on Future of Videnov Cabinet *[STANDART NEWS 10 Jun]* ..... 15
Bulgaria: Cabinet Adopts New Army Regulations *[TRUD 7 Jun]* ..... 16
Bulgaria: Russia Proposes Joint Production of New Fighter *[TRUD 1 Jun]* ..... 16

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

Czech Republic: IFOR Unit's Situation, NATO Entry Viewed *[RESPEKT 3-9 Jun]* ..... 17
Czech Republic: Cabinet Approval To Return Refugees to Bosnia *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 6 Jun]* 18
Czech Republic: Klaus's Opinion on EU Integration Examined *[PRAGUE POST 3-9 Apr]* ..... 18
Czech Republic: Poland Becomes Prague's Main Partner *[PRAGUE POST 3-9 Apr]* ..... 19
Czech Republic: Daily on Meciar's Health, 'Disappearance' *[LIDOVE NOVINY 5 Jun]* ..... 20
Czech Republic: Hints of Postelection Instability Offend Havel *[Prague Radio]* ..... 21
Czech Republic: Havel Discusses Postelection Scene *[Prague Radio]* ..... 21
Czech Republic: Talks Between Klaus Coalition, Zeman Said Tense *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Jun]* 22
Czech Republic: Coalition Divided Over Agreement With CSSD *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Jun]* 23

Czech Republic: CSSD Proposes Chairman for Parliament Speaker *[Prague Radio]* ..... 24
Czech Republic: Daily: ODS May Offer KSCM 'Important Post' *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Jun]* 24
Czech Republic: Deputy: SPR-RSC May Support Minority Cabinet *[DENNI TELEGRAF 6 Jun]* .... 24
Czech Republic: Business Leader Baranek Resigns *[DENNI TELEGRAF 7 Jun]* ..... 25

## SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Luptak: ZRS Cannot Influence Privatization Decisions *[SME 6 Jun]* ..... 26
Slovakia: Daily Views Luptak Revelations on Privatization *[PRAVDA 7 Jun]* ..... 26

## HUNGARY

Hungary: Slovenia Wants Hungary's Help in NATO Bid *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 28
Hungary: Defense Official Says Army's Planned Size Unrealistic *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 28
Hungary: Army Union Supports New Chief of Staff *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 28

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Frowick Views Conditions for Sep Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 29
B-H: Srebrenica Men Reportedly Used as 'Slave Labor' *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 8 Jun]* ..... 29
B-H: Izetbegovic on Past Sacrifices, Future of Bosnia *[BH PRESS]* ..... 29
B-H: Izetbegovic Wants 'Normal Conditions' for Election *[Sarajevo TV]* ..... 31
B-H: More on Izetbegovic's Objection to Elections *[BETA]* ..... 31
B-H: Silajdzic Discusses Elections, Party Policy *[NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 7 Jun]* ..... 31
B-H: Lack of Fairness May Mar Elections *[SVIJET 30 May]* ..... 34
B-H: Skepticism About Consensus on Defense Law *[DNEVNI AVAZ 4 Jun]* ..... 35
B-H: Mostar Police Maltreat Croat Defense Commander *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 36
B-H: Muratovic Views Election, Economy in Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 36
B-H: Commentary Views Tension in Eastern Part of Mostar *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 6 Jun]* ..... 36
B-H: Mostar Election HQ Appeals to Citizens To Vote *[Sarajevo TV]* ..... 37
B-H: Krajisnik Stresses IFOR Role in Elections *[Banja Luka TV]* ..... 37
B-H: Arkan 'Will Not Allow' Arrest of Karadzic, Mladic *[Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA 10 Jun]* 37

## CROATIA

Croatia: 'Historic' HDZ-HSLS-HSS Agreement Appears Imminent *[VJESNIK 6 Jun]* ..... 40
Croatia: HSLS Sets Conditions for Negotiations With HDZ *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 40
Croatia: Seks Hopes HSS Joins HDZ-HSLS Coalition *[BETA]* ..... 41
Croatia: Bosnia Radio on Tudjman Bid To Form Coalition *[Sarajevo Radio]* ..... 41
Croatia: Police Arrest Hague Tribunal Suspect in Split *[Zagreb Radio]* ..... 41
Croatia: New Information Law Said To Promote Media Liability *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 5 Jun]* 42
Croatia: Opposition Asks PM To Uphold Zagreb Election Result *[Budapest Radio]* ..... 43
Croatia: Susak Discusses Reintegration, Army *[HRVATSKI OBZOR 27 May]* ..... 44
Croatia: Paris, Zagreb Sign Investment Protection Agreement *[Paris LES ECHOS 5 Jun]* ..... 46

## THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Handziski on Agreements With NACC, PFP *[PULS 7 Jun]* ..... 47
FYROM: Commentary Examines U.S. Balkan Policy *[PULS 7 Jun]* ..... 48
FYROM: Visit by Slovene Prime Minister Reported *[Skopje Radio]* ..... 50

## POLAND

Poland: International Naval Exercises Begin in Baltic Sea *[PAP]* ..... 52
Poland: European Integration Policy Criticized *[TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA 4 Apr]* ..... 52
Poland: Rosati on Ties to Russia, Vacant Ministry Post *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 54

Poland: Gdansk Shipyard To Close; Solidarity To Protest *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 54
Poland: Walesa Blames Postcommunists for Shipyard Shutdown *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 54
Poland: Daily Sums Up Details of 'O' Spy Case *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Jun]* ..... 54
Poland: Deputy Reveals Secret Order on Enterprises Surveillance *[Warsaw Radio]* ..... 56
Poland: Deputy: Interior Minister Responsible for Secret Order *[PAP]* ..... 56
Poland: Alliance of Democratic Right Planned *[CZAS KRAKOWSKI 7 Apr]* ..... 56
Poland: Effectiveness of Political Parties Examined *[POLITYKA 30 Mar]* ..... 57

**ROMANIA**

Romania: Parties Discuss Arrangements for 16 Jun Ballot *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 60
Romania: Nastase Says Iliescu Will Run as PDSR Candidate *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 60
Romania: Final Results of Local Election Ballot Released *[Bucharest Radio]* ..... 61
Romania: Nastase on PDSR Candidates' Performance in Cities *[ROMANIA LIBERA 5 Jun]* ..... 61

**SLOVENIA**

Slovenia: Drnovsek on EU Membership, Government Coalition *[Ljubljana Radio]* ..... 63
Slovenia: Kucan Discusses Talks With Scalfaro, EU Integration *[Ljubljana Radio]* ..... 63
Slovenia: Italy's Efforts To Amend Association Accord Noted *[Ljubljana Radio]* ..... 64
Slovenia: Parties on Economic Policy, Confidence in Government *[MAG 29 May]* ..... 64
Slovenia: Nikolaj Oman's Involvement in Arms Trade Detailed *[DELO 4 Jun]* ..... 65

**YUGOSLAVIA**

**Federal**

FRY: Milosevic on Dayton, Foreign Ties, Kosovo *[TANJUG]* ..... 67
FRY: President Milosevic Criticizes Hague Tribunal *[TANJUG]* ..... 68
FRY: EU Officials Stress Need To Normalize Relations *[Belgrade Radio]* ..... 68

**Serbia**

Serbia: Markovic Says 'All Sides' Responsible for SFRY Breakup *[Belgrade Radio]* ..... 69
Serbia: Seselj Accuses Draskovic, Djindjic of Treason *[NASA BORBA 28 May]* ..... 70
Serbia: Intellectuals Protest Proceedings Against Karadzic *[TANJUG]* ..... 71
Serbia: Extradition of Officers Dangerous Move for Milosevic *[MONITOR 31 May]* ..... 72
Serbia: Commentary Analyzes Meaning of Hague Judge's Visit *[POLITIKA EKSPRES 7 Jun]* 73
Serbia: Avramovic Accepts Post With NEDELJNI TELEGRAF *[BETA]* ..... 74

**Kosovo**

Kosovo: Milosevic Expected To Present Solution for Kosovo *[SRNA]* ..... 74

**Central Europe: Czech, Slovak Presidents Meet at Summit**

*LD0806113796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel and Slovak President Michal Kovac met today in Rzeszow in southeastern Poland during the summit of Central European heads of state. They talked about the internal political situation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Kovac said he expected that close contacts between the two countries at the prime-ministerial level would be resumed after a new Czech government has been formed because, as far as mutual relations are concerned, there still remain many open issues.

According to Havel, the two presidents also discussed wider foreign political issues.

**Central Europe: Kuchma Addresses Central European Summit**

*WS1006090296 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0310 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, June 8—Addressing world leaders at this week's meeting of Central European presidents in the Polish town of Lancut, President Leonid Kuchma cited the creation of an effective security system as the main criteria for the future development of Europe.

Kuchma told his European counterparts that investment in Ukraine would help ensure security in the region.

Presidents of nine central European states agreed on Friday to move toward an integrated Europe, but European Union (EU) and NATO members pointed out the practical difficulties of such integration.

The heads of six former Soviet countries met for the two-day summit with leaders from Austria, Germany and Italy, and aside from Ukraine, the other five Eastern countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia—are decisively moving toward integration into the EU and NATO.

Kuchma said that while he understands some European countries' eagerness to enter NATO, he prefers Ukraine's entry to be an "evolutionary process and an element of the nation's overall European integration."

Kuchma further stated that there are no economic or political preconditions for Ukraine's entrance into NATO, but he added that the state's achievements in the reformation of its economic and political systems have given him reason to anticipate entrance into the European Union, as a bridge between East and West.

The presidents agreed that they had little influence over this month's elections in Russia, where communist challenger Gennadiy Zuganov poses an even stronger threat to NATO expansion than current President Boris Yeltsin.

Kuchma said that Yeltsin's defeat would be an "earthquake" for Ukraine and Poland in particular, and he added that Ukraine's reform process would remain "irreversible" in the event of a communist victory.

German President Roman Herzog pledged that Germany will strive to preserve Ukraine's stability and independence.

**Central Europe: Ukrainian, Polish Presidents Reach Accord**

*LD0706153296 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1410 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Rzeszow (Republic of Poland)—"I am convinced that we will cooperate with Ukraine not only on a bilateral basis but also within regional European structures," Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski told journalists after his meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma on 7 June, which was held within the framework of the information meeting between presidents of Central European countries.

According to UNIAN, the Polish president emphasized that the stands of Kiev and Warsaw on international issues almost fully coincide. He said a joint declaration on cooperation will be signed during the Ukrainian president's visit to Warsaw, which is scheduled to take place on 25-26 June. The sides will also discuss economic and cultural cooperation and vital political issues. The possibility of involving Ukraine in celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the Wisla operation to liberate Poland from the Nazi invaders, which is due next year, will also be discussed during the Ukrainian president's visit to Poland.

In a statement for the press, Kuchma expressed gratitude to Kwasniewski for supporting Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe and to the Central European Initiative. "I am pleased with the fact that our opinions on the issues discussed coincide, including the issue of security on the European Continent," he said.

In the afternoon, nine presidents of Central European countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the FRG, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, and Ukraine—opened their meeting.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Central Europe: Kwasniewski on Talks With Germany at Summit**

*LD0706190796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The fourth summit of presidents of Central European states is taking place at the Lancut Castle near Rzeszow [southeastern Poland]. Previous meetings of this group took place in Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The host of this year's summit is [Polish President] Aleksander Kwasniewski. Taking part in it are the presidents of Germany, Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and Ukraine. They are discussing issues concerning the role of Central European states in the process of unifying the continent, the new security architecture in Europe, and the eastern policy of the future European Union enlarged by the admission of new members.

In the morning President Aleksander Kwasniewski held talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Slovak President Michal Kovac, and German President Roman Herzog.

After an hour-long meeting with Leonid Kuchma, Aleksander Kwasniewski said Poland was interested in Ukraine's admission to West European structures, an expression of which was the invitation of President Kuchma to the meeting at Lancut. President Kwasniewski expressed his satisfaction with good bilateral contacts.

The Polish president's next interlocutor was Slovak President Michal Kovac. After the talks, it was confirmed that the two countries' main objective was to join the European Union and NATO. President Kwasniewski expressed his conviction that the two countries' cooperation within the Central European Initiative and CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association was preparing us for integration with the West European structures.

After his meeting with German President Roman Herzog, Aleksander Kwasniewski said that Germany supported Poland's membership in the European Union and NATO. Kwasniewski added that President Herzog also briefed him on the results of last week's NATO ministerial session in Berlin.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] We are treating today's talks as the continuation of the very lively and very good contacts between Poland and Germany. The Germans are our partners, and we could also say our advocates as far as joining the structures of the European Union and NATO is concerned, and this position was confirmed one more time.

President Herzog performed a very extensive analysis of the latest meeting in Berlin of NATO member states' representatives and expressed the view that this structure, the North Atlantic pact, has entered a period of very significant reform, adapting the activities of the pact to the completely new conditions we have in Europe and the world. [end recording]

**Central Europe: Kwasniewski, Klestil Discuss Cooperation, NATO**

*LD0806123896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0945 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Rzeszow, 8 Jun—I brought with me concrete proposals for Polish-Austrian economic cooperation, which I handed over to President Aleksander Kwasniewski in the form of a memorandum, Austrian President Thomas Klestil said after holding bilateral talks with Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Assessing the current economic contacts between Austria and Poland, President Klestil noted that the financial involvement of Austria in Polish projects reaches half of that of Germany. When the populations of Austria and Germany are compared, it turns out that Austrians are much more involved per capita than is generally thought.

Both presidents said that issues relating to NATO enlargement, the Russian position on this issue, the situation in the Balkans, and France's new involvement in the structures of European security were among the subjects discussed. Both presidents agreed that, in order to maintain good cooperation, meetings should be held more often.

Aleksander Kwasniewski said that, although the Austrian chancellor had been invited to pay an official visit to Poland, he had also extended the invitation to President Klestil. The invitation was accepted with satisfaction.

The Klestil-Kwasniewski talks were the first to be held on the second day of the Lancut summit.

Other meetings held in the morning were between the president of the Czech Republic and the president of Slovakia and between President Kwasniewski and the Hungarian president.

**Central Europe: Polish President Summarizes Summit**

*LD0806174896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1420 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Rzeszow, 8 Jun—A one-and-a-half-hour-long television debate ended the meeting of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

nine Central European presidents, Lancut-'96 . After the debate, the presidents planted symbolic trees in the palace park and met journalists. The next summit will be held in June of next year in Slovenia. [passage omitted]

President Kwasniewski said that the Lancut meeting was yet another confirmation that our region is becoming increasingly more important in the European process. "I am convinced that after two or three more meetings we will be discussing new subjects and not the European Union or NATO because these matters will already have been resolved," Kwasniewski said.

Commenting on the invitation to the summit of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Kwasniewski said that "it had been a very good and much needed idea," adding that quite recently he had still heard the opinion that we did not appreciate Ukraine's importance and that our policy toward that country was not very active. "We want to become a bridge for our eastern neighbors to link them to Europe," Wojciech Lamentowicz, the president's international affairs adviser, explained. Kuchma himself, when asked whether by his invitation to the summit Kwasniewski was trying to "pull him into Europe," replied: "Yes, and this was a success—I am delighted with the role played by Poland."

When asked whether an agreement was reached during talks with Kuchma on the return of the Polish Ossolinski library, still remaining in Lvov, in exchange for the Taras Shevchenko collection, which is in Poland, Kwasniewski answered that "there was an agreement on the will to do that." He added that both the Ukrainian and the Polish sides were in favor of resolving the matter for the benefit of our mutual relations.

There was a remark that the Central European countries aspiring to join European structures may become somewhat irritated by the initial procedures dragging on. The president replied that, although the West made declarations on openness, "we will encounter growing skepticism." President Herzog put it very clearly: For several years now, the Germans have been experiencing a decline in living standards, and many ordinary citizens asked themselves whether it made sense to incur additional costs as the price for a unified Europe, Kwasniewski explained.

According to the president, recent signals have shown that Russia has become more flexible than it was six months ago with regard to the issue of Poland's NATO membership. However, he advised patience and said that one has to await the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia because it will be easier to tell what Russian policy is really like once the leaders are no longer involved in the election campaign. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Albania: Opposition To Boycott Vote Rerun Despite Advice**

*AU0806170496 Tirana ATA in English 1412 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—The three main opposition parties, which boycotted the elections on June 26, declared on Saturday [8 June] in a joint press conference held at Social Democratic Party [PSD] seat, that they won't participate on the elections in 17 constituencies, where a re-run is planned, even the U.S. and EU advised for a development of a dialogue and the partial re-run of the elections.

**Albania: PS Leaders Call For Boycott of Election Rerun**

*AU0806201996 Tirana ATA in English 1919 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report by A. Cama]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—Today the Socialist Party [PS] held a rally of protest in its headquarters in Tirana.

Through loudspeakers, PS leaders addressed the crowd of about 200 people reiterating their slogans for the boycott of elections in those constituencies where they will be re-run. They also called for a non-recognition of elections which they alleged to be rigged.

"The Socialist Party will not take part in the elections to be re-run in 17 constituencies and calls on its electorate to boycott them," said PS Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle, reading a statement of his party.

Slogans "Either Death or Life, We Will Reach the Main Square," "Opposition in Power," accompanied the PS rally in which offences for President Berisha were also not spared.

Numerous local and foreign reporters attended the rally.

The Socialist Party and those of the Centre-Pole had called on their members and sympathizers to demonstrate in the Scanderbeg Square. But police forces did not allow the rally to be held in the square and suggested other squares and places for manifestation.

After the rally, PS sympathizers beat RD [RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE] reporter Ndreke Gjini.

In the May 26, 1996 elections, the PS won in only five of 115 constituencies on the majority system. Democratic Party [PD] won in 96 constituencies in the first round of elections. PS did not take part in the second polling round in nine constituencies held on June 2, while PD won in a further five constituencies. In 1992 elections, PD won in 90 of 100 constituencies on the majority system, while PS in six constituencies. In the same year, on the basis of the majority system two deputies of the Human Rights Union Party, one of the Republican Party and one of the Social Democratic Party (the two latter won in two constituencies PD left free by not presenting its candidate) became members of the parliament.

**Albania: Opposition Calls Election Rerun 'Haughtiness'**

*AU0806203496 Tirana ATA in English 1636 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—Three main opposition parties, which boycotted May 26 elections, today declared in a joint news conference in Social Democratic Party [PSD] headquarters, that they will not take part in the re-run in 17 constituencies on June 16, although EU and the U.S. have advised dialogue and partial elections.

"The President of the Republic is unilaterally continuing the farce of the May 26 elections," said PSD Chairman Skender Gjinushi in the news conference. "Declarations of the EU and the U.S. suggest that every solution is expected to come out of a dialogue among the parties after all irregularities are identified. This has absolutely not been realised, on the contrary, the president has unilaterally declared the re-run of elections in those constituencies he considers most proper," Gjinushi added.

Several times President Berisha has appealed to the opposition parties that boycotted the elections, to take part in the second re-run of polls, both in the constituencies where the accepted minimum of votes was reached by none of the candidates and in those where polls will be repeated.

"The president invites all the parties and the candidates for deputies to take part in these elections bringing to evidence their responsibility for this process, just like he invites all the people to vote for the best program and candidate," said a press release of President Berisha issued yesterday.

"No elections can be made when dialogue is not established," said Gjinushi, adding that "the basis for manipulation has been police pressure. In these conditions the opposition is not free to be consolidated even formally."

"What we asked from Europe is that the Albanian people should win the right for free elections. This is a right of the people and not of the parties," he said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Today opposition parties have called on their electorate to demonstrate in the Scanderbeg Square against the results of the elections.

"With this act (the poll re-run) Berisha adds to the absurdity of that scenario which started on May 26," said Servet Pellumbi, Socialist Party [PS] deputy chairman. He added that the two other parties agree on this point.

Pellumbi asked which are the criteria followed to identify the constituencies with grave violations from those without irregularities, and added that even in this case, "we see arbitrariness and action upon order of the number one."

Yesterday the Central Electoral Commission, after a voluminous work and close consideration of the ballots in many constituencies in the presence of foreign observers, declared voting invalid in a further 13 constituencies, four had been previously agreed for re-run, thus the total number became 17 of 115 constituencies.

"The re-run of elections is a sort of haughtiness towards European institutions and the State Department," said Pellumbi, referring to special declarations, which, in the view of Pellumbi, have stressed that elections in Albania had serious irregularities, had not been free and conformed to the standards, and at a time when CE [Council of Europe] is considering these acts, "another farce is announced, that of 17 constituencies," he said.

"This act of correction, in our judgment, must include the repetition of polling in some constituencies as is recommended by various delegations of international monitors, including OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and EC (European Council)," said spokesman of the State Department Nicholas Berns in a statement on June 1.

"We are ready for a compromise," said Democratic Alliance Party [AD] President Ceka, "to find the way to free elections and not for a compromise according to their nature, to accept that elections are partly or in mostly rigged."

Asked whether the U.S. and the EU will consider efficient a repetition of polling in some constituencies and which would be the stand of these parties, this, according to Ceka, would "mark the precedent of a legitimate dictatorship and would be a dangerous precedent for the entire Balkans."

According to them, Berisha is "attacking the welfare of the Albanians. For sake of keeping the power, Berisha is sacrificing Albania's integration in Euro-Atlantic structures."

"The withdrawal of major opposition party candidates and their members from electoral commissions made it impossible to gauge the true dimension of problems subsequently observed during the vote count, and contributed to a lack of integrity in the counting process. Hence the opposition must accept some responsibility for the degrading of the process," said the declaration of the Department of State on Albanian parliamentary elections.

**Albania: PS Claims Irregularities in 107 Constituencies**

*AU0806202596 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 7 Jun 96 p 4*

[Press statement by the Socialist Party issued in Tirana on 5 June: "Irregularities in 107 Constituencies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party [PS] first denounced the 26 May elections in Albania at 1730 [1530 GMT] on 26 May itself, considering them not to be fair, free, or democratic and announcing the departure of all its members from all the commissions and the withdrawal of all its candidates, in order to avert a confrontation that the Democratic Party [PD] and Berisha had anticipated in the late hours of the night, when the final act of the coup d'etat in Albania was to be staged.

A scenario to steal freely given votes and carry out a "coup d'etat" had been prepared on the basis of a clear idea and plan devised by the secret service in direct conjunction with the PD leadership. The Central Electoral Commission, brutally dominated by an irresponsible majority and directed by party fanatics, played an important part in achieving the massive rigging of the elections. Berisha, leading the electoral campaign and the first on the ruling party's list of candidates for deputy, was the master of ceremonies of this coup d'etat and the massacre of 28 May, which all Europe and the world saw on Euronews, CNN, and other television stations.

The PS, although it has taken a clear political position over the behavior of Berisha and the Central Electoral Commission, has also addressed to them official written criticisms regarding irregularities in the 107 constituencies in which the PS stood.

The PS's position over these irregularities has been and remains clear, because it involves not irregularities of a technical character, but the idea and plan for the manipulation which lie at the heart of the strategy of Berisha's regime.

Specifically:

1. Document No. 187 of 26 May 1996 addressed to the president of the republic and the Central Electoral

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Commission makes clear the position of the PS regarding the responsibility of the president and the Central Electoral Commission for the manipulations that led to the 26 May coup d'etat in Albania. This document demands among other things the annulment of the 26 May elections and new free elections under guaranteed democratic conditions of fully equal competition, rigorously observed by the EU, the Council of Europe, and the United States.

2. In Document No. 196 of 3 June 1996 addressed to the Central Electoral Commission, the PS General Management Committee put forwards its demand for a repeat of the elections in all the constituencies.

The PS has therefore clearly articulated its position on the 26 May elections and has officially addressed the president and the Central Electoral Commission regarding the irregularities in the 26 May elections, with the demand that the elections be repeated in all the 107 constituencies in which the PS stood.

**Albania: KQZ Decides on Measures for 16 Jun Election Rerun**

*AU0806191396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Announcer-read statement by the Central Election Commission issued in Tirana on 8 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] In implementation of the President of the Republic's decree no. 1,506, dated 7 June 1996, on defining the election date in several constituencies and, after discussing several preparatory measures that should be taken in regard to the rerun of elections in Constituencies 11, 24, 42, 62, 67, 69, 75, 81, 82, 89, 90, 92, 94, 101, 104, 113, and 115, the Central Election Commission [KQZ] decided:

1. To appoint new election commissions in all constituencies where voting will be repeated.

2. In accordance with Article 37 of the Law on Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania and with the relevant decision by the KQZ, proposals for the chairmen, deputy chairmen, secretaries, and members of the election commissions of the constituencies should be sent to the KQZ no later than 2000 [1800 GMT] on 10 June 1996.

3. In accordance with Article 39 of the Law on Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, proposals for the chairmen, deputy chairmen, secretaries, and members of the election commissions of the constituencies should be sent to the election commissions of constituencies no later than 2000 on 12 June 1996.

4. The state secretariat of the local power should take all measures to prepare the voting slips and the necessary material supplies.

For the KQZ—Secretary Kreshnik Spahiu,

Chairman Edmir Kapidani.

**Albania: KQZ Chief Says Opposition Filed No 'Complaints'**

*AU0806205796 Tirana ATA in English 1927 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report by A. Cama]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission [KQZ] Edmir Kapidani today confirmed in a news conference in Tirana that electoral subjects which boycotted general elections in Albania have presented no complaints to the commission.

"We have no complaints for irregularities from electoral subjects which boycotted the elections," said Kapidani. He stressed that none of the political forces has presented any complaints with concrete facts for violence used in polling stations.

"The Socialist Party has only sent a request for repetition of elections in all the constituencies but no complaint. Only four candidates of this party have complained for the 14th constituency in Has and for the three constituencies in Lezhe," said Kapidani.

He pointed out that none of the 400 foreign observers who monitored elections have presented concrete complaints for irregularities observed in constituencies or polling stations. Kapidani also confirmed that during the recent days 103 complaints have reached the CEC from 11 electoral subjects and candidates for deputies.

Kapidani explained that in order to reevaluate the results drawn by constituencies' commissions, the KQZ examined all the ballots of 40 constituencies claimed for irregularities.

The commission has reached the conclusion that besides two constituencies whose election results were previously agreed as invalid, elections must be repeated in 15 constituencies as well.

Director of the Institute of Political Sciences [Institute of Security Policy] of the Christian-Albrechts University in Kiel of Germany, Prof. Dr. Werner Kaltefleiter, invited by the Albanian Government and the Central Electoral Commission to control documentation, facts and procedure of May 26 elections, considered these elections "generally normal."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"The inevitability of irregularities has by no means influenced in the election outcome," he said in a joint news conference with the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Edmir Kapidani held today at noon in the Palace of Congresses.

"Repetition of elections in 17 constituencies is not technically justifiable but from the political point of view it is a matured step to stabilize the image of Albania in the world as a new democracy," he said.

Besides the information he got, Kaltefleiter himself checked ballots, process-verbaux and other election materials.

**Albania: Parliamentary Speaker Interviewed on May Elections**

*AU0706204096 Tirana ATA in English 1659 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 7 (ATA)—Only few hours after arrival in Budapest on Thursday [6 June], Albanian Speaker of Parliament Pjeter Arbnori was interviewed by the first channel of the Hungarian State TV. His interview was fully covered by the most authoritarian Hungarian daily newspaper, MAGYAR HIRLAP and the other daily NAPI.

Asked by reporters on the May 26 elections in Albania, Arbnori, who is attending the Conference of the European Parliaments Speakers, said that in the May 26 elections the Albanian people showed maturity and took a historic decision for the fate of Albania, opposing the return of communists to power. Arbnori said that the Albanian left opposition cannot be compared to the Western or Hungarian left because this is only its name, but in its spirit it has revenge. The left opposition in Albania still seeks to be represented by former State Security officers and collaborators. It prepares illegal structures to double the rule of law and threatens to drag opponents and imprison reporters. Therefore, it is not worthy of keeping this name.

There is also an apparent disparity between the left incriminated leadership, which for 50 years has been preparing lists of executions, imprisonments and deportations, and its grassroots, he said.

Asked by reporters about irregularities noted during the election process in several constituencies, Arbnori said that the Central Electoral Commission is examining with responsibility every complaint (which was due to the deliberate withdrawal of the left opposition).

The President of the Republic will issue the special decree on the development of the elections in those constituencies. Arbnori also stressed that the new parliament will concentrate on the preparation and approval of the constitution, on improving the privatisation law package and the building of an efficient banking system.

**Albania: Press Reacts to BBC Interview With EU Official**

*AU0706201096 Tirana ATA in English 1904 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[Report by Jerina Zaloshnja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 7 (ATA)—The Albanian dailies ZERI I POPULLIT, POLI I QENDRES, REPUBLIKA, KOHA JONE, and ALBANIA provide opposite comments on the interview of European Union spokesman Niko Vecter with radio BBC on Thursday [6 June].

ZERI I POPULLIT carries the said interview entitled: "Elections in Albania Should Be Held Fairly and Freely." The Socialist Party organ says about the interview: "Albania Is Amidst a Political Crisis." This paper as well as KOHA JONE of June 6 say that according to the spokesman, EU Commission President Santer and Lamberto Dini, Italian foreign minister, currently chairing the EU, exclude Albania from their Balkan tour precisely because of this reason.

This, (postponement of Berisha-Santer talks), according to ZERI I POPULLIT and KOHA JONE, is a "considerable disdain" towards President Berisha.

On the same interview, POLI I QENDRES says (without publishing the interview) that: "The EU Is Notifying Tirana That It Is Seriously Considering Reports on Election Irregularities."

The newspaper ALBANIA, under the title: "A New Agreement Between Albania and the European Union Soon," says that the comments by the socialists' newspaper and the independent KOHA JONE (on the canceling of Santer's visit to Albania, as a critical view of the election result) were dismissed by the EU spokesman himself in his interview. "The same people—the left opposition members—continue to dream of Albania's isolation," the paper says. The paper carries in full the interview of Vecter and stresses that: "The postponement of the visit of the European Commission President Santer to Tirana has nothing to do with the voting but with the fact that the election process has not yet ended in Albania."

REPUBLIKA, carrying in full Vecter's interview, cites Vecter as saying that: "The elections should be repeated in all those constituencies in which irregularities are ascertained."

In his Friday interview with radio BBC, the EU spokesman also says that: "The EU is expecting the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] final report before concluding on the election development and results on May 26 in Albania."

According to Vecter "The EU will insist on the re-run of elections in those constituencies where irregularities have been observed." In his interview Vecter says that the EU aims at promoting ties with Albania.

**Albania: Opposition Leaders' Visit to Brussels Analyzed**

*AU0806170296 Tirana ATA in English 1345 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—The newspaper ALBANIA reports on "very generalizing and vague explanations by Socialist Party [PS] Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi in the Socialist Party headquarters on Friday about the outcome of the visit of left opposition leaders to Brussels."

These explanations show that Pellumbi tries at the last moments of his political career to undertake the monopoly of the PS international ties: "The only thing Pellumbi has accomplished in Brussels is the enigma of talks," the paper says.

Pellumbi has very generally declared that: "We (the left opposition) won in Brussels." As regards his visit he only provides some explanation which intend to terrorize its political opponents, the paper says.

"On the other hand, sources of the Central Pole (The Democratic Alliance Party [AD] and the Social-Democratic Party [PSD]) report that the main mediators of talks in Brussels were S. Gjinushi (PSD chairman) and Neritan Ceka (AD leader). This because of polemics in the European Parliament headquarters upon learning that the PS representative in Brussels, Servet Pellumbi, had been agent of the Albanian former State Security officially denounced as such," the paper concludes.

Three days ago, leaders of the left opposition, the Socialist Party, the Social-Democratic Party, and the Alliance Democratic Party, visited Brussels to file their complaints on the May 26 election outcome.

**Albania: PS's Pellumbi States Conditions for Dialogue**

*AU0806204096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 7 Jun 96 p 3*

[Interview with Servet Pellumbi, PS deputy chairman, by Fatos Baxhaku by telephone with Brussels on 6 June: "Pellumbi: 'Dialogue but on Our Terms'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—"Dialogue? For us, this would be possible if the demands of all the parties who have opposed the results of the most recent elections are accepted, and only when those who really gave orders for the events of 28 May in Tirana are punished." Servet Pellumbi, the Socialist Party [PS] deputy chairman who has been so busy in these recent days of electoral "heat" and who is a member of the delegation of opposition parties visiting Brussels, told GAZETA SHQIPTARE what the opposition now expects from its most recent meeting with the EU. The conversation was by telephone. From one of the hotels of the Belgian capital, the voice of the PS leader seemed calm. "We have all been very pleased by the atmosphere and by the meetings we have had here in Brussels," Pellumbi explained. Two of his colleagues, Ceka and Gjinushi, will continue their diplomatic mission in Rome, while Pellumbi and Kallakula will return to Tirana to continue the half-finished electoral battle.

[Baxhaku] What meetings did you have on rsday [6 Jun]?

[Pellumbi] We met today one of the principal assistants of Mr. Van den Broek, the senior commissioner, because the commissioner himself is absent on a mission to the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik.

[Baxhaku] What impression does the opposition delegation have of all the meetings?

[Pellumbi] The impression is very positive. We are first of all struck by the quantity of fair information they possess about events in Albania. They were aware both of the election-rigging on 26 May and the violent suppression of the popular protests on 28 May. From the meetings we have had, we have the impression that Europe will not accept the results of these elections which were manipulated through and through, and that the facts we submitted have reinforced this position. We have met many representatives of different political groups. The very fact that we are representatives of different parties ranging from the left to the center and the right has created here the conviction that the most recent elections in Albania were a retrograde step for the development of democracy.

[Baxhaku] A clear message came from the chancelleries of the EU on Wednesday [5 Jun]: All the parties must sit down at the discussion table....

[Pellumbi] We appreciate this proposal, because we have been and remain in favor of political dialogue among all Albanian political forces, except that under present conditions there is no way of accepting dialogue with those who rigged the elections and used violence against defenseless people and the leaders of the opposition. Our conditions are a repeat of the elections nationwide and the sentencing of the culprits for the violence

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

on 28 May. Unless this condition is met, there cannot be normal conditions for political dialogue among the parties. No doubt all the parties must reflect on the situation that has arisen, but the Democratic Party must be the first to do this, because it devised the scenario that led to this situation.

[Baxhaku] Santer and Dini have postponed their visit to Albania precisely because the leaders of the opposition were visiting Brussels for political meetings. What is your opinion of this?

[Pellumbi] We would not like to see this visit canceled, because we are in favor of still closer relations between Albania and the EU. Canceling the visit is no doubt a retrograde step in these relations, but it must first of all be considered as a serious warning for those in power. This step must make them realize that Albania is not the fiefdom of any party and that nobody is allowed to break the rules of democracy.

[Baxhaku] The dismissal of several police officials who were in command on 28 May has been announced. What is your comment on this most recent decision?

[Pellumbi] This is not enough to reestablish justice. The real culprits are those who ordered the repression, and it must now be clear to everybody who this is....

**Albania: German Director Calls Vote Rerun 'Mature Step'**

*AU0806204396 Tirana ATA in English 1835 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—Director of the Institute of Political Sciences [Institute for Security Policy] of the Christian-Albrechts University in Kiel of Germany, Prof. Dr. Werner Kaltefleiter, invited by the Albanian Government and the Central Electoral Commission to control documentation, facts, and procedure of May 26 elections, considered these elections "generally normal."

"The inevitability of irregularities has by no means influenced the election outcome," he said in a joint news conference with the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Edmir Kapidani held today at noon in the Palace of Congresses.

"I have no doubt that elections in Albania have been held correctly, also taking into consideration the infrastructure of Albania," said he mentioning as weak points the system of many lines in a ballot which even in more developed countries would have caused irregularities.

"Repetition of elections in 17 constituencies is not technically justifiable but from the political point of view it is a mature step to stabilize the image of Albania in the world as a new democracy," he said.

"The re-run of polling result in some constituencies will not change the situation," said Kaltefleiter, referring to a meeting he had today with representatives of the Socialist Party who declared that they would not take part in elections even if they would be ensured to be correct and monitored by foreign specialists and officials.

Mr. Kaltefleiter had discussions in Albania with representatives of the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and with members of the Central Electoral Commission. Besides the information he got, Kaltefleiter himself checked ballots, proces-verbaux, and other election materials.

**Albania: Ministry Shakeup Follows Violence Against Opposition**

*AU0806203096 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 7 Jun 96 p 3*

[Report by Petrit Masha: "Interior Ministry Admits Using Violence in Skenderbeg Square"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There have been upheavals in the Interior Ministry. The events in Skenderbeg Square on 28 May have claimed their first sacrificial lambs among the ranks of senior ministry officials who led the squads that carried out the violence. Two deputy directors, one with the rank of colonel and the other a lieutenant colonel, were dismissed from their posts yesterday. The deputy directors were in charge of the special forces in bullet-proof vests and the special uniformed police respectively. The upheavals have also affected five senior officers in four police commissariats of Tirana. The reason for their dismissal is given as incompetence in the performance of their duties. The Interior Ministry explains that their incompetence led to incidents with unforeseen consequences at the Socialist Rally [PS] rally on 28 May. This is the first signal from the headquarters of the boys in blue, which further confirms that the procurator is continuing investigations of these incidents and will determine precisely who used violence. Reliable sources confirm that the top brass of the Interior Ministry's police were in charge of the operation in Skenderbeg Square, but the ministry spokesman says that these men are still at their posts. While tremors have begun to shake police headquarters, the trial of 10 PS militants has begun at the Tirana Court. It has also been reported that the dismissed police officers have received instructions not to leave Tirana. The ministry also reports that there will be further disciplinary measures including criminal prosecution of the true culprits for the violence that was fortunately

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

filmed in detail and has became famous thanks to the news broadcasts of Euronews. By dismissing senior officials from its own upper echelons, the Interior Ministry has controverted its own report immediately after the incidents in the center of the capital city, which denied that violence was used or that people were injured. It has also controverted the report about the use of violence that was broadcast in several successive bulletins of Albanian Television.

**Albania: Conference on Multinational Exercise Starts 11 Jun**

*AU0806204596 Tirana ATA in English 1852 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 8 (ATA)—Final Planning Conference of the Peace-Eagle '96 multinational exercise will be held from June 11-13, 1996 in Tirana, spokesman of the Defence Ministry reports. The conference will follow Main Planning Conference which determined the objectives and the new elements to be elaborated after necessary reconnaissance and the measures for the construction of the necessary objects in the terrain where the Peace-Eagle '96 will be conducted.

According to confirmations made, the conference will be attended by military teams from the U.S., Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], Italy, and Slovenia.

The conference will also define all details for a successful exercise. Rules for every stage and training element will also be announced.

In the meantime, work will start for the construction of the objects in Bize to ensure normal conditions for the exercise.

Spokesman said that after the conference another important activity will take place in Vicenza of Italy, which will be attended by scores of officers of the Albanian Army. The Peace-Eagle '96 will be conducted in July this year.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Bulgaria: Assembly Approves Cabinet Changes**

*AU1006095896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 10 Jun 96*

[Report by Mariya Tsankova from the National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the National Assembly voted to approve partial structural and personnel changes in the Council of Ministers. A total of 125 deputies took part in the ballot, of whom 124 deputies voted for the creation of a Ministry of the Energy Industry and Energy Resources. In a secret ballot, the deputies relieved Svetoslav Shivarov from the post of minister of agriculture and the food industry, Kliment Vuchev from the post of industry minister, and Georgi Georgiev as culture minister. The deputies then elected Krustyu Trendafilov as agriculture minister, Lyubomir Dachev as industry minister, Rumen Ovcharov as minister of the energy industry and energy resources, and Ivan Marazov as culture minister. Of the 125 deputies who took part in the secret ballot, 121 voted for the motion, two against, and two ballots were invalid.

Andrey Lukanov and Aleksandur Marinov of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group announced before the ballot that they would not support Zhan Videnov's proposals.

The opposition boycotted the ballot. The demand of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], People's Union, and DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] for debates on the proposals was rejected on the ground that the Left is the ruling majority, and that the Left will give the opposition time for debates tomorrow, when the motion of no confidence in the cabinet will be debated.

Prime Minister Videnov justified the structural and personnel changes in the Council of Ministers as being aimed at achieving financial stabilization and an effective structural reform in the real production sector. These are ridiculous and palliative measures, Stefan Savov said. He then accused the Left of irresponsibility toward Bulgaria. Yudzhel Atilla of the DPS then leveled accusations of incompetence, dangerous nationalism, and the failure of the Left's administration. The government majority must accept responsibility for the grain crisis, the Bulfon affair, and the bank failures, Yordan Sokolov [leader of SDS Parliamentary Group] said. The majority has plunged Bulgaria into a crisis that is more terrible than the one in 1990, the SDS parliamentary leader said.

Your assessments of the problems are of no importance, Krasimir Premyanov retorted to the opposition. The big question is that there is no alternative to the present government, he said. The leader of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group called upon the opposition to join in fully supporting the reform. During Premyanov's statement and during the procedural discussion on whether a debate should be held, the opposition chanted for the government to resign, banging on their benches.

After the announcement of the ballot result, the new ministers were sworn in. Prime Minister Zhan Videnov thanked the parliamentary majority for its support and described the government changes as a guarantee for the success of the structural reform that had been launched.

**Bulgaria: Six More Votes Needed To Defeat Cabinet**

*AU1006113196 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 5*

[Unattributed report: "Six Democratic Left Deputies Will Decide the Left's Fate on Wednesday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Six left-wing deputies will decide the fate of the Videnov cabinet on Wednesday 12 June. This is the number of extra votes that the united opposition, the Bulgarian Business Bloc, and the independent deputies need to topple the government.

National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov has called a special parliament session on Tuesday 11 June to debate the opposition's no-confidence motion in the government. The vote on the motion is taken at least 24 hours after the debate.

The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], People's Union, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms decided to seek the no-confidence vote because of the failure of the government's economic policy. The independent deputies from New Democracy have supported the motion.

The Bulgarian Business Bloc deputies have also declared that they are unhappy with the reform and will vote against the government.

However, for Videnov's head to fall, more than one-half of all the National Assembly deputies must vote against him. This means that six members of the Left must support the motion. This is not impossible, because according to talk in the lobbies of parliament about a dozen Democratic Left deputies have openly stated their dissatisfaction with their leader's policies. These deputies, however, will determine their position tomorrow, when parliament will vote on the changes in the Council of Ministers. According to SDS leader Ivan Kostov, if the Bulgarian Socialist Party is happy with the cabinet shuffle, it will stand behind Videnov; if not, the party will replace him.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Bulgaria: Marinov Discusses Videnov's Responsibility**

*AU1006150796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 8 Jun 96 p 10*

[Interview with Aleksandur Marinov, National Assembly deputy for the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, and former leader of the Sofia BSP organization, by Violeta Simeonova; place and date not given: "The Prime Minister Is Not Such a Sacred Cow That He Does Not Have To Justify Himself to Anyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Simeonova] Why did the BSP choose to waste a day of parliament's time to debate relieving Granitski of his post, instead of dealing with matters of state importance?

[Marinov] In my view, the Democratic Left has lost a lot more than one day of parliamentary time by bringing the Granitski problem to the forefront. First, this indicates political inadequacy, and not merely because Granitski is not the greatest problem. Granitski is not responsible for what television represents. Indeed, our television is not as bad as people try to make out. This was a deliberate provocation when more important decisions needed to be discussed. I asked why this item was put on the agenda in such an urgent manner, but no one could give me an answer.

[Simeonova] Who in your opinion was responsible for this provocation?

[Marinov] The person who probably fears the results of our criticism of it. He probably wants to take soundings in an inadmissible manner.

[Simeonova] How far have the processes of splitting or consolidation gone in the BSP?

[Marinov] I would not say that any split exists. There are differences of opinion, differences of positions, but no differences in our aims. We have only one aim, namely for the Left to govern better. This does not at all mean, however, that we have to govern in one and the same way and through the same people.

[Simeonova] Do you really believe that the BSP still has a chance of ruling the country?

[Marinov] Unless radical changes are made in the policies, the style of conduct, structures, and the personnel makeup of the cabinet, the BSP has no chance of remaining in power.

[Simeonova] Big changes in the composition of the government are expected on Sunday, 9 June.

[Marinov] It depends on what the changes are. If they are cosmetic, they are unnecessary. There are some people, in the parliamentary group, in the party, and in society, who cannot be hoodwinked.

[Simeonova] Some people are predicting a possible bad outcome, namely that the cabinet shuffle, instead of shattering Zhan Videnov's positions, will only confirm them....

[Marinov] I doubt it. By virtue of his responsibilities, the prime minister is the first man who has to render an account of what has not been done and what are evidently mistakes and weaknesses in our policies. The issue of the prime minister's responsibilities cannot be evaded. He is not a sacred cow.

[Simeonova] Do you expect the issue of the prime minister's fate to be raised at the plenum tomorrow?

[Marinov] There are some issues that have not been mentioned, but they will be raised sooner or later. Of course, it would be better if they were raised in good time, because otherwise we will all be the losers, and disastrous losers at that.

[Simeonova] What seem to be the urgent issues at the moment?

[Marinov] First and foremost, we have to make a very clear and self-critical assessment of the situation. Once and for all, we have to stop denying that problems exist. They must be recognized and we must seek the reasons and the persons responsible for them. This offers some very slight chance of restoring part of the trust in us.-

We have to map out specific measures for overcoming the situation, particularly with regard to the problems that most drastically affect the interests of the majority of the population. These are real problems, not invented ones.

This is a very clear postulate, and I would not say that it is particularly complicated, but it is difficult to put into practice. Everything is being obstructed by certain personal and group ambitions, by some people's wish to retain dominant positions in the administration at any cost.

[Simeonova] Can one attribute what has happened in Bulgaria to craving for power?

[Marinov] Craving for power is a psychological phenomenon, otherwise one talks about interests, which may be of all kinds—political and economic.

[Simeonova] Why has the BSP found its hands tied? How did it manage to adopt a statute that paralyzes it in a situation of crisis?

[Marinov] We have been led into this by our insufficiently developed sense of democracy. I was one of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

people who warned that the statute will simply become a mechanism for exerting personal or group influence, and that it will inevitably make it difficult for the BSP to play a full part in the administration. It has been clear for a long time that a group of people cannot govern the state successfully, especially if they do not take account of the views of the opposition, the public, and the media, and if democratic principles are not firmly embodied structurally and genetically in the style of work of a political force.

[Simeonova] Does this mean that one thing is certain, namely that authoritarianism has been victorious in the BSP?

[Marinov] The BSP statute certainly favors the pyramid structure, under which democracy increasingly becomes a facade, an empty display, instead of an effective mechanism for adopting and implementing decisions.

[Simeonova] How did it come about that stage figures were elected to the highest state posts?

[Marinov] When the cabinet was being formed and during the subsequent several changes, the prime minister insisted, and succeeded, in obtaining complete independence. Accordingly, the prime minister bears the full responsibility for the specific personal successes and failures in his personal appointments. No one can cast the blame on anyone else. This was an explicit condition and one that was defended extremely heatedly by some of his comrades in arms.

[Simeonova] It there any possibility of it turning out even now that nothing will change in the top echelons of the BSP?

[Marinov] Everything depends on the personal valor, courage, and political will of the members of the Supreme Council and the Democratic Left deputies. We have to understand this: We either make changes, in which case we will have some chance, or we will ruin everything together. Of course, each one of us bears a different responsibility.

[Simeonova] Neshka Robeva personally apologized to the Bulgarian people for what is happening in the state.

[Marinov] Neshka Robeva is a person with high morals, and she did this as a moral gesture, although she bears no direct responsibility. We, however, do bear a direct responsibility.

If we fail to carry out the changes that we are talking about, I too am inclined to express my regrets and offer my own apology for what is happening.

**Bulgaria: Lilov, Lukanov Attack Videnov at BSP Plenum**

*AU1006125096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 1*

[Article by Svetlana Belousova: "Lilov Wants Party Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the expanded Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] plenum on 9 June, Aleksandur Lilov proposed to the party that it change its policy and form a strong government.

According to the Strategist [Lilov's sobriquet], the basic tenets of the BSP platform are proving unrealistic. We must amend the basic party documents if we want to stop going back on our promises, he said. At the plenum, he proposed a "competent forum," and later he explained to journalists that "this could be a all-party conference." The BSP's best option is to form a strong government. Whether it will be headed by Zhan Videnov or not is another matter, Lilov said.

Prime Minister Videnov disappointed the 9 June plenum with his proposal to appoint Kiril Zhelev, chairman of the National Assembly Budget Commission, minister of agriculture. Many members of the BSP Supreme Council recommended giving this ministry to a professional. Videnov asked for specific names. However, each time a name was cited, he said that this could not happen without first asking the candidate. Filip Bokov said from the floor that Videnov was forcing the Socialists and their coalition partners to work under pressure of time, and under conditions in which policy and confidence were being undermined.

According to the structural and personnel changes proposed by the prime minister, Rumen Gechev's dismissal from the post of deputy prime minister has been indefinitely postponed, and parliament will not vote on it today.

The Ministry of Economic Development also remains intact. Only the Committee on Power Supply becomes a ministry. It will be headed by Rumen Ovcharov, currently first deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply. Lyubomir Dechev, deputy minister at the Ministry of Education, currently in charge of technology, will become minister of industry, replacing Kliment Vuchev.

Prof. Ivan Marazov will replace Georgi Kostov as minister of culture. Members of the BSP leadership claim that during the night Stefan Danailov called Videnov from Italy and said that he can only play the role of minister of culture, but not implement it.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Participants in the plenum said that the only proposal that could be changed was the one for minister of agriculture. Videnov has time for only this change prior to today's parliament session.

Andrey Lukanov clashed sharply with Videnov. He accused the prime minister of treason because of the closing of the Plama Oil Refinery and other enterprises. The obstinacy with which the prime minister is making inadequate proposals shows that he is unable to carry the responsibility he has been entrusted with, Lukanov said. Videnov replied by saying that Lukanov was defending his personal interests.

The plenum postponed adopting changes in the BSP Executive Bureau to Saturday.

**Bulgaria: Videnov Admits 'Weaknesses' in Plenum Address**

*AU1006134296 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 1*

[DUMA PRESS staff report: "Videnov Admitted the Existence of the Crisis and the Government's Mistakes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation is critical; the government has no strategic program; in the economy, the assessments of the macroeconomic parameters for 1995 have proved to be excessively optimistic; in 1996 we are not in a position to fulfill our promise to halt impoverishment—these were some of the admissions made by Prime Minister Zhan Videnov in the political analysis that he presented on 9 June at the joint session of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council, the leaderships of the coalition partners, the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, and the Ecoglasnost Political Club, and the deputies of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group.

There exists a risk of a collapse of confidence in the national currency and the financial system, the analysis stated. The consequences of this would be hyperinflation, a collapse of the banks, and social conflicts. However, the prime minister was convinced that determined actions by the government can prevent this. In his words, the only chance of success lies in the already announced program of structural reforms.

Apart from objective factors, Videnov sees the explanation for the sharply intensifying social conflicts in "the aggressiveness of the trade unions, the manipulative role of the media, and the destructive actions of the institutions of state," as well as of the opposition. According to Videnov, friendly journalistic groups have been utilized to mount media campaigns against party leaders, deputies, and ministers. Within the ruling coalition itself, a small minority and certain individuals are attempting to impose their wills on the majority, Videnov claimed.

In speaking about the failure of the administration, it must be known that despite all the failures regarding its style and composition, the government of the Democratic Left impinged upon the interests of a narrow circle that controls immense resources, Videnov explained. He claimed that these interests and the motives for their furious opposition to the left have now come out into the open. "The new Bulgarian elite is showing furious resistance and might not stop at organized violence," he said.

Referring to figures proved by the National Statistical Institute, Videnov presented a picture of the bread crisis "stripped of the theatricalism of the media," pointing out that more bread has been produced than normal, and that the available stocks ensure real possibilities of feeding the nation and even of exporting grain at a profit. According to Videnov, the main error of the Council of Ministers was to underestimate the animal feed crisis, so that the animal farmers started feeding bread to cattle. Regarding bread and flour, Videnov pointed out that the regulations in the sector are controlled not by the cabinet but by big private owners, who engaged in speculation in their desire to gain excessive profits. The government has taken the solving of the problem into its own hands, he said, and imports have been arranged that are now being carried out.

In Videnov's words, the grain hysteria illustrates a general problem of the transition, namely that the operators in the market are not in fact behaving in a market way, so that not only the Council of Ministers, but the whole of society should be ask to render account for its actions.

According to the prime minister, the shortage of sound common sense is more frightening than the bread shortage itself. "Real problems are replaced by fictitious ones. Excessive expectations are being encouraged. A war is being waged against common sense," he said.

For the first time, Videnov also acknowledged weaknesses committed by the Council of Ministers and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group. The chief one is the lack of a strategic program, which dooms the government to act in a blind manner. A big economic team started work on drafting such a strategy last autumn, he said, but failed to complete its work by March. As a result, the ministers were misled by "the apparently good macroeconomic indices" for last year, and the processes that developed in the economy a little later caught them by surprise.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Videnov claims that the foreign currency and financial crisis could only have been prevented by a radical structural reform. However, last year the readiness for such a reform was lacking. Many people in the Council of Ministers and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group were not convinced of the need for it. They would have fought against this program if it had been proposed in the summer or autumn of 1995, Videnov believes.

The participants in the session disputed some of the theses and proposals put forward by the prime minister.

**Bulgaria: BSP Official on Future of Videnov Cabinet**

*AU1006122696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 4*

[Interview with Chavdar Dobrev, member of the BSP Supreme Council Executive Bureau, by Neda Popova; place and date not given: "The BSP Has Shown That It Can Part With Anyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] Professor Dobrev, how do you assess the meeting of the Democratic Left parties on the changes in the cabinet?

[Dobrev] I think that the frank tone with which we discuss the weaknesses is the best thing.

[Popova] People are saying in the corridors that the clever people who could have done a good job in the renewed Videnov cabinet ran away, because they do not want to work with this prime minister.

[Dobrev] In my personal opinion, this is not so. However, on the other hand, it appears that the period between the two plenums was not put to good use by the prime minister's aides. They did not talk with more experts or produce a wider range of proposals.

[Popova] Generally, the most shocking fact is that Kiril Zhelev will become minister of agriculture. He is an excellent financial expert. Why was it necessary to give the Ministry of Agriculture to him?

[Dobrev] Probably because he is an administrator with experience and knowledge in the economic field. It is assumed that he will work with good experts.

[Popova] Klara Marinova's resignation from all party posts has been demanded. Is it true that she will only lead the media campaign?

[Dobrev] According to the rumors, Klara Marinova has resigned as a spokesperson, but she remains chief of the Press Center and head of the National Assembly Mass Media Commission. As far as the Mass Media Commission of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council is concerned, she will have the possibility to decide alone what to do.

[Popova] There obviously have been some conflicts between leading figures in the party. Indeed, people are saying that the conflict is between her and Krasimir Premyanov. Is this true?

[Dobrev] This is not what it is all about. It is good periodically to change the people with whom one is working. New people bring in new ideas. This is not related to the "Klara Marinova" case. I think that at present there are two great dangers for Bulgaria. The first is an all-national danger, namely that two states exist at present: The first is the official one and the second is for private use. I call the second the criminal state. Perhaps there are several parties within the BSP and, until a single road is selected, and I mean a nationally responsible road, both the nation and our national policy will be sick.

[Popova] Is this why the BSP factions were not allowed to the joint meeting?

[Dobrev] This was a meeting of the parliamentary faction, the Supreme Council, and the coalition partners.

[Popova] How many people will be ousted from the Executive Bureau? Videnov is saying that there will be seven.

[Dobrev] He has not made a statement yet. People in the corridors are saying that for the time being the deputy chairmen will remain members of the Executive Bureau, as will some of the members, such as Koychev and perhaps Nikolay Dobrev. The others will be new.

[Popova] Nikolay Dobrev is a minister, but will he remain a member of the Executive Bureau nevertheless?

[Dobrev] Doncho Konakchiev is also a minister and yet he is a BSP deputy chairman. This is the principle. The question is who is useful for the party's work, for working out its strategic course and solving the daily problems posed by life.

[Popova] Let us assume that parliament accepts the cabinet changes. How much time do you give this renewed government headed by Videnov?

[Dobrev] Government is not a type of marriage contract. Nor do I have a marriage contract with Videnov. However, the BSP has shown that it can part with anyone when the difficulties engulf the party from all directions.

[Popova] Are you hinting about an extraordinary party congress at which Videnov will be replaced?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Dobrev] No, I do not think that this is a topical matter. The replacement of a prime minister or a deputy prime minister is something that could happen at any moment. There is nothing wrong with that.

[Popova] Is this Videnov's last chance?

[Dobrev] I think that this is his last, great, and real chance.

**Bulgaria: Cabinet Adopts New Army Regulations**

*AU0706090296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 7 Jun 96 p 5*

[Article by Vasil Lyutskanov: "Defense Minister To Propose Special Services Chiefs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chiefs of the National Intelligence Service and the National Protection Service, who are subordinate to the president, will be appointed at the proposal of the minister of defense.

This is what the Professional Military Service Regulations Code says. The regulations were adopted on 6 June by the Council of Ministers. The chiefs of the National Intelligence Service and the National Protection Service will sign personal contracts with the Ministry of Defense, which then will pass them on to the Presidency. The members of the two services may be dismissed by the services' chiefs, with the explicit approval of the defense minister. Thus, spies whose identity has been revealed and bodyguards who have encountered problems in their work, will be able to complete their career within the framework of the Defense Ministry system. The chiefs of the Interior Ministry special services will also be proposed together by the ministers of interior and defense.

The Code of Regulations, considered to be the military "Labor Code" reduces to three years the period for which the military servicemen can have the same rank. In practice, this means that an officer who, after 12 years of service, fails to gain entry to the Military Academy, has not learned a foreign language, and cannot complete the General Staff course, can only reach the rank of major, after which he must retire. If during the same period he acquires the necessary qualifications, however, he can become a colonel at the age of 40. This applies only to the Army and not to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Transportation and Construction Troops, where the orders on higher command posts will be signed on the basis of an agreement between the minister of defense and the commanders of the relevant departments.

**Bulgaria: Russia Proposes Joint Production of New Fighter**

*AU0306131896 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 1 Jun 96 p 2*

[Article by Vasil Lyutskanov: "Russia Proposes Joint Production of Superweapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is proposing that the Bulgarian arms industry should play a part in the manufacture and repair of the latest generation of Russian weapons. This news emerged following the talks that Gennadiy Voronin, Russia's deputy minister of the defense industry, held with Ivan Kolev, deputy chairman of Bulgaria's Interdepartmental Council for the Defense Industry.

Vladimir Babak, head of the Russian aerospace giant Sukhoy, has reportedly suggested that our aviation plants in Plovdiv and Dobrich should start mastering in stages the production of assemblies and parts for the Su-29 superfighter. Bulgaria's economic and financial state does not permit it to manufacture combat aircraft, Ivan Kolev explained to TRUD, but it is possible in the future to manufacture individual assemblies and parts in cooperation with Russia. Kolev agreed with Voronin and Babak that at the key meeting of the Bulgarian-Russian Commission on Cooperation in Special Production it will be decided which old licenses will be extended and which new licenses will be granted to our arms plants. Groups of experts will also work on the problem of alleviating the high Russian export taxes and duties that affect Bulgaria.

Ivan Kolev believes that the Bulgarian arms plants must be restructured as a matter of urgency, before the three-year moratorium on privatization of the military-industrial complex expires on 6 August. Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev announced recently that about 240 firms will remain in Electron Consortium AD, Metalchim Holdings, and the giant companies of Arsenal in Kazanluk, Beta in Cherven Bryag, and Pima in Montana. He also said that at least 40 unprofitable workshops are likely to be closed down.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Czech Republic: IFOR Unit's Situation, NATO Entry Viewed**

*AU0706153796 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 3-9 Jun 96, No 23, p 4*

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "Our Boys in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the preelection races, when the government did not sit and parliament did not meet, it was possible to monitor at least signs of "political activity" only in matters concerning the Army. During the past 14 days, two prominent Western generals and the British defense secretary have visited us. Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra conducted the first of the "intensive individualized dialogues" on joining NATO with the alliance's deputy secretary general, Gebhardt von Moltke, in Brussels, and, two weeks ago, two Czech generals carried out an inspection of the Czech IFOR [Implementation Force] unit in Bosnia. Following their return, one of them declared that some of the unit's problems "should perhaps not be discussed in front of journalists." General Karel Kuba had in mind mainly the disparaging attitude of the British toward our battalion.

**The Czech Battalion in the Role of Cinderella**

Only an insignificant little agency report was issued originally about the Bosnian visit by General Rostislav Kotil and Karel Kuba: The two apparently visited the mechanized company's base in the community of Stari Majdan, where they became acquainted with the living conditions of the Czech troops. Only later did it become clear that the two generals returned home indignant. The first reason was the fact that there is no place for a Czech representative in the command of the British IFOR sector, under which our unit comes. The Czech troops felt, to a certain extent, cast aside—the British, admittedly, are generous with their praise of our battalion (for example, the Czech unit has confiscated the most weapons so far from the warring sides in Bosnia)—but they do not want to let out officers make decisions.

The issue was also discussed during the visit to Prague last week by the chief of staff of Britain's Armed Forces, Peter Inge. The British field marshal also praised our unit, but he rejected unequivocally the idea of one of our men being in the British sector's command. Apparently, "rear-echelon support" would have to be expanded disproportionately. Despite the fact that no one explained what specifically is concealed behind this general term, Defense Minister Vilem Holan also supported Inge's view. Furthermore, he added the bon mot that all of the countries that do not have a place in it could, theoretically, raise a claim to a place in the command. The meaning of the minister's statement, however, escapes even his own officials: Apart from us, only the Canadians operate within the British sector, and their representatives are in the command.

Holan's comment provoked consternation among our battalion's troops in Bosnia. According to some observers, it has intensified further the aversion that the Czech members of the NATO forces feel toward their distant ministry. In the words of a General Staff officer: Holan likes to boast about the unit's successes, and, recently, he personally presented commemorative watches to 20 soldiers, but the battalion would prefer greater concern for its quite basic needs. For example, the coal ordered by the troops in January arrived from the Czech lands only at the beginning of May. The wait for spare parts for the personnel carriers was protracted by two months compared with the original promise. None of those involved "even wants to think" about what would have happened if an armed conflict had broken out during this period in the proximity of the Czech post.

**The Right of Veto**

As far as the aforementioned activities by Czech diplomats in the past two weeks are concerned, the most important was the Brussels visit by Alexandr Vondra. A meeting involving NATO foreign ministers, at which "strengthening the European wing" of the alliance will be discussed, is to be held in Berlin in six weeks. The bilateral talks with the candidates from the individual countries will give the alliance a basic idea of the motives and overall readiness of the applicants. Although Vondra did not say it directly, it is apparent from behind-the-scenes reports that Moltke wanted, first and foremost, to find out if the Czech Republic will begin to ignore the interests of the less successful candidates for membership the moment it gets into NATO. Another meeting will be held in July. According to Vondra, the issue at it will involve more specific military matters and financial issues.

The recent visits to Prague by George Joulwan, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, and Michael Portillo, British secretary of state for defense, were of a more formal nature, but, in essence, they were about the same thing. They both praised the performance of the Czech battalion in Bosnia and said that we are well on our way to NATO. At the same time, however, they both emphasized that the architecture of European security will not get by without Russia and the countries that remain outside the alliance's gates. In other words, the visiting officials were sounding out what would become of us in the event of membership. Namely, it brings automatically the right to veto the admission of the other candidates, and it is important for the current NATO

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

states to ascertain how—or if at all—we would exercise this right.

**Czech Republic: Cabinet Approval To Return Refugees to Bosnia**

*AU1006121696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 6 Jun 96 p 3*

[Report by "nak": "The Cabinet Approves the Program for the Return of Refugees to Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In its first postelection session yesterday, the government approved the plan for the return of 400 refugees from the countries of former Yugoslavia, who had obtained temporary refuge in the Republic because of the war conflict and who now intend to return to their homes in Bosnia.

So far, however, the Interior Ministry's original expectations that most of the war refugees would not want to go back have been confirmed. "Many of them have found jobs and new homes here. Some 1,200 Bosnian citizens live in the Republic, half of them in humanitarian centers," Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said. According to him, only 400 of them want to return to Bosnia.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has recommended to all countries to pay for the return travel of the refugees and give them an allowance. "Therefore, we set certain financial limits. For air transport from Prague to Sarajevo, for instance, we earmarked 3 million korunas. We approved the same amount for allowances for the refugees so that they would have some money for their first few days in Bosnia," Klaus stated. Similarly, medical care en route to Bosnia will be covered by the State Treasury.

The Interior Ministry expects that the first refugees could travel to Bosnia in July. Nevertheless, the ministry emphasizes that it must be a decision made by the refugees, and no one can force them into it. It seems that a total of four charter flights will go to Sarajevo. From there the refugees will be taken by bus to the regions they themselves chose. This transport will also be covered by the Interior Ministry. The repatriation should end in September.

**Czech Republic: Klaus's Opinion on EU Integration Examined**

*96CH0093C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3-9 Apr 96 p 11*

[Commentary by Daniel Kumermann, journalist with the daily Svobodne Slovo: "Klaus' Remarks Sound Closer to the Royal We Than 'We the People'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "We" are interested in a less unionist attitude, in a weaker structure for European institutions, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus told participants of the European Banking and Financial Forum in Prague March 19.

One word—"boring" would be the proper response to this sentence. It's hard to keep track of how many times Klaus has said something like this regarding the Czech Republic's integration into European structures.

And yet with the elections just around the corner, that little word "we" is beginning to carry more and more importance and prompt more and more questions. Especially because, only a day after the above-mentioned declaration, there began a three-day sitting of the Interparliamentary Committee for Integration, which consists of Czech and European parliamentary deputies. Over the course of those three days, several participants stressed that "we" are prepared to fulfill all conditions for integration. The other (European) side then responded with hints that the Czech Republic is virtually on the threshold of joining the European Union.

But who are the "we" who prefer this or that kind of EU? At first glance it might by Klaus' own Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which has no internal opposition to its leader. Well, almost none. Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec does not usually defy his boss openly, but he often does so implicitly by his more reasonable policy toward the EU.

As to the governing coalition, the differences are much more obvious and much less hidden. Both Jan Kalvoda and Vladimir Dlouhy, the two top politicians of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), not so long ago published articles in the daily Mlada fronta Dnes about the Czech Republic's integration into Europe. They may not differ from Klaus so much where the inner workings of the EU are concerned, but their attitude toward the process of integration is diametrically opposed to his. According to them, the Czechs will have to conform to EU standards, not question them as Klaus does.

The leader of the People's Party (KDU-CSL) Josef Lux, also has defied Klaus on several occasions. He can barely help it because, as minister of agriculture, Lux deals with one of the most sensitive areas within the EU. He rejects Klaus' opinion that agriculture is but another part of the free market, to be ruled by the "invisible hand." This view puts him more in line with the EU's approach to farm subsidies.

The government keeps claiming that Czech integration into international bodies should be subject to wide consensus across the political spectrum. Yet considering the way the opposition is being treated, one can be sure it is not included among Klaus' "we," and that he does

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

not care a bit about what type of integration they might support.

The legitimacy of a democratic government should stem from the people. That means that the ultimate "we" should be the general public. In developed democracies, the public is being re-asked its opinion continuously, whereas in the still-budding Czech democratic system, we are expected to shut up until the next elections. That doesn't make much difference, anyway, because where European integration is concerned, Czech voters have very little influence on their representatives. The quality of "European" education is poor here, and the politicians do not exactly fight for the chance to explain their views and attitudes to the public. EU integration should be thoroughly discussed, especially as the political landscape coming out of this summer's elections may cooperate actively in the integration process.

It may be partly the fault of the Czech media, which have underestimated the problem, but, above all, it is the politicians who should instigate such debate if they are really interested in obtaining a true "we" mandate. Instead of showing scorn and contempt for the "socialist" trends within EU, they (read Klaus) should strive to explain the federalist approach and what a unified Europe would stand for.

Instead of words about how great we are and how Europe longs to have us, there should be a full-fledged discussion about all European concepts. Only that can produce a "we" worth mentioning. Without such discussion, that "we" sounds too much like the maiestaticus, the royal "we" used by kings hundreds of years ago. Perhaps some of our politicians prefer absolute monarchy to democracy.

**Czech Republic: Poland Becomes Prague's Main Partner**

*96CH0093A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 3-9 Apr 96 p 1*

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "Czech-Polish Relations Becoming More Neighborly"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After years of Czech coolness toward its northern neighbor, a new harmony is developing between the Czech Republic and Poland.

This new intensity in neighborly relations was highlighted by a flurry of diplomatic activity between the two countries in the days preceding and following U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's March 19-21 visit to Prague.

On March 3, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus traveled to Poland to meet his counterpart, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. On March 19, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski met with Czech President Vaclav Havel in the north Bohemian town of Nachod. And during Christopher's Prague visit, which included consultations with the foreign ministers of 12 regional countries, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec held separate talks, and a news conference, with Dariusz Rosati, the Polish foreign minister.

All three meetings produced the same amicable, if not euphoric, declarations on the present state of Czech-Polish relations, and the assertion by both sides that the two nations were not in competition in their efforts to join NATO and the EU. This statement, together with the timing of the whirlwind of bilateral diplomatic activity—so close to the Christopher visit—suggest a turnaround in Czech attitudes.

"Good relations between prospective (EU) members are evidence of the ability to integrate," said Dusan Ondrejicka, information officer of the European Commission delegation in the Czech Republic.

But relations weren't always so neighborly. As recently as May 1995, Klaus rejected formal ties among the member countries of the so-called Visegrad Four: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

"If it is an instrumental adjective, we do not mind," Klaus told a Washington, D.C., audience. "If (Visegrad) is an attempt to artificially push the countries together again ... to form nongenuine integration then it is a mistake."

A few weeks after that, Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan told reporters at a Visegrad conference in Budapest, "Our country wants to communicate with these countries, but this doesn't mean we share the same beliefs."

According to Jiri Weigl, chief advisor to Prime Minister Klaus, the reason for the negative Czech attitude toward the Visegrad Four was "not a reluctance to cooperate with our neighbors, but the danger that Central Europe would be seen as a buffer zone between East and West. We did not want to be regarded as a homogeneous entity that could exist by itself somewhere between East and West."

But there were other reasons for the Czech coolness toward Warsaw. "It was not in our interest to pursue the policies of (former Polish president Lech) Walesa," Weigl said. "We did not want to try to break down the doors to the West. We were against the kind of verbal radicalism that could not resolve serious problems."

According to Bretislav Dancak, a specialist with the Philosophical Faculty of Masaryk University in Brno and a specialist in Polish affairs, another reason for the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech attitude was that after the demise of communism, the Czech Republic concentrated mainly on the EU and the West, while Poland chose "a shock therapy of economic transformation, which led to internal instability, including seven different governments between 1989 and 1993."

"But the more Poland began to stabilize and the Czech Republic realized it would not enter the EU as quickly as was hoped, relations began to change," Dancak said.

Additional incentives for the change in the Czech attitude were the developments in Slovakia, according to Milos Reznik, who works in the Czech Foreign Ministry's Central Europe section. "Since (Slovakia) has had internal problems, it is no longer a prime partner for the Czechs," Reznik said. "Now Poland is."

Zieleniec and Holan are to meet April 13 with their Polish counterparts to discuss European security and cooperation in armament.

As Weigl admitted, "Our economic and political cooperation now reflects reality and (more) realistic possibilities."

**Czech Republic: Daily on Meciar's Health, 'Disappearance'**

*AU0706190696 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 5 Jun 96 p 7*

[Commentary by Peter Schutz: "Vladimir Meciar Among Bears"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Meciar is not available. So far, he has missed two government sessions and cut almost all of the rest of his agenda. He vanished into thin air almost three weeks ago and has "surfaced" only three times since, which has, of course, started an avalanche of speculation. The opposition doctors diagnose a "political flu," and bashful contemplations have escaped from the lobbies about some general correction of the hitherto line. The prime minister's spokesman, Magda Pospisilova, indignantly denies all hypotheses with a standard reference to the "low professional standards of some journalists" and their "unethical practices." According to Pospisilova, the prime minister has been stricken by such a complicated case of influenza that he cannot even talk.

Unfortunately, Meciar himself has been undermining the credibility of the spokesman—namely, he has spoken on several occasions. And the results were lamentable. First, he took the side of SIS [Slovak Information Service] Director Ivan Lexa and Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek with a claim that he had obtained an expert report regarding the scandalous telephone call that "questions the authenticity of the recording." Next, he exercised the imagination of a prominent visitor to Bratislava, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] High Commissioner Max van der Stoel, with a picture of "purely Hungarian constituencies, which are in the interest of Slovakia." Subsequently, he belittled his "constitutional" adversary from the Castle [President Kovac] in an attack to which Kovac could not respond but by immediately filing charges: Namely, he said that, if Kovac were not president, he would be one of the accused in the Technopol case (the lawsuit in which Kovac Jr. is implicated). The fourth instance was allegedly the talks with another guest by the Danube River, Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksiy II, which were marked by indications of heavy indisposition on the part of Meciar—fortunately, no specific details were made public.

To score so many own goals in such a short time does not seem to have any other explanation but that Meciar is really sick. Nevertheless, it is rather symptomatic of a different malady than the flu, especially because we know that it is not the first time he has disappeared like this. His sudden disappearances are a special phenomenon that is now an inseparable part of the folklore of the Slovak scene. It is a well-known aberration—at least here in Slovakia. Another accompanying syndrome has been noticed much less: The prime minister sometimes combines the escape to solitude with radical steps of an extreme nature.

The first documented defection was connected with the "Andras case" of October 1990, when Meciar submitted his resignation to then Parliament Chairman Miklosko, to take effect if the coalition did not dismiss the aforementioned Andras (Christian Democratic Movement) from the post of interior minister. He successfully tested this maneuver twice within the framework of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], when his deputy chairmen attempted the removal of Lexa and personal secretary Nagyova from their posts in the party apparatus. Meciar's good-bye letter of April 1992 has been even preserved. In it, he "gives up his place on the election slate and resigns as HZDS chairman because of the continuing attacks against him." There are more examples—they could make up a special medical report. Meciar himself described his absences as escapes to bear country, for bears understand him better than people.

Psychiatric experts, if they do not establish a more precise diagnosis, are quite certain on one thing: Meciar is a mentally unstable person, who responds irrationally and unpredictably to resistance, who cannot cope mentally with crisis situations without an unequivocal, direct solution. A classical example of the "crisis syndrome" was his postelection depression, when, despite the impressive victory, he considered going into opposition

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

when it emerged that he could not put together a majority coalition with anyone but the extremists.

Meciar's present ailment, combined with the secrecy surrounding the place of medical treatment, cannot be taken out of this context. There are indications, however, that this time he is suffering really serious health problems of a physical nature. He even canceled the trilateral meeting with the prime ministers of Hungary and Austria planned for mid-June. It seems that the recent scandals have exhausted Meciar both mentally and physically. Ivan Lexa is unsustainable in the long run—that is, sustainable only at the cost of bleaching the remaining democratic hue of the regime that Meciar heads. Moreover, due to Lexa's "achievement" (the idea of wiretapping the conversation with the interior minister was apparently conceived and "delivered" within the secret service), he himself is also implicated and suspected of inadmissible interference in the investigation. With his public defense of Lexa's claim that the recording is not authentic, Meciar has reached the very brink of being convicted of serious deceit—the authenticity of the recording is being examined by the institute for criminology and expert analyses. Sooner or later, the policemen must give their biblical and unequivocal: Yes, yes or no, no. This time, any maneuvers are out of question—the owner of the private radio station that first broadcast the recording has copies of the recording and can submit them for expert analysis anywhere in the world. To add insult to injury, the prime minister is facing the most developed coalition skirmish in the 17 months of the government—war has broken out between the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia on one side and the HZDS on the other over the privatization of the Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Co.], which claimed its first victims: On Friday, the supervisory board, dominated by the HZDS, dismissed the management "close" to the SNS.

The opposition, whose "right" wing made the hunt for Lexa its priority, is, in this situation, forcing upon Meciar its intention to bring about early elections. It is of great interest how history repeats itself and thought patterns recur: When Meciar set off for bear country in May 1995 (he spent only four days with the bears then), early elections were the fantasy of the opposition and occupied the front pages of the press.

Just as then, it is all nonsense. Meciar will probably prepare some surprise upon his return from the bears, but no dramatic turnabout will take place. The move he made by defending Lexa and Co. is binding now, and there is no going back. It is too late. Vladimir Meciar has missed the last chance to shake off the responsibility for the havoc caused by the secret service. It is certainly good reason for heavy depression. It would be so even if the latesst disappearance of the prime minister were really caused by a "chronic infection of the respiratory passages of a viral origin, complicated by an inflammation of the inner ear," as the latest diagnosis reported by the prime minister's spokesman has it.

### Czech Republic: Hints of Postelection Instability Offend Havel

*LD0806154696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel talked about the postelection situation in our country at a news conference held at the conclusion of the two-day summit of Central European countries [at Lancut in Poland]. Czech Radio correspondent Miroslav Karas has sent us the following dispatch from Lancut:

[Karas] At the final news conference in the garden of Lancut Castle, a number of Polish and foreign correspondents were interested in the postelection situation in our country. Havel said that a process of long and complex negotiations had started. I believe that it will end well and that a stable government will be formed, the president said. Havel also said:

[Begin Havel recording] I do not understand why our situation in the future should be less stable than in any other Western democracy, where very often postelection coalition talks drag on for many months, coalition agreements are several hundred pages long, and no one seems to be bothered by that. Why should we be judged more harshly than any other democracy just because we do not have a new government two days after the elections? I am a bit offended by this—that we are being judged by a different yardstick from other democracies.

Why is it that some countries are allowed to have a new government every six months and early elections every two years? Why should we become a suspect country if something like that should happen to us? Nothing like that has happened to us yet. [end recording]

### Czech Republic: Havel Discusses Postelection Scene

*LD0906164696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[Regular Sunday interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by Robert Tamchyna; "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tamchyna] [Passage omitted] Mr. President, could you comment on the talks held at Prague Castle this week?

[Havel] [Passage omitted] I made a political decision to ask Vaclav Klaus to hold talks on a future coalition only

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

after I became certain, after many complicated talks, that the two parties currently in coalition with his Civic Democratic Party [ODS]—that is, both of the ODS's coalition partners—had agreed to his leading these talks, and once I had been assured by the Social Democrats that, under certain conditions, they would be prepared to give parliamentary support to a government formed by the above coalition, to a government that should emerge from the talks held by Vaclav Klaus.

I needed these assurances of support to avoid making an empty gesture, to have a legitimate reason to call on him to take this step. [passage omitted]

[Tamchyna] At present you frequently hear views pointing out negative aspects of the current political situation in the Czech Republic. I would like to approach this differently and ask you what, in your view, are the positive aspects of this situation?

[Havel] The principal positive aspect is that we are facing a real test of democracy. We might be, once again, the first country among those that have got rid of communism to face a normal test, a test of what some people call standard democracy.

The situation when one party wins but together with its coalition partners fails by two seats to gain a parliamentary majority can arise in any democratic system. [passage omitted]

We are now facing such a situation. It is a challenge to show our political maturity, to embark on talks. It is testing our politicians' maturity, and I do believe they will pass this test. [passage omitted]

I am an optimist, but I have to admit that I am rather irritated and even offended at coming across commentaries from abroad that, three days after our elections, are saying that this might be the beginning of an era of instability, that doubts are being cast on existing trends, and that there is no government in the Czech Republic, and so forth. This is nonsense. Why should different criteria be applied to us than are being applied to any standard democracy?

It seems quite acceptable for some states to have several votes of no confidence in a government, to have many early elections and coalition talks dragging on for months—but as far as we are concerned, they would like to see a new government three days after the elections. This is really absurd. It is illogical and unjust.

The talks that culminated on Thursday [6 June] in our joint meeting at the castle were not easy at all. In fact, I spent three entire days attending ongoing separate talks, both public and private. The coming talks will not be easy, either. They will be even more complicated than those held so far.

However, this does not mean that they will not result in a stable government and that they will not bring a good result—as is the case in democracies when elections end in such an equilibrium, simply leading to talks lasting weeks and months and finally reaching a result. I hope that in our country we will also reach a result.

[Tamchyna] [Passage omitted] Are you well prepared for your current role?

[Havel] [Passage omitted] It is, of course, my presidential duty to be here, to be available and to mediate consensus whenever the partners in question are unable to reach it themselves. [passage omitted]

**Czech Republic: Talks Between Klaus Coalition, Zeman Said Tense**

*AU0706150796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Jun 96 p 2*

[Article by Sabina Slonkova: "Behind the Door, the Parties Fought Over Tiny Details"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The key talks between eight representatives of the government coalition and the Social Democrats and President Havel, which lasted almost two hours, ended in a merciless battle over tiny details. The participants agree that the air at the Castle was thick with nervousness, and for a long time it was not clear whether the meeting would not end in total collapse.

"The representatives of the parties actually got up to leave several times because they refused to accept the demands of their partners. There were sharp disagreements not only between the coalition parties and the Social Democratic Party but also directly within the coalition," one of the participants in yesterday's meeting said.

His words were gradually confirmed by all representatives of the coalition, although they had originally agreed at the Castle that no one would publish anything about the meeting. Only the Social Democrats, who for the first time were officially negotiating at Havel's office with the representatives of the strongest party, maintained their silence and did not say a word.

The departure from the Castle was threatened by the representatives of the coalition and the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] at the time when they began to discuss with the president the statement that Vaclav Havel would read to reporters after the meeting.

"The first dispute arose over whether the word 'negotiate' or 'form' would be in the document, as Klaus

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

wanted, despite strong objections from the People's Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and was eventually unsuccessful. It was a sentence in which the president asks whether the present coalition is prepared also to negotiate the future coalition. Zeman and Gross, in turn, threatened to leave because of a passage about the conditions under which the Social Democrats are prepared to support the minority government. The Social Democrats wanted this sentence watered down but did not succeed in getting their way," one of the politicians present at the Castle said, and added that the meeting occasionally reminded one of an argument by 10-year-olds over marbles.

CSSD Chairman Milos Zeman did not succeed with his next demand, either. He wanted the coming talks between the coalition and his party also to be chaired by the president. "ODA and the People's Party were upset in turn by Klaus's apparent attempts to limit the talks with the Social Democrats to the ODS rather than including the entire coalition. The ODS believes that they will form the government through consultations with Zeman," another member of the Cabinet said.

This point eventually remained unclear because the ODS vehemently opposes a joint written document between the coalition and the Social Democrats that would define the conditions under which the Social Democrats would support the new government. The discussion about the new Cabinet's government policy also divides the coalition. "We do not want it to be a paper rag as the ODS would have it. We want clear rules so that things are not what they were during the past four years, when nothing was agreed upon and nothing observed," one of the participants said, speaking for ODA and the People's Party. y

**Czech Republic: Coalition Divided Over Agreement With CSSD**

*AU0706135996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Jun 96 pp 1-2*

[Report by "(rep)": "Klaus Will Form an Old-New Governing Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—President Havel has asked Prime Minister Klaus to begin talks on forming a minority coalition government. Five days after the elections, in which the right-wing coalition lost its parliamentary majority, the president has made it clear that he continues to consider Klaus the leader of the cabinet.

At the same time, the current governing coalition has promised the Social Democrats the post of parliament chairman as long as they agree to support its government.

Vaclav Klaus, Milos Zeman, Jan Kalvoda, and Josef Lux agreed on this with the president yesterday afternoon during their two-hour meeting at Prague Castle. Havel has thus accommodated the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], which had wanted its chairman to be asked as quickly as possible to conduct the talks on a governing coalition.

Indeed, the talks at the Castle were preceded by a morning quarrel within the coalition so that, even at noon, it was not certain if all of the parties invited would come to see the president.

The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and the People's Party accept the Castle settlement but are insisting all the more that the coalition agreement be in a written and specific form. The ODS, on the other hand, would like the coalition agreement and the government statement to be much more general. "We think the policy statement really should be a general one. This means continuing mainly in the reforms, in our foreign policy orientation," said ODS Deputy Chairman Ivan Pilip.

"The meeting was the result of what was possible at the given moment," said Klaus as he left the Castle. Klaus and Zeman, who did not comment on the meeting at all, met here at the negotiating table for the first time since the elections.

"I do not anticipate talks with the Social Democrats now. The coalition parties will now talk among themselves about the government—about its composition and program," said ODS Deputy Chairman Libor Novak. "This is a logical step that could have been taken earlier," he said apropos the outcome of the talks.

"I consider the president's statement to be important, but it is merely the starting point for constituting a new stable government. I consider the conditions under which the Social Democrats will be willing to support the minority government to be one of the key issues. We did not talk about them matter-of-factly at the Castle," said Kalvoda.

"It is important that all of the parties were able to come together. The real talks on the written coalition agreement and policy statement can begin now," said Josef Lux. [passage omitted]

The morning talks involving Klaus, Kalvoda, and Lux, which preceded the meeting at the Castle, ended in a bitter dispute over whether written agreements between the coalition and the Social Democrats and among the coalition parties will be concluded at all and what they will contain.

The ODS was opposed to these agreements being in a written form; its coalition partners, on the other hand,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

rigorously insisted on it. Klaus announced to Kalvoda and Lux that, because of this disagreement, he would not go to the Castle at all, and the three of them parted ways. "If there is to be a minority government without clear and written agreements, a grand coalition would be better," said Josef Lux.

Three-quarters of an hour later, all three attempted to reach a settlement in Valdstejn Palace, where parliament had adjourned. Even then it was not certain if the afternoon meeting with Havel would take place. "ODA and the People's Party made it clear to Klaus that they would go to the Castle without him. They did not take seriously his claim that the ODS would not go," said a senior politician from the governing coalition.

According to reliable sources, the president then acceded to the scenario for the meeting proposed by the ODS and agreed with Kalvoda and Lux on the conditions for their participation.

The ODS had previously, after the meeting in Valdstejn Palace, agreed to conclude a written coalition agreement. So there was still disagreement over the agreement between the coalition and the Social Democrats and the wording of the coalition document and the government's policy statement.

"I do not think it makes sense to put too many of these things on paper," said ODS Deputy Chairman Jiri Vlach yesterday. But the two smaller coalition parties want the agreement on Zeman's support to be in a written and specific form because they are afraid that the ODS would otherwise negotiate with the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] behind their backs. "This would, in fact, be a kind of grand coalition," said a politician from the People's Party.

"It cannot be said that we parted on bad terms in the morning. It is true that we had some arguments, but we prevented the situation from coming to a complete head," said the same source.

**Czech Republic: CSSD Proposes Chairman for Parliament Speaker**

*LD0706123096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Presidium of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] has approved the candidature of Chairman Milos Zeman to the post of next parliament speaker. Vladimir Hruby reports:

[Hruby] Milos Zeman said today that he accepts his candidature for the post of parliament speaker. He also specified the demands of the CSSD, which include, for example, disagreement with the introduction of school fees, individual accounts in health care, and privatization of power and transport industries.

In connection with the parliamentary posts, Zeman is not against their democratic distribution between all parties, including the Communists and the Republicans, if sufficiently strong personalities are found in their clubs. [passage omitted]

**Czech Republic: Daily: ODS May Offer KSCM 'Important Post'**

*AU0706140396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Jun 96 p 2*

[Report by "(rep)" and CTK: "The ODS Is Allegedly Thinking About Making an Offer to the Communists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—According to a senior coalition representative, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] is considering offering the Communists an important post in parliament in return for their tacit support.

Officially, of course, the ODS rigorously rejects such an option. "I have not heard anything of the kind," declared ODS Deputy Chairman Jiri Vlach.

Nevertheless, one coalition member has refuted his statement. "This idea came up yesterday morning, when the ODS made it clear that the Communists could get a parliament deputy chairman post," he said. He added that this is quite unacceptable to the People's Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance.

The option whereby the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] could fill one of the senior posts in the Chamber was not explicitly denied even by KSCM Deputy Chairman Zdenek Klanica. He said that he cannot confirm or deny that the KSCM is negotiating with another parliamentary political party on posts in the Chamber's leadership. "I cannot say," is all he said.

**Czech Republic: Deputy: SPR-RSC May Support Minority Cabinet**

*AU1006094696 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 6 Jun 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Ferdinand Peroutka: "The Republicans Would Support the Government..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The deputy chairman of the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC] Deputies' Club, Jaroslav Novak, yesterday allowed for the possibility of support for the probable minority government from the Republicans. By taking this step, the Republicans would, according to him, like to forestall early elections and contribute

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to stabilizing the political situation. "We would rather reach an agreement with the coalition than with Zeman," said Novak.

According to him, the Republicans would thus "in fact save the governing coalition so that it remains in power," but they would definitely want to replace certain ministers. Vaclav Klaus could be the prime minister of a minority government, but Ministers Jan Ruml, Karel Dyba, and, conceivably, some others from the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] should leave the Cabinet. Of the parliamentary posts, the Republicans would be interested "if not in the chairman, then at least in the deputy chairman of the Chamber plus the heads of certain committees." Apart from this, they would require a change in the government's policy in the social and security spheres.

Although accepting the possible offer from the SPR-RSC, which declares itself to be right-wing, would enable the coalition to get by without the support of the left-wing Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], some coalition deputies are adopting a very guarded attitude toward this option. As Agriculture Committee Chairman Jan Cerny [ODS] told us, he sees a problem in the fact that the SPR-RSC is relatively unknown and that it behaves inscrutably. According to him, it is impossible to base a minority government on an inscrutable factor of support, and, therefore, it is necessary to seek broader support rather than relying only on the Republicans. "Of course, if it were to have support from the Republicans and from some of the Social Democrats, the government would be considerably more stable than if it had the support of only the Republicans or only the Social Democrats," said Cerny. According to his colleague Vaclav Krasa, the deputies have no idea at all how the new Republicans' club will behave in parliament and whether a genuinely right-wing orientation will be manifested in it. Therefore, it is impossible to reject the offer from the SPR-RSC in advance.

Other coalition deputies do not trust the Republicans because, during the past four years, they have behaved only destructively and have virtually not participated in the work of parliament. According to Ivan Masek [Civic Democratic Alliance], the offer from the Republicans suggests that the model of a minority government is very unstable. "Participating in a government that would be dependent on the support of Mr. Sladek and his boys would be a risk," thinks Masek. Therefore, he would give priority to a "standard solution," which is a majority government of the two victorious parties "conceivably with someone else." Such a government would, according to him, be stable if for no other reason than that it would have more than a so-called constitutional majority. A "broad" coalition of the ODS and the CSSD would have 129 votes at its disposal in parliament (121 votes are enough to approve a constitutional law), while a coalition with the Republicans would have only 117 members.

**Czech Republic: Business Leader Baranek Resigns**

*AU1006122996 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 7 Jun 96 p 1*

[Report by "(pas)": "Baranek Resigned Yesterday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Rudolf Baranek submitted his resignation yesterday as chairman of the Association of Entrepreneurs of the Czech Republic. He described as the main reason for this the electoral failure of the Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers, which campaigned under his leadership for the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] and decided to pay this party roughly 8 million korunas for its placement in electable places on the SD-LSNS's list of candidates.

Bedrich Danda, previously deputy chairman, has become the Association's new chairman. Baranek, who will remain a member of the Association's Presidium, thinks that the businessmen were not paid as much attention by the government as they deserved. For this reason, Baranek would like to appeal to the future prime minister to facilitate the restoration of the Tripartite group, which apparently contributed to social conciliation. At the same time, he is convinced that the Association can continue its work under the new leadership of B. Danda and will be successful in promoting the future demands of the businessmen. New Chairman Danda would be happy if new companies were established and if the conditions for their activity were to improve.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Slovakia: Luptak: ZRS Cannot Influence Privatization Decisions**

*AU0706205596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Jun 96 p 2*

[Article by "r": "No One Told Luptak About Coalition Talks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"No one told me that there would be coalition talks," Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of the Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], said in reaction to a question from Slovak Radio's Radiozurnal program yesterday. As he stressed, the ZRS wants coalition talks to be conducted among three or four parties and not separately. "As for the Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company; SP] issue, I think the Executive Committee (of the National Property Fund [FNM]—editor's note) proceeded incorrectly because it does not have the right to decide on management changes. I think that also Mr. Rehak, as vice president, does not play a clean political role in this case; therein lies his unreliability. I went to talk with him, but he says one thing and does something else—probably under someone else's pressure," said Jan Luptak about the changes in the SP management, but refused to elaborate. According to the ZRS chairman, the government coalition "is not shaking even when some things tremble." He said that it was out of the question that the ZRS could influence in any way the selection of privatization candidates and the like. That is in the jurisdiction of the FNM Executive Committee, nine out of 11 members of which represent the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and two the SNS [Slovak National Party]. The FNM Presidium, which decides on the Executive Committee's proposals, has nine members, six of whom represent the HZDS, two the ZRS, and one the SNS. This is why, according to Jan Luptak, the ZRS demanded also in the past that each session of the FNM Presidium be preceded by a meeting of the Coalition Council. "These consultations have not been held for five weeks now, and we have therefore instructed the FNM president not to convene the FNM Presidium, which was supposed to meet tomorrow (today—editor's note), because there have been no political talks," Jan Luptak said.

**Slovakia: Daily Views Luptak Revelations on Privatization**

*AU0806142496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 7 Jun 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Vladimir Jancura: "What If Luptak Digs In His Heels?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium was to take place yesterday to approve another list of privatization sales. The meeting did not take place. FNM President Stefan Gavornik was instructed by his party's leadership (Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]) not to convene it. According to comments by Jan Luptak [ZRS Chairman] in Radiozurnal [Slovak Radio's main newscast], there were ample reasons for this, more than enough, at any rate, for a government crisis to break out in any other state. The ZRS leader revealed how the privatization machinery operates in our country. We had a faint inkling of much of what he said, but some of these things have until now been among the most strictly guarded secrets, so to speak. Luptak's revelations about the behind-the-scenes activities of the FNM Executive Committee, for example. It is supposedly submitting to the FNM Presidium completely different privatizers than originally agreed upon. Even the General Prosecutor's Office might take an interest in Luptak's words about two or three men with a mysterious suitcase who manage to change the conclusions of coalition consultations and about factories that had originally been earmarked for employees being sold, all of a sudden, to unknown, dubious buyers. According to Luptak, no consultations have been held with coalition politicians for five weeks. Consequently, all of the decisions are being made by Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] representatives on the Executive Committee and in the FNM Presidium. The Meciarites have a comfortable majority in these bodies. Thanks to this majority, they were able to decide even on the privatization of the Piestany spa, despite suspected crime—according to Luptak—of 150 million korunas!

The ZRS chairman bears a grudge, in particular, against Milan Rehak (HZDS), FNM Executive Committee chairman and FNM Presidium vice president in one person, who, also in the case of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], "says one thing and does something else—probably under someone else's influence" and, in general, "does not play a clean political role." Faithful to the spirit of its election manifesto, the ZRS is opposed to the privatization of the largest financial institutions. But that is not everything. It is also opposed to the increase in electricity prices if wages are not increased simultaneously. This is why ZRS ministers were instructed to vote against the proposal [to increase electricity prices], which was to be discussed in the government on 4 June. In the end, the item was withdrawn from the agenda, but, had it been approved, the ZRS would have had to publicly dissociate itself from it....

It seems that this time Jan Luptak dug in his heels. And convincing him "not to be silly" will probably be more difficult than becoming reconciled with Jan Slota

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Slovak National Party chairman]. This is perhaps also why the sick Vladimir Meciar is trying to negotiate with each of them separately, which Luptak, who is also ill, does not like in the least. He wants the coalition partners to meet as a threesome or foursome. For the time being, he is at least sending from Bystrica [Luptak's home town] to Bratislava the message that he is not going to "sell" his character and honor for any millions....

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Hungary: Slovenia Wants Hungary's Help in NATO Bid**

*LD1006120096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 10 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovenia would like Hungary's help in order to obtain NATO membership. Attila Peter Nagy reports on the talks of the Slovene defense minister's delegation in Budapest:

[Nagy] The Slovene military attache has highly praised the fact that Hungary was the first from the region to form close military relations with Slovenia. Bogdan Koprivnikar said that help is still needed because Slovenia formed its army from scratch a few years ago. Thus, they count on the participation of Hungarian instructors in training Slovene officers and hope their army will get the Hungarian parliament's permission to use Hungarian exercise grounds.

The head of department of the Slovene Defense Ministry said that Hungary's participation in the Yugoslav peacekeeping efforts is a great help. Maya Stolic said that lasting peace in the region can be established only if the peacekeeping forces stay longer than the planned one year. In her view, they should stay at least until the end of next year.

**Hungary: Defense Official Says Army's Planned Size Unrealistic**

*LD0806202896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Attila Peter Nagy reports on the security policy conference in Budapest:

[Nagy] [Passage omitted] Istvan Gyarmati, deputy state secretary at the Defense Ministry, has said that Hungary still has a lot to do to fulfill the minimum admission requirements set by NATO. He also considered it important that Hungarian soldiers should be able to interpret properly all parliamentary and government decisions.

Gyarmati also said that ideas of an army of 60,000-70,000 soldiers could no longer be maintained.

[Begin Gyarmati recording] Maintaining an army of 60,000-70,000 will require about twice as much money as the current budget. For this reason it does not appear realistic. Therefore, I think that certain steps that are unavoidable must be taken; first, we must work out our long-term ideas to ensure that we cut only those things that we will not need in the future either. [end recording]

**Hungary: Army Union Supports New Chief of Staff**

*LD0706134696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The army trade union expressed its support for Ferenc Vegh, the new chief of staff who was appointed yesterday. The first statements made by Lieutenant-General Vegh seem to have pleased the soldiers. [passage omitted] Agi Pap reports on the trade union meeting:

[Pap] The army trade union launched legal proceedings against the commander of the air force and the air defense corps because, in its view, he unlawfully banned the collection of signatures organized by the trade union in army units. This was said by trade union executive Peter Konya when he informed Hungarian radio about the executive body's decision. The trade union leader said that despite the ban, their initiative has succeeded: a law on the legal status of soldiers has been passed, the National Assembly seemed to support the introduction of the new pay system for professional soldiers as early as possible, and the army's new chief of staff has also asked the soldiers about the army reform.

Peter Konya said that the new chief of staff enjoys their full support. It transpires from his first pronouncements that he is a good expert who takes not only his job but also the principle of partnership seriously, the trade union's executive body reckons.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**B-H: Frowick Views Conditions for Sep Elections**

*AU0706154196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[Report on interview with Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Samir Huseinovic; place and date not given—Frowick speaks in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Huseinovic] Mr. Frowick, do you think the conditions for holding elections have been met? The freedom of movement has still not be established, the war criminals have not be arrested, there is no freedom for the work of the political parties in the Serb entity, and the media in that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina are under the full control of the criminal Karadzic. Do you think that elections held under such conditions will really be fair and democratic?

[Frowick] Two days ago, at the summit meeting in Geneva, everyone agreed that the elections should be held in the period set for the elections, which is mid-September. Regarding the conditions for holding elections, I would like to stress that it is the parties that should secure these conditions. These parties are Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation, and the Serb entity. They should create these conditions.

I am sure that the conditions for holding elections will be lacking. Radovan Karadzic, who has been accused of war crimes, must be taken to The Hague. This is a very serious matter. However, this is not one of the specific conditions for holding the election, unlike the freedom of movement, the freedom of media, and the freedom of work of political parties.

The way in which we want these conditions to be achieved is the democratization strategy that OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] has been pursuing since the beginning of this year.

[Huseinovic] How will the voting and all preelection activities in general be checked?

[Frowick] What we are trying to do is offer the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina a chance to vote and decide on the future of their country. I would also like to add that 1,200 OSCE monitors will be there. The representatives of the international police and IFOR [Implementation Force] will help with the implementation of elections and enable the people to decide on the future of their country.

[Huseinovic] Ambassador Frowick also said that there have been some changes in the electoral rolls. In order to carry out registration as efficiently as possible, the OSCE has decided to enter the identification numbers [maticni broj] on the electoral rolls. Ambassador Frowick said that there are some other changes, but that, at that moment, he was not acquainted with all the details.

**B-H: Srebrenica Men Reportedly Used as 'Slave Labor'**

*AU1006132996 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 96 p 4*

[Article by S.A.: "Slave Labor in Serb Mines"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Information leaking out through certain channels says that some of the Srebrenica natives kept on file as missing are still in that town, where the Serb authorities are using them as the labor force in the Sase and Aleksinac mines.

Little information from Srebrenica reaches the public eye and ear, but no blockade or ban can block all channels, so one can speak in very reliable terms about several hundred Srebrenica citizens still being held in this town, where the Serb authorities are using them as slave labor in the Sase mine. This is claimed by people who, through certain channels, visited Podrinje [the Drina River basin] and Srebrenica. The same sources claim that the detained Srebrenica citizens, men who are fit for work, are accommodated in stables outside the town proper and are transported to work each day in trucks, closely watched by prison guards.

A large group of Podrinje natives is being kept in Aleksinac, which means in Serbia, where the local authorities are using them as slave labor in the coal mine there. The authorities are carefully hiding them from the international organizations, which are not able to identify the prisoners, especially as their registration is made difficult due to name changes on internal lists [interni spiskovi]. They cannot be kept secret for long, however. The truth about them must come to light.

**B-H: Izetbegovic on Past Sacrifices, Future of Bosnia**

*LD0806191796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1650 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Izetbegovic's address at a rally to mark the anniversary of the battle of Zuc hill on 8 June 1992.

Dear soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, dear Sarajevo citizens, dear citizens of Bosnia, wherever you are from, I greet you and thank you for leaving your work for a while and coming here so that we might together recall the difficult and glorious days of the struggle to save Sarajevo and Bosnia. The soldiers who survived the crucial battle on Zuc have gathered today, and we have come to pay tribute to them. I have

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

asked the organizers not to forget any of the surviving participants of the battle for Sarajevo, and I believe that they have tried to ensure this.

You have come here in large numbers on this very hot day, which means you have not forgotten and that you will not forget.

You see, today's program began as it should, with our anthem and the paying of our respects to those who died defending Sarajevo. Though most of the fallen soldiers, even the vast majority of them, were Bosniaks, other religions were also respected. We stood to attention and paid our tributes in a minute's silence to the fallen Croats, Serbs, and others. But even if only one Croat or Serb had died defending Sarajevo—and this was not the case, there were many of them—we should stand to attention and pay our respects in an appropriate way. We should do this because this is Bosnia. I would like to say a few words today about this Bosnia, this Bosnian dream.

We have always thought of it as a country of good, upright, and honest people and believed that herein lay the power of Bosnia and the weakness of the assailants who always repeated their attacks in an effort to subjugate it. One day when analyses are made, and when from a certain historical distance the miracle of Bosnian resistance is deciphered, it will be discovered, I am certain, that this secret lay somewhere in the souls or character of the people.

Remember the spring and summer of 1992. We were almost bare-handed, they were armed to the teeth. Then, gradually, we started to push them and their steel monsters out of the cities, into the hills and mountains, where they belong. It was a real conflict between good and evil, between humans and nonhumans, literally between spirit and steel; spirit won. According to all military logic and calculations, they should not have abandoned Sarajevo. All military cards were on their side, not a single one on ours. Still, they packed up and left even then, in 1992. And [words indistinct].

We should think about this because of our present dilemmas, doubts, and possible mistakes. Even today many are rightly asking themselves how we will deal with all the legal and political traps that are being set against the unity of Bosnia. The answer is the same as it was four years ago: We will be stronger and we will win if we are better than our opponents, if along with the military strength that we must have, we at the same time, possess the proven human values, if we oppose blind ideology, barbarism, dogmatism, and all types of violence. The opposite also applies: We will lose this battle if we follow the logic: All they are doing to us we will do to them. In that case we will lose our moral and political advantage, and their advantage in men and material remains.

One of the strange battles of this kind, whose external history is known in parts—some of it you have just heard in General Delic's speech—and whose internal history will be written later, took place four years ago exactly on the spot where we are standing today. This battle did not last a few days; I would rather say that it continued for the next two years, maybe went on until the end of the war itself. Because almost a year later, in June and July 1993, not far from here two famous commanders, Seha and Safet, were killed one after the other, within a short time. I had the honor of knowing personally these modest men, great fighters and men.

In those difficult days—it was at the time of the Mt. Igman crisis—the chetniks literally ploughed with shells this relatively small piece of land whose peace today seems unreal. Then they continued from time to time to attempt to conquer Zuc and that is how it lasted almost until the end of the war. The fighters who have survived, the ones I see here today in great numbers, remember that hell and they could tell you more about those days than I could.

Ibro [not further identified] has just told us something about this, but it is only a small part of the exciting story of unparalleled courage of a generation that lived and died for Bosnia.

We have an opportunity now to ask ourselves—or to recall—for what kind of Bosnia this generation lived and died.

We have often said that Bosnia is not only a plot of land in the mountainous Balkans. For many of us Bosnia is an idea, a dream of a country at the intersection of worlds, on the frontier between the East and the West. It is a multireligious and multinational country and therefore, a country of tolerance, where everyone can think and believe as he wishes, where there must be no violence against man, and where there will be no injustice.

This has been our dream of Bosnia, and only such a Bosnia can exist and survive.

This Bosnia was brutally attacked. They did not succeed in killing it, but they did wound it gravely. They destroyed villages and towns, they killed and expelled people. Nowadays there is no freedom or human rights in a considerable part of the country. That is why I said in Bihac and Gorazde that the struggle for Bosnia was not finished and that it was continuing—and I was accused of announcing a new war. I am not announcing a new war, neither do we need it, but we do need the struggle—and there are many struggles without war—to remove the proven butchers from power and to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

establish human rights where they are currently being violently and arrogantly violated. We need this so that the expelled can return to their homes and so that Bosnia becomes Bosnia again.

Speaking about the return of refugees, I have to say the following clearly: In order for the Bosniaks to return to Podrinje the Serbs have to be able to return to Sarajevo; not chetniks, but Serbs. I can say this the other way round: In order for the Serbs to return to Sarajevo the Bosniaks have to return to Foca, Visegrad, Rogatica, Prijedor, and so on. This is law, simple and inexorable. Any other logic leads to the definite division of Bosnia and accomplishes Karadzic's genocidal concept. He is the one who expelled both the Bosniaks from Podrinje and the Serbs from Sarajevo. Let us think about why and how he did this and let us draw conclusions about what we are to do.

I have again spoken about reconciliation, too, because of Bosnia and its future, but I said then and I repeat now: The irrevocable condition is that war criminals be prosecuted and punished. Without this there is not, and there cannot be, peace or reconciliation.

So much for this time. I did not mention our internal political disputes intentionally today so as not to spoil this beautiful day and this celebratory mood.

I would like to greet you all once more and wish you well in peace. I would like to reiterate that together we will continue our struggle for an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina, free Bosnia without butchers and tyrants.

Thank you and may God protect you.

**B-H: Izetbegovic Wants 'Normal Conditions' for Election**

*LD0806225896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The president of the Presidency [of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] Alija Izetbegovic received Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio in Sarajevo this morning. [passage omitted]

President Izetbegovic noted that real conditions for the elections still did not exist.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] That is why we demand normal conditions for the elections and why we are against elections under abnormal conditions. It is certain that these elections are not only about who will be in power as in other countries, but in this case it is also about the survival of the state and its integrity. [end recording]

During his visit to our country, President Sampaio is also expected to visit the Portuguese soldiers serving with IFOR [UN Implementation Force] in Gorazde.

**B-H: More on Izetbegovic's Objection to Elections**

*AU0806155696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1421 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 June (BETA)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic stated today that he did not believe in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina but in "its integration."

"I believe in Bosnia's integration and that is why we insist that normal conditions for the elections be secured," Izetbegovic told reporters, commenting on the statement by IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Admiral Leighton Smith that Bosnia was threatened by division.

Izetbegovic said that the belief in a unified Bosnia "is the reason why the Bosnian side is opposed to holding elections under abnormal circumstances."

The Bosnia-Herzegovina elections are not merely about winning power, but represent "an issue of the state's survival," the Bosnian president said.

Smith, who is leaving the post of IFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated yesterday that the politicians in Bosnia did not wish to prevent its division and that "unless something is changed, Bosnia will mostly probably be an ethnically divided country again."

**B-H: Silajdzic Discusses Elections, Party Policy**

*AU0806180696 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 96 pp 14-15*

[Interview with Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "I Am Not Cristopher's Man, but the Americans Appreciate My Defending Bosnian Interests!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The media have been very interested in Haris Silajdzic, the former Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ever since he left the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and founded his own party, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu]. The media interest has been fueled by the opposition parties' speculations on whether the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina is a mere left-wing faction of the SDA or the leading party of the Bosnian opposition block. We spoke to Silajdzic about his political opponents who are daily hanging various names on him, about the political platform of his party, and about the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Soldic] Mr. Silajdzic, the decision on the timing of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be made in several days by Flavio Cotti, chairman of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Are there any conditions for the elections, and what is your opinion about the election rules and regulations that have been severely criticized in political circles here?

[Silajdzic] I think that elections will be held as scheduled in Dayton. As to the conditions for democratic elections, those are nonexistent, but that would not be a precedent for the international community to apply the policy of turning impossible into possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those election rules have a deep latent trap with possible disastrous long-term consequences for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those elections enable people to vote in places where they intend to live in the future; for instance, a Serb from Drvar who went to live in Zvornik has a right to vote in Zvornik. Such election rules might legalize the consequences of ethnic cleansing. The election rules have left many questions open, and the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina asked for an explanation from the OSCE—however, we have not received any.

**The Oldest State**

[Soldic] According to certain predictions, it might happen that the Bosnian "national rug" be divided into three patches of three separate colors after the elections. Do you hold such an opinion realistic?

[Silajdzic] The only possible consequence of national homogenization leads toward the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This generation of Bosnians must not allow that to happen. Our state was not made yesterday, it is one of the oldest European states with stable borders, and its attributes of a state entity date as far as the Middle Ages. As we can see, Bosnia-Herzegovina has as much right to exist as any European state. In the Zagreb VJESNIK of 24 May, I saw a weather forecast map that illustrated, or rather reflected the political forecast of the Croatian authorities. The state newspaper VJESNIK used the same color to shade the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and it is a wrong political prognosis, as Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be divided. If you want to pretend you are a CNN of some kind, why don't you include Italy or the German mark area in your weather forecast, and wait for the reaction. Zagreb has also turned HVO [Croatian Defense Council] officers into HV [Croatian Army] officers as if they were from the same state. All those things will result in consequences for Croatia, too, not only for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia might pay the price. I cannot understand why there is so much persistence to apply a policy that obviously has no future. It must be clear to everyone that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be divided.

[Soldic] The head of the Bosnian HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], Bozo Raic, recently said that you were a "deceit for the Croatian people" and that you have been "programmed to destroy the HDZ?"

[Silajdzic] It is extremely difficult to deceive the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as they have already been deceived. How and about what can they be deceived after two-thirds of them have left Bosnia-Herzegovina? Just look at the statements of high dignitaries of the Catholic Church about who drove most Croats out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That deceit has cost them lives and territories, from the Sava valley to other places. I confront the retrograde forces in the political leadership of the HDZ, those who favor division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As to my being programmed to destroy the HDZ, I can tell you that I am a man who wants to create, not to destroy. The policy of the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina is aimed against the natural, historical situation and against the very nation that they represent.

**I Am Not a Fundamentalist**

[Soldic] In certain opinions, you are "the greatest fundamentalist in Bosnia-Herzegovina," who nevertheless "dances to the American tune" to please the United States?

[Silajdzic] Well, I cannot be the fundamentalist and the American man at the same time—they should make up their mind. I was proclaimed the American man by the Yugoslav embassies even before the war, when I was living abroad.

[Soldic] You cannot deny that Warren Cristopher has openly shown his sympathy for you. In any case, he spent more time talking to you than to all representatives of authorities together during his last visit to Sarajevo?

[Silajdzic] I also have sympathies for Cristopher, simply because the man has tried to tell the truth and support moral principles. It is difficult for a person in a political job to remain integral. I will tell you one thing: If you want to gain the respect of a great force like the United States, you must defend your attitudes very firmly and continually. If they have any respect for me, it is not because I have danced to their tune, but because I have defended the interests and attitudes of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Soldic] So, your party has not been financed by the Americans?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Silajdzic] We only accept donations from our people. I do not think an election campaign must be expensive. We cannot waste millions that we do not have. We spent 8,000 German marks for the party convention, and I think even that was too much.

[Soldic] Your vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not clear to many people. There are theories that you are trying to annul the constitutiveness of the three nations through a civic Bosnia-Herzegovina. What does Bosnia-Herzegovina look like in your projects?

[Silajdzic] Every person in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be sovereign. My concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a civic, not a national state. Bosnia-Herzegovina, being inhabited by three equal nations, cannot be a national state. The nationhood is not questioned—we are not going back to communism, are we? However, none of the three nations has the right to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Bosnia-Herzegovina is older than the nations. There cannot be my part and your part, that is, the Croatian, the Muslim, and the Serbian part—Bosnia-Herzegovina is Bosnian.

[Soldic] What does your neologism, "Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina", mean?

[Silajdzic] Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina primarily means the healing of the open wound inflicted in the war. It means rebuilding the bridge of all functions that belong to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to every Bosnian and Herzegovinian, man and woman. Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina means an open society with its history, its historical direction, its state of mind.

[Soldic] What is the political platform of your party in the upcoming elections?

[Silajdzic] Our primary goals are to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina in its borders and to develop democracy in the real sense of the word. These people deserve freedom after all the sufferings they have been through in the war and in the previous system. We must leave behind the time when opinions were dictated. So, it is freedom, but the Hegelian kind of freedom—freedom within borders.

[Soldic] According to the statute of your party, members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the security services cannot be members of your party?

[Silajdzic] That is correct. There are a number of demobilized officers in our party, but persons presently in the army cannot be our members for a simple reason: The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina favors depoliticization of the army. Armed forces are an honorable service to the society, a pillar of the social stability, but they do not participate in politics in modern democracies. Politics changes, parties come and go, and all generals would have to change in a party-dominated army. That is one of the prerequisite conditions for us to be taken seriously and for our law state to be understood. If we want to be a part of Europe, we must have European standards, whether we like them or not.

**Izetbegovic and Durakovic**

[Soldic] Will you be a candidate to be a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency?

[Silajdzic] I do not know. It is too early to talk about that.

[Soldic] You have lately been a favorite target both of the SDA and the opposition.

[Silajdzic] Of course they are attacking me, they are fighting for votes. Everybody is talking about a coalition of some kind, but there are no coalitions for the time being. That does not mean there will not be any.

[Soldic] Nijaz Durakovic, chairman of the SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, recently said for SLOBODNA BOSNA that the conflict between you and Izetbegovic is a fabrication.

[Silajdzic] That is nonsense. The opposition has been attacking me ever since the declaration of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed, asking why I initiated it and signed it with Izetbegovic. I think such a question reveals political ignorance. With whom else could I sign it? He is the president of the state, and his signature in that case has the most power for the international community. I think that should be clear to everyone. Besides, when it comes to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there must be no party interests—we must fight together when vital interests are at stake. All the opposition people, who openly talked about a conflict between Izetbegovic and me two years ago, during the war, when we did not want to discuss that issue, are now saying that the conflict is a fabrication.

[Soldic] Izetbegovic recently stated that you were fighting for power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] I would never say such a thing about a democratic party in democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is only natural for every party to fight for power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as we cannot see a different or better way. We see wrong steps being made. Whoever makes such a statement forbids everybody else, in advance, to enter politics, which reestablishes the one-party system. We will never have political monologue in these regions again.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Soldic] Is that why you are constantly accused of breaking the unity of the Muslim national entity?

[Silajdzic] Well, you see, the Muslim people, who are now dispersed across five continents, have never preserved their unity through political parties. Muslims were kept and preserved by tradition, the family tradition, and the Islamic community, as there have not been any other institutions.

[Soldic] Is not the name Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina a kind of burden, now that you should "enter" the entire territory of the Federation, including the Serb Republic?

[Silajdzic] You are right. It is a long process, and we are aware that the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a job that also awaits the next political generation. We went to Banja Luka, and we demanded that OSCE enable us to move freely in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is still not freedom of movement, but that is another request we will not give up.

**B-H: Lack of Fairness May Mar Elections**

*AU0906185096 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 p 7*

[Commentary by Vlastimir Mijovic: "Symbiosis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The elections will perhaps not take part in September, as was planned before, but when it comes to them, the presently ruling, nationalistic parties will have the advantage. The civil option has achieved a lot alone by managing not to be completely stifled in the nationalistic war. That is why it still has a chance to resurrect, although not so fast as its protagonists would like. Namely, the circumstances are highly suitable for the so-called war parties, i.e. the national movements which in the war blast in Bosnia-Herzegovina completely seized the might to represent people—regardless of whether the people in question want that or not.

On the territory under the control of guys whose uniforms are decorated with lilies [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army], the advantage of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] is doubtless. The key reason for that is the fact that the leading Bosniak party has practically become so much like the state itself.

The SDA has become so identical with the state that the point of their separation, which is necessary for truly democratic countries, can no longer be discerned. If in the war and in the resistance to merciless aggression there were reasons for that, peace—regardless of how fragile it may seem—creates an obligation to respect truly democratic principles. At that, those who believe that the process of separation of the leading party from the state cannot last shorter than the process of their former unification may be right. Those who claim that that will never come about by the good will of the state or of the party also have their arguments: That symbiosis will defend the acquired monopoly with all means.

Monopoly and privileges multiply with progressive speed. Those who have a better memory can remember well how that process developed in socialism, how the Union of Communists became one with the state and how the monopoly of that party finally turned into monopolies and privileges of its members. Membership in one political party was a condition for any sort of social, political, and economic promotion. The state had a clear communist infrastructure, almost identical to what we have today, only now in the version of the SDA. Compared to the number of noncommunist directors in former times, there were no more people on managing positions in the economy who are not members of the SDA.

In the last five years, a great purge has been carried out according to the party principle, and, as it seems, still goes on. It was recently noticed by the people, the objectivity of whom we should not doubt, although their familiarity with the facts can be doubted, since they are foreigners. However, the analysts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who are preparing the election process in Bosnia, do not have to offer any new evidence for their claims about the pressures which the SDA, "particularly in small places," exercises on members of other parties, or on the party-wise neutral people. It has been known for a long time that all important places in the political, but also in social and economic leaderships, are reserved for members of the leading party. It uses that fact in two ways: For maintaining its own power, and for inciting the people who are not decided to make "the real choice." In that way, with methods which are actually illegal, they cement their own power.

For politicians and party people, elections are the same as war for soldiers. And just as there are dirty wars, which we got acquainted with in the worst Serbian-Montenegrin variant, there are also dirty elections. Unless in the meantime something is seriously changed, we will get acquainted with that election variant too. That is the essence of the warning from the Bosnia-Herzegovina mission of OSCE, that elections should be made as honest as possible, although that warning is nothing but the refrain of an old and often repeated song. However, it used to come from opposition parties, which in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not enjoyed adequate treatment for a long time now, so that it did not produce wanted effects. It could be different with the warning which comes from the Europeans, because in this country one listens more

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to what comes from the outside, than what comes from our own people, public, and parties.

The key problems concerning the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina originate from some bad sides of the Dayton agreement, but also from the essential unwillingness of the international community, and of the peace guarantors, to help eliminate some war "accomplishments" in peace, in the first place the results of ethnical cleansing. This topic is as old as the election rules which foreigners prescribed for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to which—out of mentioned reasons—all those clever enough have a pile of objections. However, in the preoccupation with those most important shortcomings of the election regulations and pre-election circumstances, the issue of party fair play has been pushed to the margin. And that issue does not exist only in Sarajevo, as could be concluded from the reaction of the OSCE mission. That issue is even more present in Grude and in Pale. There, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] are everything. There, the membership in other parties is dangerous for life. That is why there is a need to create a situation, regardless of when elections will take place, in which all parties and their members will have equal social treatment. For the time being it is hard to promote full equality, because of a number of circumstances, but every new construction—including the erection of modern democratic architecture in Bosnia-Herzegovina—starts with the first spadeful.

**B-H: Skepticism About Consensus on Defense Law**

*AU1006104696 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 p 3*

[Commentary by Sead Numanovic: "The Dual Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Geneva meeting, the Croatian media raced to publish the news that the consensus on the Defense Law had been reached under Tudjman's sponsorship, and that the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, and the president of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak, were the civilian commanders of the two armies of which the federal armed forces would consist. However, the information was not accurate.

As Alija Izetbegovic told journalists at a press conference held yesterday [2 June] in the state Presidency, one of the problematic details of the Law had been solved by taking over the regulation agreed upon in Dayton: Until the elections are held in September, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will be commanded by a member of Presidency of our state, a Muslim, while the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] will be commanded by a Croat official. An important step, but not one that solves all problems.

The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been lost—that is out of the question—but the project has certainly met new difficulties, and stumbled on the Croats' silk braids, blocking the very foundations of the peace process. War criminals are still at large both in the Serb entity and in the Federation, and a solution to that problem has not been devised.

The world could encourage us with new arrangements, and calm down the nervousness created by the obvious process of dissolution in the state we have paid so much for. Those who have not experienced things that we have do not understand our attitude, and even criticize us.

Those whose foundations have been eroded by the current of hegemony want tact and diplomacy, and the world insists on our obeying the principles on which the future of the entire world should be built.

Zagreb was informed about the action taken. The Croatian media boasted that President Tudjman said "amen" to that arrangement. The same media have helped promote him as the first man of both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with strong support from the Croatian establishment in Bosnia-Herzegovina delegated by the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. President Zubak has been told exactly what to do and what not to.

Judging by all that, neither Zubak nor Izetbegovic will command the united Federal Army in the next three years. The army will consist of two elements, and the capacity of each president—and of persons appointed civil commanders after the elections—will be restricted.

That again coincides with the Croatian intentions to create a divided Federation and eventually separate "their part." They are not even trying to hide their intentions anymore, calling President Tudjman their one and only supreme commander. And he is so pleased by that.

On the other side, there is the joint command of both armies, as a nucleus of the future united armed forces, and the world is pressing us to move toward that goal (a bit faster, if possible).

What is going on is a fierce conflict between two concepts, the historical anachronism (hegemony) and the futurist avant-garde (integration), and that is a difficult test for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having a thousand years of experience, we have enough grounds for self-reliance.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**B-H: Mostar Police Maltreat Croat Defense Commander**

*LD1006121996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The political administration of the Defense Ministry of the [self-proclaimed] Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has reported that the police in east [Muslim-held] Mostar arrested Brigadier Ivan Nagulov, commander of the Orasje zone of responsibility of the Croat Defense Council [HVO—Bosnian Croat army], at around 1400 GMT yesterday. Brigadier Nagulov was kept in detention for about an hour. He was physically maltreated and his rifle was taken.

This is another example of the serious violation of the agreement on freedom of movement and of a personal offense to officer Nagulov and the HVO, the public statement of the political administration of the Defense Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia says.

**B-H: Muratovic Views Election, Economy in Mostar**

*AU0706184496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[Report by Halid Setka from Mostar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic visited Mostar today. Halid Setka reports:

[Setka] During his regular visit, Prime Minister Muratovic also met with Safet Orucevic, mayor of the eastern part of the town. After the meeting, during which they discussed the economic development of Mostar and the current political situation, Prime Minister Muratovic and Mayor Orucevic said the following:

[Muratovic] I came here primarily with the intention of finding out what the situation is like prior to the elections and of reviewing all the problems of economic recovery of Mostar, Neretva Canton, and further afield. We came to the conclusion that we should act by taking into account what the EU should do and what the government should do [words indistinct] other help [words indistinct]. We will certainly help with some funds, both material and financial. Our goal is primarily to improve the industrial structure. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Commentary Views Tension in Eastern Part of Mostar**

*AU0906142796 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 96 p 10*

[Commentary by Veso Vegar: "Criminal Shoot-Out or Political Conflict?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information broadcast by Mostar television from the eastern part of that town, a curfew has come into force and movement of citizens has also been limited when the curfew is not in force. The cause is a deterioration in security in the city after an armed skirmish that started in the center of town on Monday evening at 10 pm, according to information from the "Security Services Center," and lasted for several hours. The information says that in those street fights one passerby was wounded and two vehicles were damaged, but it does not identify the leaders of those "warring groups" nor the number of members of the groups.

Evidence that it was a big shoot-out is the arrival of the special forces from Sarajevo, who intervened along with the local special forces. Several persons who committed this disturbance were arrested, and the others are being sought. They have been urged to turn themselves in to the police, and the citizens have been encouraged to assist in the search for the perpetrators and their identification. The citizens have also been warned that they should exercise caution in their personal security.

The Presidency of the Municipality in eastern Mostar asks the police to "investigate the entire case professionally and with total responsibility and to inform the public about the results of the investigation. Anybody who hinders the investigation will be held responsible," says the information from the Presidency. In the opinion of the Presidency, "this incident is the product of a planned conspiracy to provoke uneasiness and stage an atmosphere of anarchy in this part of Mostar on the eve of the approaching elections."

One can conclude from this information that it is a conflict with a political background. It is not hard to believe that this was a planned shoot-out that cannot at all be qualified as a disturbance of the peace. The presence of the special forces from Sarajevo at the event indicates also the very probable possibility that the police started this conflict. According to unofficial information from eastern Mostar, the police sided with one of the "warring groups," the situation remains tense, and they are still searching for the members of the other group. The leader of that other group was allegedly Zijad (Zijo) Orucevic, who recently returned from Italy, and who, when the war began, joined the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and later moved to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Some people claim that he was also involved in the unsolved murder of Juka Prazina in Belgium, as ordered by the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] leadership.

### B-H: Mostar Election HQ Appeals to Citizens To Vote

*LD0806222896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Elections in Mostar will be held on 30 June. The election headquarters of the city of Mostar appeals to all the citizens of Mostar to vote, regardless of their nationality, so that their city can belong to its people again. The municipal election headquarters of Mostar has issued an appeal to the citizens of Mostar in the country and abroad, calling on them to take part in the elections for the city and six municipal councils that will be held on 30 June.

The appeal says that everyone from Mostar who is an adult and whose permanent place of residence in 1991 was Mostar creates conditions for the return to his city, his house, or apartment by casting his vote for the return of Mostar to its people. The least you can do for your Mostar is to vote for it to remain undivided, the appeal says. The citizens of Mostar living abroad can vote in four countries: Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden. The polling stations will be located in the capitals of these countries. Further information is available in the diplomatic and consular offices of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The statement goes on to say: Citizens of Mostar, the costs of your organized transport to the polling stations in these four countries will be borne by the European Union. If you wish, you may come on organized bus tours to your Mostar and vote. Europe is paying for these costs, too. Our embassies and consulates are prepared to help you by ensuring transit visas, passports, and other necessary documents. Please call them and check if you are on the election register. Your taking part in the elections will not threaten your refugee status. This is guaranteed by the EU and the host countries, the statement by the municipal election headquarters of Mostar ends.

### B-H: Krajisnik Stresses IFOR Role in Elections

*AU1006090096 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[Report by Aleksandar Vitomir]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Momcilo Krajisnik and Admiral Leighton Smith met to discuss several issues related to the implementation of the Dayton accord. They focused on freedom of movement, opening of the Banja Luka airport, cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal, and the incident that happened in Dobrinja a couple of nights ago. Momcilo Krajisnik thanked Leighton Smith for his active role and efforts to preserve peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. He emphasized that the role of Adm. Smith and IFOR [Implementation Force] is great and added:

[Begin recording] [Krajisnik] We still want to solve all the problems through negotiations. We believe contacts with IFOR are very useful and that we can solve all the problems. None of the problems are unsolvable. IFOR will certainly play a very important role during the elections, because we need peace, freedom of movement, and everything else that we must have to hold the elections. Let me thank the admiral once again. I hope to meet with him soon again and continue our cooperation. [passage omitted] [end recording]

### B-H: Arkan 'Will Not Allow' Arrest of Karadzic, Mladic

*BR1006125296 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 10 Jun 96 p 6*

[Report by Massimo Nava on interview with Zeljko Raznatovic, "Commander Arkan," leader of the Serbian Unity Party, in Belgrade; date not given: "Arkan, the 'Tiger' in Sheep's Clothing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Even the Encyclopaedia Britannica cites him as the most famous Serbian paramilitary leader, the terror of the Muslims and Croats. Though the tribunal in The Hague has not yet brought charges against him, ever since the start of the war in the Balkans "Commander Arkan," whose real name is Zeljko Raznatovic, has been constantly mentioned in connection with massacres, rapes, and looting. His notorious "tigers"—a group of several thousand highly trained volunteers—fought in Vukovar, Croatia, and various parts of Bosnia, leaving a long trail of horrors behind them.

According to many reports, their specialty was to enter a village, to sow fear, to separate the ethnic groups, and to conduct a "cleansing operation." It is said that the "tigers," supported by Belgrade, were granted the right to plunder and were reimbursed expenses of 1 million German marks [DM] per village: "Nonsense," Arkan said. "We received help from emigres—millions of dollars for our soldiers from America and Austria."

According to Commander Arkan and many other military and political leaders of the Serbian world, these charges are merely ravings on the part of the Western press and skillful misinformation on the part of the Muslims and Croats. In Belgrade even normal people suffer

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from an encirclement complex. The fault is never merely their own, but everyone's—and mainly other people's.

Arkan said: "I have nothing to be ashamed of. I can look anyone in the eye. I and my men fought with our heads held high. I can rule out that there was any raping or looting. Absolute discipline is taught in our training camps. Alcohol is forbidden, even on the front. We fought as soldiers against other soldiers, and we did not lose a single battle, even though it cost us 51 lives and 383 other casualties. Nobody allowed himself to be taken prisoner, and nobody surrendered. This is the truth! We took many prisoners, who were released following the accords. Nobody can say that he was mistreated."

But what about Srebrenica? And what about the common graves? "None of my men was in Srebrenica. Perhaps they will find two or three Muslims who accuse me. But I have seen Serbian soldiers with their heads cut off!"

So he is just a soldier repeating the feats of his grandfather, whose portrait hangs in his office—"a heroic fighter in the war against the Turks"—and of his father, an officer in the Yugoslav Air Force, who sired him 44 years ago in Slovenia. Yes, because Arkan—like Milosevic and Karadzic from Montenegro, like Mladic from Herzegovina, like Seselj from Sarajevo, and like millions of other former Yugoslavs—emphasizes his blood lineage in spite of his place of birth. And this is how the huge tragedy came about, despite the interplay of origins, transfers, mixed marriages, and births in the enemy camp.

This is already past history. In his office in a new building lined with mirrors and marble, a kitsch neoclassical construction worthy of Disneyland, Arkan receives visitors sporting a necktie and vest. He has put away his military uniform and donned that of the businessman and politician. Judging from his office, his bodyguards, his secretaries, and his Japanese jeeps, business is going well: "Imports and exports. All kinds of things—oil, toys, hides, furniture," Arkan said. Not bad for someone who started out as a barman and who before the war was known as the leading supporter of Red Star, the Belgrade soccer team.

"It was by following the team that I realized that a war would break out. I was in Zagreb stadium and thousands of Croats shouted, 'death to the Serbs.' That was in July 1990. We had to prepare for the worst. We rushed to their defense."

Now Mr. Arkan mixes in influential circles in Belgrade, in political and economic circles, and attends fashionable venues. Nobody dares challenge his "military" status and few, even at high level, consider it right to do so. So in February last year, Arkan celebrated his third wedding with a luxurious reception. His bride, Svetlana Velickovic—a pop star known as "Ceca"—was dressed like Scarlet O'Hara. He wore the uniform of an officer of the monarchy and rode in a Rolls Royce. Orange blossoms and rifles were waved in the air.

Svetlana is about to give him his eighth child. Arkan had his first from a Swedish girl whom he met in Rimini, the city of his first love affair and where he learned our language. He had another four children by his second wife, "a Montenegrin Serb who now lives in Greece." Another two were born from affairs that have revealed another facet of a man who, however he is judged, is a mixture of vigor, excesses, passion, and Serbian mythology. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Arkan was also a member of the Serbian secret services from as long ago as 1980. There are records that show that he spent time in Swedish and Italian jails. But the commander denied it all—both common crimes and war crimes. "Someone even wrote that I was dead!" Having laid down his weapons, his business affairs—"I have found jobs for 900 of my men!"—and politics grant him an image different from that of the militia leader. A pacifist who has learned the lesson of war and a tolerant man who occupies a center stance in parliament, through the movement that he founded—the Serbian Unity Party. "We will be critical of the Milosevic government. We will oppose all forms of extremism, in order to build real democracy," the commander promised, thus distancing himself from the president (who is nevertheless considered to be one of his protectors) and from the ultranationalist Seselj. "We have different ideas. He is too right-wing."

"Of course we will not allow Kosovo to rebel or anyone to arrest my friends, Karadzic and Mladic. But we will not repeat the stupidity of this tragedy. We want to struggle for the country's unity within observance of all its ethnic components."

Was this a self-criticism? An admission that the war was stupid? Did we hear him correctly? "This is normal," Arkan replied with a sly smile. "We fell into the trap laid by the Americans and Germany, but we did not want war. Then it was right to fight it."

But peace is to be achieved partly by bringing the war criminals to trial. "Those who committed crimes must be punished, but not by a court chosen by the Germans in order to appease their conscience. As for Karadzic, he is a good man, a respected politician, a hero, and a friend. I want to tell you about an unknown episode. In the final months of the war, during the Muslim offensive in central Bosnia, we went together

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to a Serbian village. Many of the peasants were fleeing. Karadzic went toward the people. 'I will stay with you,' he said; 'do not run away.' One peasant replied: 'I will go back if you give me your a hair from your head.' Karadzic knelt down, bowed his head, and said: 'Take as many hairs as you want!'"

Arkan is so convinced of his new "mission" that he permits himself to defend the people's unity even in other countries. He has given DM1 million to his friend Giovanni Di Stefano, chairman of the Campobasso soccer team, who has good connections in the heart of the Serbian Government and who is the founder of the Italian "Southern League," a movement designed to counter Bossi's separatist plans. "I cannot think about a divided Italy, because this could only happen by means of bloodshed, as in our country," Arkan prophesied.

Di Stefano—a controversial businessman who took part in the war, and who travels between Belgrade and Rome by private jet—reciprocated by funding a private radio station in Belgrade, "Radio Tiger," Arkan's own station.

The commander accompanied us outside, via a corridor hung with portraits of Serbian heroes and generals. What is the origin of the name Arkan? "It comes from the war movies that we used to watch as children. From Air Commander, which became Arkomand and then Arkan. I took that name!"

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Croatia: 'Historic' HDZ-HSLS-HSS Agreement Appears Imminent**

*AU1006100696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 96 p 1*

[Report by Nenad Ivankovic: "Agreement of the HDZ With the HSLS and the HSS?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Something like a "historic agreement" between the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] seems to be approaching, and probably between the HDZ and the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], too. There is certainly something "serious going on" between those parties, and there have been serious discussions about that in the parliament lobby.

Although the HDZ has kept the "golden silence" for the time being—neither confirming nor denying the possibility of agreement—it is sure that there have been many contacts on various levels between the parties, as confirmed by the HSLS sources. Vlado Gotovac, the HSLS chairman, was "seen" on several occasions in the Presidential Palace on Pantovcak, at hours not determined by the protocol.

Another confirmation of the claim that something very serious is going on between the HDZ and the HSLS can be deduced from the speech that Ivo Sanader, head of the President's Office, delivered in the formal session of the Chief Council of the HSLS, on Saturday [1 June] in the Lisinski concert hall. It cannot be a coincidence that Sanader then invited the HSLS to cooperate, adding that the HSS had been invited, too. He pointed out that the HDZ wanted "a new kind of cooperation and dialogue" on the local level, as well as in issues of state interest.

A senior HDZ official, who wanted to remain anonymous, told VJESNIK: "If it is true that a new agreement with the HSLS and the HSS is about to be made, it must correspond to the policy President Tudjman defined long time ago: That strong and stable parties be formed left and right of the political center—represented by the HDZ—in order to open up possibilities for cooperation in essential state issues and interests, and to enable us to form coalitions, if that should be necessary for the preservation of our country's political stability, the prerequisite condition for democracy. Such parties are also necessary for contacts abroad and representation of our national interests in the world."

As VJESNIK found out, the parties at stake might soon issue official sstatements about the agreement. Should the agreement be realized, it will enable parties to cooperate in the solving of global issues and essential problems of state politics, as well as finding a solution to the political crisis in Zagreb. Another state and national interest that would thus be promoted is the improvement of our country's position in European integrations, including admission into the Council of Europe.

Such cooperation among parties is an evidence that the Croatian political scene has reached maturity, primarily in the sense that parties have outgrown their narrow party interests (that were reflected by the political crisis in Zagreb). The German model can prove that the cooperation of the HDZ, as a typical party of the center, with the HSLS and the HSS is a natural process. Kohl's CDU [Christian Democratic Union] has been in power for 14 years in the coalition with the German liberals (a left wing party), simultaneously maintaining "sisterly" relations with the Bavarian CSU [Christian Social Union], which is a right wing party.

**Croatia: HSLS Sets Conditions for Negotiations With HDZ**

*LD0906164096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The guidelines for the talks on the democratization of Croatia and the demonopolization of the state administration by the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] and the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], which Vladimir Gotovac, the HSLS chairman, handed to assembled journalists this morning, say that in order for his party to negotiate with the HDZ at all it demands the following:

Preconditions of a procedural nature: All the agreements reached between the two parties have to be published in all dailies and announced at the beginning of every news bulletin on Croatian radio and television;

The HSLS requests of general nature:

—The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia has to be changed, as well as the election procedures;

—fulfillment of all the conditions set by the Council of Europe;

—immediate measures for the democratization of Croatia; these require personnel changes—appointment of the Zagreb mayor from among the HSLS membership and of the city leadership, which would be formed by the HSLS and the HDZ together with all the other parties in the association;

—changes in the state administration—in the judiciary, executive, governing and public services bodies;

—a revision of the economy and economic services;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

—appointment of the chief state auditor and chief inspector of the financial police from among the HSLS membership.

**Croatia: Seks Hopes HSS Joins HDZ-HSLS Coalition**

*AU0906164996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sisak, 9 June (BETA)—Croatian Sabor Deputy Speaker Vladimir Seks stated today that a new process of creating Croatian unity and cooperation of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) was on the horizon.

He voiced hope that the HDZ and the HSLS would also be joined by the Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS).

Seks spoke at the celebration marking the 125th and 128th anniversary of the birth of Stjepan and Antun Radic in their home town Trebarjevo Desno today, the patron of which was Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

**Croatia: Bosnia Radio on Tudjman Bid To Form Coalition**

*LD0906155496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Huge changes have taken place on the political stage in Croatia. The ruling Croat Democratic Union [HDZ] is offering a coalition to different opposition political parties. At the moment negotiations are taking place with the Croat Social Liberal Party [HSLS] after similar attempts with the Croat Peasants Party [HSS] and the Croatian Independent Democrats [HND] failed. The general view in Zagreb is that Tudjman is trying to convince Europe that he is a supporter of democracy. Nada al Issa reports from Zagreb on the possible implications such a development could have for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Nada al Issa] Since the Council of Ministers a few days ago finally rejected—at least for the time being—the request of Croatia to join the Council of Europe because of its suppression of democracy, President Franjo Tudjman has been trying to improve at least the illusion of democracy in the country. Thus, he has been offering a coalition to most of the opposition parties which carry any weight in the country. According to well-informed sources, representatives of most political parties have been to the presidential palace. But not a single one has accepted HDZ's conditions for a coalition. Because the public does not know what these conditions are, many intriguing questions have been raised.

Stipe Mesic [HND chairman], the first one to have been offered a coalition and and at the same time reconciliation by Dr. Tudjman, has not accepted all the conditions although, allegedly, he has even been offered the post of prime minister.

Zlatko Tomcic, chairman of HSS, the strongest Croatian opposition party, has done the same, although allegedly he has been offered several ministerial posts. Dr. Tudjman is now trying his luck for the third time—with the Liberals. The talks are still going on and so far no statements have been issued. The public is confused—what is so very unacceptable about what HDZ is offering that everyone is refusing it?

The only possible answer was given by Zlatko Tomcic and Stipe Mesic. They said that the negotiations failed when they wanted to discuss the change of Croatian policy and Dr. Tudjman would only talk about deals with certain government posts.

What implications could these changes on the Croatian political stage have for Bosnia-Herzegovina? Good—because all of the opposition, especially HSS, HND, and HSLS, have always advocated a single Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was about Bosnia that Stipe Mesic fell out with Tudjman, while Drazen Budisa has been warning that Croatia and Serbia cannot divide Bosnia.

Thus, no matter who from among the Croatian opposition, if anyone, enters a coalition with HDZ, it would be a boost for a single Bosnia-Herzegovina. [Words indistinct] but no one seems to be able to strike a deal with HDZ. Of course, according to Stipe Mesic, it is not on account of Bosnia that Tudjman is offering this coalition, but because of Croatia. With it, HDZ would achieve a democratic legitimacy. And without it the much desired European integration procceses cannot be entered. It is evident that in order to enter Europe Dr. Tudjman will have to renounce at least a tiny bit of power.

**Croatia: Police Arrest Hague Tribunal Suspect in Split**

*LD0906140696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The police in the Split-Dalmatia County have arrested Zlatko Aleksovski, for whom The Hague tribunal issued an arrest warrant, the Justice Ministry has announced.

Aleksovski is detained in the investigation center of the county court in Split, where the magistrate charged with investigating his case decided to keep him in detention. Further proceedings against the accused will be carried out in line with the penal code and the constitutional

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

law on cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and The Hague tribunal, the statement by the Justice Ministry says.

**Croatia: New Information Law Said To Promote Media Liability**

*AU1006100796 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jun 96 p 2*

[Analysis by Olga Ramljak: "Journalists Also Elect Editor in Chief?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Legal deadlines are pushing the Government to adopt the new Law on Public Information by the end of June this year, after the Constitutional Court, in November 1995, canceled the valid law because it had not been adopted with the majority vote of all the representatives. The Ministry of Justice has prepared a draft of the new law that does not contain essential changes and alterations in regard to the present law, but gives a more precise definition of certain terms. What is new in regard to the legal definitions so far is the definition of the authorization of a text, the prescribed liability of the editor in chief for editorializing the information published, the joint and individual liability of the publisher and the source of information, and the procedure for the compensation for damage inflicted by the publishing of misinformation.

Although the legislator in his explanation points out that by this new law the freedom of public information is in no way limited, but that liability for accuracy and authenticity is merely intensified, the law will find itself before the National Assembly burdened with a couple of dilemmas. For the Croatian Journalists Society [HND] has announced that it will send its draft law to the National Assembly to be processed if the suggestions discussed during the preparation of this new law are not accepted.

**Authorization**

At the Ministry of Justice, too, there was a special working group that was working on this new law, in the preparation of which the HND was represented by the HND chairwoman Jagoda Vukusic, and Vesna Alaburic, lawyer. The result of that work is a law whose norms are based upon the regulations of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which grant freedom of thought and opinion, and forbid censorship (Article 38), and then those constitutional regulations (Articles 22,35,16) that grant dignity and privacy to every man, and limit freedom in order to protect the freedom and rights of other people, that is, to protect public morality, and health. The legislator invokes the adopted protocols of the Council of Europe, which speak of the freedom of public information, and there it often quotes the declaration from 1982 on the freedom of expression and information, Resolution 428, and recommendation 834 and R (81) No. 19.

The most recent comb through the Law before the National Assembly procedure proved that there are not many major differences between the Ministry of Justice and the HND draft law. Apart from that, during the Government coordination for internal policy, some remarks made by the representatives of the HND were accepted. According to the new law and after coordination, the authorization is a written or oral confirmation of the content of an interview or other information given to the public media. The sponsors of the law have agreed that authorization cannot contain the term of verity, and it has remained undetermined whether authorization can be tacit. Although a tacit quality carries uncertainty, there were those who advocated responsible participation by public workers. Apart from an interview, or a conversation, authorization would also comprise a statement intended for publication.

Talking about the rights and obligations of journalists, the suggestion of the Ministry of Justice is that they can be determined by a Statute made by the publisher and the representatives of the editorial staff, which enters into force when it is approved by the editorial staff with a two-thirds majority. Also, the appointment and dismissal of the editor in chief can be determined with the approval of the editorial staff, and the principles of the Statute can be determined by a Collective Agreement.

**Arbitration**

There are also two options offered to this article of the law that are transcribed from the draft law offered by the HND. According to this alternative, the Statute would particularly determine the way of participation of journalists in the procedure of appointing and dismissing the editor in chief, and apart from that, when an agreement to pass a Statute between the publisher and the representatives of journalists fails, arbitration is prescribed, as well as the time limit in which to carry it out. The National Assembly will decide about the alternatives and about the differences between the solution offered by the Government and the one offered by the guild.

The legislator has agreed with the HND suggestion that the rules of the journalistic profession oblige other authors who are not journalists, but who publish their texts in the public media, which is also applied to the right, to keep secret the source of information.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

It is interesting to note that the representatives of the guild mostly stuck to questions regarding insurance for liability, and to the chapter of the law that discusses liability for physical and consequential damage. It has been agreed with the legislator that the same treatment will be applied to both information and picture, that a journalist and publisher cannot be liable if they report accurately and completely from any public event. It is the general opinion that one must determine the amount of damages a newspaper publisher pays directly, and that one must oblige companies to take out insurance for damages liability.

**Protection of Juveniles**

It has remained an open question whether we needed a Council for the Protection of Public Information in order to protect public information, because the HND, knowing the bad practices in the work of such a council, asked that this organ be dissolved, but the legislator envisages its remaining in force. It was also a question of how to protect juveniles from publicity, and at the same time to provide for the accessibility of information.

There were several references to the strengthening of the institution for the correction of inaccurate information or misinformation, and apology for it, which was found very significant in terms of the increase in the level of information by a majority of participants in the preparation of the new law. This would allow for the amount of consequential damage compensation to be determined so that it would not jeopardize the existence of the paper. However, the most disputable and unresolved question as far as the HND is concerned is what signifies privacy as regards public personalities. The legislator strictly relies upon the Constitution and the Council of Europe protocols, and the HND relies upon the right to complete information for the public, and the equality of all citizens before the law. The monopoly of distribution as an essential link in the chain of the freedom of information has also remained unsolved, and the lack of time has entirely pushed aside the necessity of simultaneous adoption of the law on state secrecy. This law refers to legally defined secrets, although no such law as yet exists. Therefore, one has, between two readings in the National Assembly, to try to find answers to all the open questions and coordinate different opinions, in the name of protection of freedom of information and responsible journalism.

**Croatia: Opposition Asks PM To Uphold Zagreb Election Result**

*LD0906101796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0705 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Council of Europe has rejected Croatia's membership application because, to put it mildly, democracy and the freedom of the press are not the rage in Croatia and because President Tudjman simply ignored the Zagreb local government election since the outcome did not please him. Gyoergy B. Valko has interviewed Zdravko Tomac, the legitimate president of the Zagreb County Assembly, a social democrat. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Tomac, in Serbo-Croatian fading into Hungarian translation] Today I wrote a letter to the prime minister asking him to relieve the Tudjman-appointed mayor of Zagreb of her post and to make it possible for the local government to elect a legitimate mayor. [passage omitted]

[Valko] The press frequently reports on dirty deals. Are these stories true, well grounded, or are they just stories?

[Tomac] Of course, all these stories can be substantiated. Material interests, business premises, houses, and huge amounts of money are concentrated in Zagreb. This is probably one reason why the governing party is resisting handing over power; it wants to continue to control Zagreb.

Another reason is, I think, that the governing party's leadership has assessed the situation incorrectly. They thought that if they showed cooperation on the Bosnia and Vukovar issues, if they listened to the Americans, then their domestic politics would be overlooked and the Zagreb affair and similar [antidemocratic] measures would not an issue.

[Valko] When do you think Croatia will be admitted to the Council of Europe?

[Tomac] It is hard to say when specific steps will be taken, when the Zagreb crisis will be resolved, or freedom of the press will be given. If they settled these issues soon, we could be admitted before the end of the summer. If the current course continues, the admission will be postponed indefinitely. [end recording]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Croatia: Susak Discusses Reintegration, Army**

*AU1006112696 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 27 May 96 pp 11-14*

[Interview with Defense Minister Gojko Susak by Milan Ivkosic and Ratko Peter; place and date not given: "The Peaceful Reintegration Is Guaranteed By—The Army"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Many call him the second man in the country. Even those that are not partial toward him, and they do exist, recognize his authority, as well as the results. He is the longest-serving minister, and a returned refugee. He is a Croatian nationalist, from Herzegovina, according to many a rightist, and according to the president of the republic he is the "best minister." He is not partial to the media, which he does not like, but he does not complain about them. He is always an interesting person for interviews, which he does not like to give. However, the "official" reason for this conversation with Gojko Susak, the defense minister of the Republic of Croatia, was of course the Day of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (28 May) and the sixth anniversary of Croat statehood. [passage omitted]

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] How would you describe the Croat Army? Can it be compared with other armies regarding its basic characteristics, training, personnel, and equipment?

[Susak] Regarding the shape it is in and the training, our army can be compared with all the armies of the world. But considering the extra, national motivation, only Israel can be compared to us. Regardless of the professionalism of our army, signed agreements, and everything else, this is still an army of Croat volunteers, at least this generation. Regarding schooling, the former officers have played a positive role. They thought up a preofficers' and officers' school, and a few generations have already finished these schools in order to become preofficer and officer personnel. While we were having the war, we had constantly insisted on this segment. The schooling is not yet at the same level as in the academies around the world, but for what we had needed in order to set up a structure and command personnel at all levels, I think that we have fulfilled the demand that existed at the time. Regarding special training, we are equal to all the armies in the world. After all, that was the fatal segment of all our actions. Even the Americans were envious of the special training that we have in Sepure.

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] To what extent can the experiences of foreign countries help us? Does any country serve as an eventual military model for Croatia? He who does not learn from other people's experience will pay for the mistakes with his own inexperience. We have tried to cooperate on all sides; from Israel, to France, from its Foreign Legion to its regular army, Germany, Britain, not to mention the USA. From all of them we have tried to implement whatever could be of use to us. However, we are aware that we are in a situation in which we could not copy any of the military systems of the aforementioned countries and say—there, we are now equal to them. We had here army organization experts from the USA, and this is already producing good results. This all means that I will be able to leave this position with a calm conscience, because I know that the ministry will function, that it no longer depends on the person who heads it, but that the entire system simply functions as it is.

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] As far as we know, there is a great deal of interest in military cooperation with Croatia.

[Susak] Yes. We have had, and do have, offers from countries for military cooperation regardless of the fact that the embargo is still in effect. More and more countries are deciding to sign agreements on military cooperation with Croatia. We signed an agreement on military cooperation with the USA back in November 1994, last week we met with the Hungarians, not long ago with the Ukrainians, we will soon do so with the Slovenes, in June the Bulgarian defense minister is coming here....

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] Many believe that the military cooperation with the USA had gone through thanks to you.

[Susak] That was our decision. The less united Europe is in every way, the more our cooperation with the USA is emphasized. A united method of thinking simply does not exist in Europe; it is a nightmare of the most different interests, from the French to Germany. Who can define Europe at all? What else is it but a heap of special interests? However, this is different with the USA. It is clear that we need to have concrete ties with all the European states, to join all the European institutions; that is beyond dispute. I simply went my own way. That I turned more toward cooperation with the USA has proven to be a greater opportunity than with anyone else, especially in this moment. Moreover, no one can either train us, or equip us, either qualitatively or quantitatively, in the way the USA can. That is why we have decided for such a cooperation with the USA, and also because our interests coincide with the interests of the USA. At this moment it is Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not know where our interests will lie in a few years. In August U.S. Secretary of State William Perry is again coming to Croatia, and by then all the preparations for Croatia's

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

joining the Partnership for Peace will be completed. I will personally sign agreements with all the neighboring countries, which will also influence this decision. We would thus join the Partnership for Peace in September or October.

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] Could you explain what joining the Partnership for Peace will mean for Croatia, and how the Russians view this problem? It is known that Russia has reservations regarding this.

[Susak] To put it shortly, the Partnership for Peace is the last step before joining NATO. Regarding the Russians, they are not satisfied with this. One day I spoke to the Ukrainian minister of defense and asked him what their long-term plans were. He answered that they would not like to join any alliances, since it is known that the Americans had insisted on one alliance of all former eastern communist states. Regarding Croatia, we simply do not care about what the Russians will say. We have taken a firm position that we want to join the Partnership for Peace, and we will see how the situation develops. A lot will depend on the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia. In short, it is quite realistic for us to join the Partnership for Peace by the end of the year.

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] The reintegration of the last occupied part of the Republic of Croatia is the primary goal of the state. What importance did Operations Flash and Storm have for peaceful reintegration? Would the peaceful integration, which has already begun, have been possible without these actions?

[Susak] Had we not gone through with that operation, then no one would have taken us seriously. Ever since the time of Lord Carrington, Vance, and Owen, [former EU mediators] everyone has spoken of Knin as a state within a state. Only after that would Milosevic be spoken to on the matter of whom eastern Slavonia belongs to. These were the options. It practically meant that we would not have one or the other. If we had not done what we did militarily, then there would have been no theory of the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, western Srem, and Baranja. However, regarding the current situation in these areas, I am an absolute optimist. There are many indicators that point out how this will all end, but that is what worries me least. That is because if it does not go through, then it is a matter of one day's work. [passage omitted]

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] Could you comment on the recent reports on the "Livno case." Apparently Livno did not become the headquarters of the municipality because of you? How do you experience the articles that are not at all sympathetic toward you?

[Susak] GLOBUS can write what it wants to and I do not pay attention at all to what GLOBUS, NACIONAL, FERAL TRIBUNE, and similar papers say. This does not upset me at all. Moreover, I am not in the habit of suing people and I do not intend to. Until now I have only sued Cicak, who stated in NOVI LIST that the Ministry of Defense is a nest of crime. Since I am ultimately the responsible person in that ministry, I decided to react. Those present from his side were the lawyers Slobodan Budak and Dafinka Vecerina, and the trial took one and a half years. I did not ask for money, I only wanted it to be proven whether he was right or not. He was fined 1000 Croat Kunas; this was purely symbolic, but the satisfaction was mine. Regarding the journalists, I am supposed to be walking behind Jasna Babic and Jelena Lovric every day. This at first irritated me, but I later realized that they would like me to deal with them, and I will not do so.

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] You probably know that even those newspapers that were not sympathetic toward you had written positively about you while you were in the USA for medical treatment?

[Susak] I did not follow this, I have become immune to both attacks and praise. One can often hear that your colleague Dunja Ujevic is "my journalist." I consider Dunja as a person who thinks in a state-creating manner, and in a way that is close to my way of thinking, as well as to the point of view of Croatia. In that context, when I see her in the Assembly, we talk, have a coffee, but it is more of a personal contact than a talk between the minister of defense and a journalist.

**[Box, p 12]**

**Spegelj? Let the Experts Tell Us**

[HRVATSKI OBZOR] Could you think back to the theses of General Spegelj in his time? For a while he was describing crucial events in the creation of the Croat Army even in newspapers, in installments. According to him, the situation was quite chaotic.

[Susak] General Spegelj is not normal. You can print that clearly, and let him sue me... A few years ago in the Assembly, they had asked to have me replaced. It is not to be expected that everyone would understand everything we have gone through, and in which way we have created everything. In my judgment, with regard to General Spegelj, it is a matter of envy which was incited by being replaced. Foreign experts can answer the question as to whether we have succeeded or not. Everything can be spoken about now. I would not like to polemicize with Spegelj as to what we should and should not have done. The revision went through this ministry, as well as through others. We need not forget

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that we are the only ministry that started from zero. All the other ministries had some kind of infrastructure. We were the only ones to start from nothing, and we directly and indirectly affect 50 percent of the budget. In four months we have demobilized 150,000 persons, and the Hungarian defense minister has told us that he needs to demobilize 20,000 persons in the next three years and that he does not know whether he will succeed.

**Croatia: Paris, Zagreb Sign Investment Protection Agreement**

*BR0506134496 Paris LES ECHOS in French 5 Jun 96 p 4*

[Report by Michel de Grandi: "France Striving To Make Up for Lost Time in Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] While Croatia's political talks with the EU have been bogged down for months, Zagreb has been making plenty of economic contacts. Yesterday Yves Galland, minister delegate for foreign trade, completed a three-day visit in Croatia. He was accompanied by representatives of some 40 companies led by the National Confederation of French Employers, including Dumez-GTM, Alacatel, OTV, Renault, the Schneider and Spie Batignolles group, Systra, and the BNP bank.

Compared with its neighbors, France is all but absent in this market with a share of only 2.5 percent; Germany has 20.1 percent and Italy 18.2 percent. Even tiny Slovenia accounts for 10.7 percent of its Croat neighbor's imports. As a result, Paris only ranks ninth among Zagreb's suppliers, a level that "does not reflect France's standing in the world," [Croatian] Finance Minister Bozo Prka regretted.

"Beyond our excellent political relations, we are entering a new era of economic ties," Yves Galland told Economy Minister Davor Stern during the signing ceremony of an investment protection and incentive agreement. Such a legal framework is expected to encourage investors, who have proven extremely cautious so far: France is only the ninth-biggest foreign investor with a 0.4 percent share, far behind Germany (35.8 percent), Austria (13.9 percent), Switzerland (6.7 percent), or the United States (4.4 percent).

Making up for lost time both in trade and investment is going to be difficult. "We are aiming to significantly narrow the gap" with Croatia's three main suppliers, the French minister stated.

**Tangible Gains**

Several companies are already hoping that tangible gains are going to materialize soon as a result of contacts made during the war. Alcatel ISR (Computers, Systems, Networks) signed on Monday [3 Jun] a Fr55 million contract. After winning the concession for building and operating the Istria highway, the Bouygues group is awaiting an answer from the authorities concerning a highway between Rijeka, Zagreb, and the Hungarian border. Airbus expects to be apprised "in the coming weeks" of the authorities' final decision concerning the renewal of Croatian Airlines' fleet of aircraft. The contract being negotiated—with Boeing as a competitor—provides for the sale of six aircraft, with an option for four more. In addition, the Societe Generale bank and the Schneider group are set to open local branches. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**FYROM: Handziski on Agreements With NACC, PFP**

*AU1006084296 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 7 Jun 96 p 14*

[Statement by Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski: "Closer to NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the first system law that was promulgated on the autonomous and independent Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the first foundations of the civil model of defense for the Republic of Macedonia were laid, which are compatible with the defense models of member countries of collective systems for security and defense, but first of all with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In accordance with the regulations in this Law and the rights that are guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Republic of Macedonia is constructing its own system of defense, which is for the protection of its border, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. We have decided on a small and efficient army that will be trained and equipped to modern standards, capable of responding to the first blow by a possible aggressor, of creating conditions for mobilization of military formations, of making the institutions of the state function, and of waging war over a long period throughout its territory. With this concept of defense, the Republic of Macedonia relies on the collective systems of security and defense. We have thus adopted the modern concepts for overcoming isolated systems of national defense and for availing ourselves of all the advantages of collective defense and construction of the euro-atlantic defense architecture that is based on multilateral cooperation and on an integral character of defense with the aim of avoiding new divisions and delineations.

In the realization of this concept of our defense and security, all the institutions in the state were included in fulfilling the conditions for joining the collective systems of security and defense.

The productive foreign policy, the preparedness for open cooperation with the countries in the neighborhood, in the region, and at large, the European orientation, the development of democracy, the economic reforms, the regulation of relations with all the neighbors, and the construction of the civil model of defense with which we maintained peace and stability in our state, but with which we also made a large contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the troubled region, represent achievements that are highly appreciated by the international community and made us a respected and desired factor for cooperation in the field of security and defense as well.

These were the basic reasons for our exceptional cooperation in the field of defense with some of the neighbors in the region, like Turkey, Slovenia, and Romania, as well as with some Central European countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, and with some Western European countries like Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, but first of all with the United States.

These are the reasons why we succeeded in achieving a status in "Partnership for Peace" in less than half a year after the normalization of relations with our southern neighbor, which made us one of the most active partners.

With the elaboration of the most successful individual program, as NATO unanimously assessed, with the full membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC, and in PFP, with the training and equipment of our units for participation in peacekeeping operations under the sponsorship of the United Nations and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], we fulfilled all the obligations that have been undertaken with the signing of the framed document of partnership and we created conditions for reaching the needed level of cooperation of our armed forces with joint activities and through NATO's and the Partnership's programs.

We started a process of negotiations with the Alliance for its expansion, and we are among the few countries that are taking part in such negotiations and which are evaluated as being able to receive the benefits of a collective defense, but also to give their own contribution to the expansion of territories in which a high level of efficiency in peace and stability will be maintained, something that the Alliance guarantees for the territories that it covers.

We think that we have prepared a solid document for discussions on the Study for NATO expansion which, among other things, represents a good base for our active participation in making concrete decisions on the future structures in NATO, OSCE, the European Community, and the countries of the European Union, as compatible systems on which the future euro-atlantic security structure is based.

A big step forward to an efficient defense of full security in our state was made with the signing of the Agreement with NATO states and with the other states that are members of the Partnership for Peace on the status of their forces and, as more important, with the regulation of the status of the forces on a bilateral level with the United States. We created a legal basis for the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

stay of the U.S. forces in the Republic of Macedonia with the aim of providing a collective approach in the defense of our country, by which we fully approached collective defense, which is guaranteed to NATO's full members. This also gives grounds for deepening bilateral cooperation in the field of defense with the United States in all areas, but it also gives more grounds and perspectives for full membership in NATO.

**FYROM: Commentary Examines U.S. Balkan Policy**

*AU1006094496 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 7 Jun 96 pp 13-15*

[Commentary by Eleonora Karanfilovska: "Did Anybody Say Base?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is heretical today to utter the word "base." You will be reproached for "exaggerating," "not understanding the essence," "twisting matters...." On the one hand, yes, I can agree. On the other, however, there is that big, that enormous "no..." which is the reason for us to raise a couple of questions. If you do not want to use the word "base," you will have difficulty finding another appropriate term. We are dedicating the introduction to the terminology that we will use in the text, but it will be difficult for us to identify matters for you and call them by their proper name.

The story has a pre-history a number of years ago, but it officially started last week. We were allowed to watch it as an audience, after the opening had ended without glorification or announcement in Brussels on 30 May. In the office of Counselor (De Witts), Macedonian ambassador to NATO Jovan Tegovski signed the protocol by which Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], as a member of the Partnership for Peace [PfP], accepts both NATO "SOFA" [Status of Forces Agreement] agreements—the "original one" of 1949 for the Alliance's members and its "annex" of 1994 for the countries that are "partners in peace." On that occasion, Mr. (De Witts) made just a brief statement: "NATO welcomes the signing by the FYROM on 30 May 1996 of the agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty member states and some other countries that participate in the PfP on the status of their forces and its additional protocol." To be more precise—these are not agreements on the deployment of NATO or PfP member state's troops. They are simply agreements that regulate the status of NATO troops in the territory of a state that has signed the SOFA agreement.

The text of the agreement was accepted by the Macedonian Government on Monday, 3 June, and the following day it was ratified in an accelerated procedure by the Macedonian Assembly. The urgency and the need for a Law on Ratification of the Agreement was justified by Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski with the upcoming joint exercise in Albania, scheduled for 13 July, in which Macedonian troops will take part. The agreement goes into force 30 days after ratification and after the ratification instrument is delivered to the State Department in Washington. The procedure for informing the other NATO members only begins later. This position is quite clear regarding the participation of Macedonian troops in such an exercise, as well as regarding the regulation of their status. Nevertheless, let us recall that at the beginning of this year there was a military exercise in our country and the then "non-regulated" status of the U.S. troops who participated was not an obstacle. At that time, there were not conditions for signing such an agreement. By the way, the conditions were created after the individual program prepared by the Republic of Macedonia "passed," that is, was accepted in March by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and by the NATO Military Committee. Now there remains only the formal act of "delivery" on 12 June by Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckovski to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.

This agreement has been signed by all NATO member states, and only by seven PfP members, first of all because, as one western diplomat in Skopje said, they did not have any particular reason to hurry up. So, the reason for the "urgent" need for such an agreement must be sought elsewhere and has more to do with the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mission. We will not review the reasons that Macedonia believes it is essential for the UN mission to remain because we have discussed this topic in all the mass media in the last two weeks. We are also familiar with the positions of those who decide on this, as well as with the results of the voting in the Security Council, as a result of which the mission will be continued in the next six months and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali is obliged to submit a report by 30 September in which he will recommend prolongation or cessation of the mission. It is here that we should look for the reasons that the Law on Ratification of the Agreement for the status of NATO and PfP forces was passed in such an urgent manner.

In the diplomatic negotiations before the UN Security Council made the decision, it was clear that the Russian opposition to prolonging the mandate could easily lead to a veto on a different decision or to a drastic drop in the number of the mission's troops (a drop by 700 was mentioned, as well as a change in the composition, which is now 50 percent U.S. blue helmets and 50 percent the Nordic Battalion). If the Russian request had been accepted while Butrus-Ghali's report

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

was in preparation, the U.S. troops would have been decreased by about 300, our sources say, because the U.S. contingent is to be rescheduled and therefore this would be the turning point.

In the same period, China's view was uncertain. It was not even revealed in the talks that Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen had in Skopje that ways of preventing the departure of a number of blue helmets from Macedonia were being sought. The particular reasons were that, as some military experts assess, the observation posts are organized in such a way that if their number is changed some of them will have to be canceled.

On the other had, the assessment of the Macedonian side, and of the United States as well, was that the mission should be continued as it is now and that the number of troops should not be cut. The Russian side advocated an increase in the number of civilian observers, which would require regulation of the status of the U.S. troops in the event the Security Council returned a negative decision on UNPREDEP. The first step was taken in Brussels on 30 May, and it was not published until Monday. The fact that such an extremely important act for Macedonia was kept secret for a couple of days prompts us to speculate that there might have been fears of a Russian "reaction" that might be negatively reflected in the voting in New York. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the Russian Federation will have to sign this agreement one day since it is a PfP member.

So, the voting in the Security Council ended as it ended. It means that 46 U.S. troops should depart and that the number of 1,000 blue helmets be restored. This is where the second part of the events come into play, when in Skopje on Monday Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski and Victor Comras, head of the U.S. mission in Macedonia, exchanged diplomatic notes regulating the stay of the U.S. troops. "Our exchange of notes today opens possibilities for a direct interim agreement that will regulate the presence of U.S. Army personnel in the country, an agreement that is not covered by an agreement of your country with the United Nations," Mr. Comras emphasized. The "extra" U.S. troops in the UN mission are precisely located—the U.S. helicopter unit that provides logistical support to the U.S. contingent in UNPREDEP. Since Monday these U.S. troops have had a special status—they are U.S. troops on Macedonian territory under a bilateral agreement between Skopje and Washington, because due to the present situation, the SOFA agreement was somehow "enforced" even before the necessary 30 days, although it is the foundation from which we start. A further step was taken, however, in the framework of the bilateral relations because the SOFA agreement regulates only the status of the troops and not their deployment. The stay of the Americans is not in direct connection with NATO. So, they are in the Republic of Macedonia on a bilateral basis, and their status is in accordance with the SOFA agreement.

When a U.S. diplomat was asked to place the U.S. troops in relation to Macedonia, but also in relation to the UNPREDEP Command, as well as to the U.S. Command, he said that the most appropriate term would probably be that they are now in the "gray zone." They are completely financed by the U.S. budget (and thus separate from UNPREDEP), but they operate as logistical support to the U.S.contingent inside UNPREDEP. We tried to speak with the head of the UN Mission in Macedonia, Mr. Sokalsky, about the new situation and about the possible implications for the work and command in UNPREDEP, but Mr. Sokalsky is too busy in the next two weeks, and he cannot give not even a brief statement on what is of particular importance for his work. For now, the Russian side does not have any comments and Mr. Trushin [Russian ambassador in Macedonia] emphasizes that he does not have enough information to make a statement. The U.S. diplomat insists that this does not have any connection with a U.S. base in Macedonia, although the status of the troops is the same as the status that the U.S. troops have in Japan or in Panama, for instance. For now the U.S. position is that for the stability in the region it is essential to prolong the UN mission. By 30 September, when Mr. Butrus-Ghali is to submit his report, the development of the situation will be viewed and further activities will be taken in accordance with the Security Council decision on whether UNPREDEP stays or leaves. He insists that Washington does not have any particular plans for now.

A U.S. military analysis on the Balkans that was made on 11 April this year, just after the meeting of the defense ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Italy, and Macedonia with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry in Tirana says the following about U.S. policy in the region: "In the last three years, the key states for U.S. policy in the southern Balkans have been Albania and Macedonia. They are both small and internally more unstable than the other postcommunist countries in the region; as a result, they are more willing to cooperate with U.S. policy." As far as Albania is concerned, it is said that its strategic importance lies in its control over the Adriatic roads, as well as in the fact that since 1994 the United States has become the most influential force in Albania, replacing the traditional influence of Italy and Greece.

Regarding Macedonia, it is said that its strategic importance is even greater because it is the only territory in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the Balkans that lies on the road that links the Danube with the Aegean, and the Black Sea with the Adriatic. With the passing of time, it is said, the U.S. interest in Bulgaria has dropped with the fading away of the supposed Russian threat in the Balkans. It is a military evaluation that for now the United States has prevented a larger expansion of Russian influence in the region, as well as that after Dayton Agreement there are no longer any fears that Serbia might become a Russian client. Although the Russian influence will continue in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece in spite of U.S. policy, the evaluation is that there are not yet any possibilities for the creation of an Orthodox alliance that might link these three states and direct them toward Moscow. The analysis further says: "The active U.S. role in the region is in contrast with the European Union's failure to develop a coherent strategy in the region. The United States is more concerned than the West European counties by the possible break-up of NATO's southern wing and communications with the Middle East." The conclusion is that the United States is becoming the main player in the southern Balkans. Such an analysis could lead to the conclusion that Macedonia and the United States will long be "associated." We do not say that we doubt that in September and November Washington will review its policy when the decision on whether the troops here stay or depart is made. It can be seen from Washington's attitudes, however, what its long-term policies are, and it is difficult to accept that solutions will be reached in the summer. The U.S. troops in Macedonia are not there as a protection of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Their role is more a "demarcation line" of U.S. interests, which do not have much in common with the stability in Macedonia itself, if we do not refer to the whole region. Fortunately, in this period they coincide with Macedonian interests, particularly regarding integration in western collective security systems. The promotion of the idea of expanding NATO on the southern wing, that is, reinforcing it with Albania and Macedonia, is not without real grounds. A high-ranking official in the Macedonian Defense Ministry assesses that this question will be raised at the Alliance's meeting in December when the agenda for the admission of new members is defined. The same source says that Macedonia may be on the eve of becoming a member of the Alliance in January, particularly if the present idea on expansion is accepted and six countries, including ours, are accepted in a basket. On the other hand, there is the actual situation regarding relations with Greece and its declared "policy that will not be friendly," which could mean that they will use their veto when a consensus is needed for admission of new members. It would be amazing if Athens thwarted a possible decision to admit Macedonia into NATO, which would certainly ease the security situation in Greece, particularly because of its dispute with Turkey over the Aegean isles. A relaxation in the north might focus it more on the sea. Remember, Minister Pangalos told us that if the situation does not develop in the best possible way and if there is an explosion in Kosovo or in Bosnia and if we felt safer under the sponsorship of Serbia regarding the open pretensions of Bulgaria and Albania, we would then not need them [the Greeks]. The conclusion is that this would not have any impact on Greece, because it has lived in a different world, and not in the Balkans, for a long time. What an illusion! However, only the wise are realistic. It does not matter. We have witnessed a totally irrational attitude by Greece so far and would therefore not be amazed if it opposes. In any case, whatever the outcome of the decision, it is clear that the United States is taking on the role of stabilizer and that the line will be drawn on Macedonia's northern border. Whether it has the Russian blessing is less important, although the ministerial meeting in Berlin announced such a possibility as far as NATO's relations with Moscow are concerned. Namely, if the Baltic states are left on the "waiting list," and this is certain, Moscow will accept [NATO] expansion, but without a mass movement of armies and arms toward its border and without new military bases in any of the new member states. But not only because of this one should not mention "bases." The word is "deployment of a foreign army on the territory of a NATO or PfP member state." There is no other explanation. The invitation for deployment and its acceptance are exchanged. The number of troops is not mentioned. The duration is not mentioned. It is only timely. And that is all. For now.

### FYROM: Visit by Slovene Prime Minister Reported

*AU0706193696 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek arrived in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] today. He was received at Skopje airport by Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski with the highest state honors. Immediately upon his arrival in Skopje, official contacts of the delegations of the two governments began, and three important documents were signed on the future development of relations between the two countries. The following protocols were signed: a protocol on the mutual protection of investments, a protocol on cooperation in education and sport, and a protocol on environmental protection and urban construction.

Prime Minister Drnovsek was also received by President Kiro Gligorov. At the meeting, mutual satisfaction with the development of the relations between the two

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

countries was expressed, as well as close views on international relations. Drnovsek was also received by Assembly Chairman Tito Petkovski, on which occasion it was indicated that both countries have traditionally good relations in economy and trade and identical views on the succession to the former Yugoslavia. Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Crvenkovski are just holding a news conference in the government building. Todor Keramitcievski reports:

"Dear audience, the first to address the journalists was Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, the host, who emphasized that it was assessed that there is a high level of mutual relations in several fields, with emphasis on the major potential for an intensification of cooperation. In the past, a lot of work has been done on the promotion of free trade, Crvenkovski said, and he added that it has been completed now and that a document is expected to be signed in the course of the next month. Slovene Prime Minister Drnovsek said that this visit is of great significance for the further promotion of relations. 'We in Slovenia believe that the Republic of Macedonia is an important factor for security in this region. We have been cooperating within the frameworks of international institutions so far, and we plan to do so in the future. The documents that we signed today will represent new foundations for future cooperation, as will those we will sign in the future.'"

The correspondents wanted to know about the development of the political relations, which were assessed by both prime ministers as excellent. This was particularly stressed regarding the European associations and in relation to the succession to the former Yugoslavia. At this moment, dear audience, I can see my colleagues coming out of the news conference hall, which means that the news conference has ended, and thus the visit of Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to Macedonia is also ending. Drnovsek will fly to Ljubljana this afternoon.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Poland: International Naval Exercises Begin in Baltic Sea**

*LD0706162996 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1427 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 7 Jun—Naval exercises Baltops '96 began in the western Baltic today. A total of 58 warships and 18 aircraft and helicopters from the Baltic states, as well as from the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, and the United States, are taking part. These include 11 Polish warships and aircraft and helicopters of the Polish Navy.

Lieutenant Janusz Walczak, press spokesman of the Polish Navy, has reported that missile ships from the 3d Naval Flotilla at Gdynia—Piorun, Grom, and Metalowiec—the submarine Orzel, and the large rescue ship Lech are taking part in the exercises this year. From the 9th Coastal Defense Flotilla at Hel, the antisubmarine corvette Kaszub is taking part.

Taking part in the maneuvers from the base at Swinoujscie are minesweepers of the 8th Coastal Defense Flotilla—Naklo, Resko, Serbsko, and Necko—as well as a Zbyszko type rescue ship. Also taking part in the exercises are Mig-21 fighter aircraft and Anakonda rescue helicopters from the 1st Air Squadron at Gdynia, and Mi-14 antisubmarine helicopters from the air squadron at Darlowo.

The Baltops maneuvers are taking place in the western Baltic, including Kiel Bay and Mecklenburg Bay.

The first stage of the exercises, described as port-based, is to last until 10 June. During this stage, a detailed program of the maneuvers will be drawn up. On the same day, the warships will put to sea to carry out gunnery, antiaircraft, antisubmarine, and mine-hunting practice. The maneuvers will end on 16 June at Karlskrona.

Baltops maneuvers have been organized for more than 20 years now by the United States. Poland is taking part for the fourth time. The exercises are carried out within the Partnership for Peace program.

**Poland: European Integration Policy Criticized**

*96EP0055A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA in Polish 4 Apr 96 No 14, pp 3, 5*

[Article by Andrzej Ananicz, former under secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former adviser to President Walesa: "Perils to Poland's International Standing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During 1989-93 the main directions of Polish foreign policy were outlined and consolidated. They are accepted by a definite majority of society, which agrees that Poland's national security would be best guaranteed by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that the most effective way in which we achieve prosperity and civilizational progress is by integrating into the European Union. Preparing the conditions for attaining these strategic objectives meant overcoming all the factors that underlay the vassal-like nature of our relations with Moscow and launching huge internal reforms. It was also necessary to establish new relations with neighboring countries and define principles of regional cooperation that would be favorable to us and promote stability in Europe.

**External Challenges**

Within just a few years Poland turned from a satellite country into a sovereign partner in international dialogue, one with a clear vision of its place in Europe and a consistent foreign policy based on the principles of international law. Our aspirations were accepted by Western partners.

But now we are entering upon a period of growing challenges that require and shall in the next few years continue to require special analytic precision, consistency, and coordinated action by the machinery of government.

The preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union revealed that the integrative idea in Europe is fading. Particularist objectives and parochial interests of individual countries and pressure groups are overshadowing the long-range European interest. More and more often mention is being made of huge difficulties in reaching a consensus on the structural reform of the EU [European Union], a reform that its member countries view as the fundamental prerequisite for its expansion. This is complicating our efforts to gain membership. Various pretexts serving to justify the need to postpone negotiations for the date and conditions of our joining the European Union are being effectively put forward.

Fewer and fewer NATO member countries view the issue of expanding the alliance as worth resolving in the next few years. The problems with the peace process in the Balkans, the intensification of terrorism in the Middle East, the complications of Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, the conflicts in post-Soviet territory, and growing tension in the Far East—all this may effectively distract the attention of Western politicians from the difficulties attending the expansion of NATO.

**Russian Maneuvers**

In Russia nationalist and big-power elements along with a strong component of centralized etatism are becom-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ing increasingly dominant. Moscow has intensified its efforts to keep Poland outside the boundaries of the West.

Russian policy toward the area of the former USSR has become consolidated. Determining the place of Ukraine and the Baltic countries at the moment of Poland's joining the alliance acquires a crucial importance. Nowadays there is no guarantee that the expansion of NATO will not entail Russian pressure in those two directions. The West is not ready to assume that risk. This may also complicate our bilateral relations with our neighbors to the east.

The community of interests and coordination of policies of the countries of the Central-European region has become markedly weakened if not disintegrated. This creates the possibility of playing them against each other, e.g., by "pragmatic offers of cooperation" made from outside our region.

At the same time the image of Central-East European countries as "second-class democracies" (with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia) with incompletely defined rules for the operation of laws, the market, and governance, is being perpetuated. Unless this process is reversed, this may become the main barrier on our road to integration.

**A Governing Coalition Without a Signpost**

The trends on the international scene would not be so disturbing if Polish foreign policy remained dynamic and creative. It may be feared, however, that this is not so.

In the course of more than two years the governing coalition has failed to develop even one plan of action on foreign policy that would be in the nature of at least a medium-term objective. This also applies to domains included in Polish strategic objectives, that is, the efforts to gain Poland's membership in NATO and the EU. In that domain conceptual inertia seems to be chronic. The absence of a plan of action based on a hierarchy of objectives is resulting in the rise of nonsensical ideas such as the idea of consulting Russia on the terms for Poland's joining NATO.

Such an absence of a signpost is hastening the process whereby various ministries become independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That institution, established to coordinate and watch over the Polish raison d'etat, is being gradually limited to purely diplomatic activities. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has taken over almost entirely the reins of economic promotion, and the Ministry of Culture of cultural promotion.

The government-drafted project for reforming central administration transfers the coordination of activities concerning relations with the European Union to a new office whose nature of operation and purposes are not suited to the operating mode of the EU, which is contrary to the Constitution and to the protests of the minister of foreign affairs. At the same time, the operations of offices of commercial attaches, which are in total disagreement with the free-market economy, have been extended indefinitely.

**A Partisan Diplomacy**

When we also consider the partisan approach to staffing diplomatic posts and the continuing tensions within the governing coalition, we can see how difficult the situation of the minister of foreign affairs and the institution he heads is.

The consistent blocking of a reform of public administration has resulted in a deplorable situation. Consider just three facts:

—A specialized and properly staffed department for EU affairs has not been set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

—There exists no properly prepared task force specializing exclusively in NATO problems.

—Owing to a freeze on the structure of employment at central and local offices and the blocking of two previous ministers from carrying out personnel shifts, several dozen candidates for diplomatic posts are being hurriedly sought; to this day, for example, the post of ambassador to Italy has not yet been staffed, even though that country hosts the Intergovernmental Conference and chairs the EU.

Summing up, I am not certain whether nowadays whenever national interest conflicts with group or party interests in the broadly conceived domain of foreign policy, the common good and national interest always win.

**What Is To Be Done?**

This country's international standing is too important an issue for it to remain the fiefdom of whatever partisan coalition happens to be in power. The place of foreign policy on the list of state and national priorities must be defined. This should be followed by budget decisions and preferences for structural changes.

The government must present for public debate national programs for integration into the EU and NATO. Their acceptance will determine the direction of everyday activities of the government and individual institutions of state. Similarly, the public has the right to know what

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

are the principles and directions of Polish eastern and regional policy.

Here is a vast field for extragovernmental and opposition initiatives. So that a debate on our international standing be substantive and produce the optimal results, intensive conceptual and training work is needed.

Note: Text of a paper prepared at the Conference of the Windsor Group, "What Alternative to the SLD?" on 30 March. Andrzej Ananicz is a former under secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a former employee of the Chancellery of President Walesa. The subheadings were provided by the editors.

**Poland: Rosati on Ties to Russia, Vacant Ministry Post**

*LD1006094896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 10 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati has said that Poland will cooperate with every Russian president, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming elections there.

In an interview for Polish radio, the minister refused to comment on press reports alleging that a Polish Peasant Party politician was to be appointed to the post of deputy foreign minister.

Dariusz Rosati admitted, however, that such a post in the ministry remains vacant and that talks about candidates for it are under way.

**Poland: Gdansk Shipyard To Close; Solidarity To Protest**

*LD0806184196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk Shipyard Solidarity has announced a protest action following the decision by the annual general meeting of the plant's shareholders to close down the shipyard.

We are determined to take drastic action to make people in Warsaw understand that 7,000 people work here, Jerzy Borowczak, the leader of the yard's Solidarity organization said. He added that the union was considering taking to the streets again, as well as staging blockades of major transport interchanges. A final decision will be made by the protest committee on 10 June.

**Poland: Walesa Blames Postcommunists for Shipyard Shutdown**

*LD0806201196 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1900 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The postcommunists are now finalizing their act of destruction of Gdansk shipyard, Lech Walesa told Gdansk radio, commenting on the decision of the annual general meeting of the shareholders on ceasing production at the yard. In his opinion, the plant should undergo restructuring. Walesa added that the plant should have been given help.

[Begin Walesa recording] I can say that I am with the work force and I will remain on their side. Of course, I cannot lead all the actions the shipyard will probably take. I will be one of them, and I will act in solidarity with them.

One must defend jobs. Even in the West, even great capitalists have not been as unscrupulous in their actions involving the shipyard as the postcommunists, who are supposed to look after the working class, have been. When shipyards were closed in the West, there were deadlines, procedures, things like that. It was not done in this way. What has been done to the shipyard is something unheard of. I am not talking about reorganization because this should be done, but not in such a way. The work force must defend itself—in a sensible way, of course. [end recording]

**Poland: Daily Sums Up Details of 'O' Spy Case**

*WS0706143396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Jun 96 p 3*

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Deputy Minister Anklewicz Is Not Agent 'O'; The KGB Note Cannot Concern an Alleged GRU Informer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Andrzej Anklewicz cannot be agent "O" because the note in which this code name appeared was prepared by the KGB, and for this reason it cannot assess an alleged GRU [Soviet Army Intelligence] informer. A report from the Sejm Extraordinary Commission and publication of the white paper are to put an end to the "Oleksy case." For the time being, however, as new pieces of information are presented and more understatements are made, more and more speculation and doubts appear. According to Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, "people feel increasingly more disoriented."*

Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said that "the 'O' code name was used by a functionary of the Polish secret services whom they probably planted to enable him to play a game in some spy case." He based his statement on the findings of an internal commission of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. It was not difficult

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to guess that the person the prime minister had in mind was Andrzej Anklewicz, currently deputy minister of internal affairs and adviser to former Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. Anklewicz made a great contribution in the detention of Marek Zielinski, who then got a court sentence for spying for the Soviet Union and Russia.

Since a four-page Russian note was enough for UOP analysts to be able to say who agent "O" may be (the only person who spoke about "Olin" was Grigoriy Yakimishyn), they must have decided the note was credible.

The author of the document is Artur Pyatin, a KGB resident-agent in Poland. Andrej Anklewicz, "a figurehead in the Zielinski case," cannot be the agent "O" who was mentioned in the note because it was prepared by civilian intelligence, whereas the operational game in the Zielinski case was played in the GRU (military intelligence). Also, it is not very likely that, being a KGB functionary, Grigoriy Yakimishyn came into possession of the GRU note that assessed a GRU agent. This reasoning is supported by Andrzej Milczanowski, former head of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW], and Konstanty Miodowicz, former head of counterintelligence. In an interview for the Third Radio Program, General Gromoslaw Czempinski, former UOP chief, said that "the Russian civilian and military services do not penetrate each other." This means, among other things, that these services do not exchange such materials.

One may accept the hypothesis that the fact that Yakimishyn gave the note to Zacharski was part of the Russian provocation; however, why should the Russians want to provide evidence against Anklewicz as the alleged agent in the Zielinski case? After all, they may have fabricated any document—which would have looked more credible and which would have pointed to any other person they wanted to discredit. According to the opposition, the prime minister's statement suggesting that Anklewicz is the alleged agent "O" is only one possible hypothesis. The prime minister added, however, that this hypothesis was still being checked out.

The opinion expressed by UOP experts that "the note is true" suggests that Vladimir Alganov had an informer under the code name of "O" somewhere in Poland. Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz suggested in an interview for RZECZPOSPOLITA that this agent was a politician. Also, Captain Dariusz Izgorski (his real name is Sz.) was told that Alganov recruited "a high-ranking party functionary"; he was told about it by a Russian whom he had recruited. This Russian is the second source of information on this issue whom Polish intelligence has in the Russian services. This source is still secret.

One can also accept the version that says that the code name "O" is a combination of several people—for example, the politician (of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] or the opposition) whom Alganov actually recruited, and the politician's informer, who passed him materials and information.

The Xerox copy of the note will probably be included in the white paper. For the time being, all we know about agent "O" is the information that was disclosed by Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz:

—The note included an "analysis of the value of the information and documents passed to the KGB by agent 'O' since the beginning of April 1992."

—The author of the note assessed information provided by agent "O" as not very valuable, "similar to newspaper information." As for the materials that were obtained, he termed them as "generally available Sejm documents."

—In line with explanations provided by the prosecutor, the Russians doubted whether agent "O" had access to the secret UOP report for the president; this means that he must have given them some information that he claimed came from the report.

—Agent "O" was alleged to be a member of the "Sejm Commission for Defense and Security." According to Andrzej Milczanowski, this is the literal translation of the Russian name: Committee for Defense and Security. The Polish name of the commission is imprecise. Therefore, one can assume that agent "O" may either be a member of the National Defense Commission or the Commission of Administration and Internal Affairs.

—"He (agent 'O') had access to the leadership of the MSW the entire time, despite changes in the leadership of the ministry itself (Majewski, Milczanowski, Macierewicz—all of them equally trust him)." This information may be interpreted literally. However, [former] Minister Milczanowski explained that this portion was interpreted as information pointing to indirect contact, which means that agent "O" had his own man in the MSW, and this man was trusted by the subsequent heads of the ministry.

On 5 June, Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski was interviewed at the Voivodship Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw in connection with the investigation into the leak of the full text of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz's reasons for his decision [to drop the Oleksy case]. The senator claims that he does not know who in the SLD passed this document to journalists.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Poland: Deputy Reveals Secret Order on Enterprises Surveillance**

*LD0906122196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Labor Union [UP] Deputy Konrad Napierala revealed at a news conference in Poznan today a secret order, issued in April by Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski—at the time acting head of the State Protection Office [UOP]—on monitoring all threats connected with social unrest and industrial actions at crucial points of the national economy. According to Deputy Napierala, the document constitutes a step toward setting up political police in our country.

Among other things, the text of the order says that it is necessary to list the most important enterprises, whose functioning is important to preserve economic security of the area they are located in, and prepare a system of obtaining advance information on possible conflicts in these enterprise, which might disturb their efficient functioning.

Deputy Napierala told journalists that he had revealed the document because it was in breach of the law now in force and that there was absolutely no need that would justify surveillance of enterprises. The deputy did not want to disclose how he had obtained the document. He added that, in practice, the order meant that all plants, enterprises, institutions, and offices could be put under surveillance. Essentially, it also meant that trade unions could also be put under surveillance, he said.

In the opinion of UP Deputy Napierala, Col. Kapkowski should be suspended from his official duties until this matter is clarified, and UOP should withdraw the order. The deputy hopes that Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz will provide an appropriate explanation of the matter at the forthcoming session of the Sejm.

**Poland: Deputy: Interior Minister Responsible for Secret Order**

*LD0906134296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1216 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Bialystok, 9 Jun—In the opinion of Deputy Artur Smolko (UP) [Labor Union], a member of the Commission for Administration and Internal Affairs, it is the minister of internal affairs who bears "political responsibility" for the secret order issued by the UOP [State Protection Office] head. The information on a system of advance monitoring boils down to introduction of secret security agencies at work enterprises.

When asked by a PAP journalist to comment on Colonel Kapkowski's secret order issued in April—which was revealed by Deputy Konrad Napierala (UP) today and concerns all possible threats resulting from social unrest and industrial action at crucial points in the national economy—Smolko said that the institution of advance monitoring is aimed against "trade unions and will backfire against political parties."

In his opinion, if the minister of internal affairs knew about the existence of the document, he is politically responsible for "setting up a political police." "If he did not know about it, he is politically responsible for the lack of supervision of UOP at a time when UOP had no head," he said. In April, Col. Kapkowski was acting UOP head.

"The worst thing about the document is the fact that it mentions the setting up of an advance monitoring system, which, in the language of the secret services, means creating secret security agencies at work enterprises. According to the definition contained in the document, a factory, a provincial office, or an office of a deputy may constitute a work enterprise because they are of crucial importance to the state of security in any given area," Smolko said.

**Poland: Alliance of Democratic Right Planned**

*96EP0055B Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 7 Apr 96 p 3*

[Unattributed article: "What Alternative to the SLD?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At Saturday's conference of center-right groupings some of the participants signed a declaration pledging themselves to build "a broad formation of the Polish center-right transcending existing divisions." It was acknowledged that distancing the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] from power in the next parliamentary elections requires the formation of a broad bloc of the opposition presenting a common electoral list.

The debate was organized by the Windsor Group, a foundation established three years ago in Windsor, at a conference of the center-right groupings of Central European countries.

The declaration was signed by, among others, the leaders of Conservative Party (Aleksander Hall) and the Peasant-Christian Party (Artur Balazs), as well as by Andrzej Ananicz and Andrzej Zakrzewski of the Lech Walesa Institute, and also by the "totally interparty man" (as he defined himself) Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, and by activists from the rightist wing of Freedom Union—Bronislaw Komorowski, Piotr Nowina-Konopka, Jan Maria Rokita, and Donald Tusk. It was not signed by, among others, Stefan Niesiolowski (Christian-National Union).

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

—Bronislaw Komorowski, one of the conference's organizers, declared that soon a working group will be formed in order to prepare for June the draft of the platform of the future center-right formation and "a scenario for integrating political groupings."

—Jan Maria Rokita proposed forming before this spring is over the National Committee of the Opposition, which would by midyear formulate the principal objectives of the opposition for the years 1996-97, designate its candidate for prime minister, and adopt criteria for establishing a common electoral list of candidates for the parliament. In Rokita's opinion such a committee should be appointed by Walesa and other "widely respected" leaders. This should be "a resolute initiative by prominent figures" rather than the result of arduous negotiations among parties, he clarified.

—Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz commented that the very name of that committee is not constructive enough.

—Aleksander Hall opted for a broad rightist bloc and added that it does not have to be "a radical right with a socialist platform." He cautioned that should several different post-August party blocs participate in the elections, that would mean accepting a scenario of disaster. Balazs did not exclude the possibility that in the future the Peasant-Christian Party may become part of a strong center-right party.

—Czeslaw Bielecki (Movement of the Hundred) argued that an agreement among leaders will not be enough, that what matters most is the electorate, which will not necessarily be totally gained following the merger of the parties, as proved by the results of the merger between the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress.

—Jan-Krzysztof Bielecki claimed that a technical merger will not convince the voters.

—Andrzej Milczanowski, former minister of internal affairs, referred to "Red solidarity," which has proved effective in the last three years. It is not enough that all the reins of power are now in a single hand, he said, because the SLD is now also trying to extend its reach still further to, e.g., the special services. At the same time he mentioned "a process of decay" of the right, parochialism, pettiness, and quarrels about ranking "at one's own funeral."

—Donald Tusk in his paper on the political mistakes of the Solidarity camp declared, "We witnessed an embarrassing subservience of the authorities to various interest groups, impotence in face of adventurers and criminals, changeability, and sloppiness of legislation.... It became a specialty of Solidarity governments to change the rules during the game; retroactive taxes and duties were introduced, debts were exacted from the weak rigorously, while the strong and impudent received lenient treatment. And thus we got mired in the ruts of the former system." In his opinion, a thorough change of the system of society in democratic conditions required "political heroes, but had to be implemented by the hands of dwarves, petty individuals lacking imagination and genuine will to power."

—Wladyslaw Bartoszewski warned, "The Reds are multiplying by a budding process throughout the government" and threatened that if in five years the nation reelects "Handsome Olek" [Aleksander Kwasniewski] for another five-year term, he, Bartoszewski, would not rest peacefully at Powazki Cemetery.

—Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in a letter read at the conference, recalled the words of John Paul II: "What matters most is to fight something and not someone."

**Poland: Effectiveness of Political Parties Examined**

*96EP0050A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 30 Mar 96 No 13, pp 3-4*

[Article by Mariusz Janicki: "Armchairs, Chairs, Couches: In Polandm, 300 Political Parties Exist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish political parties are in bad shape. Membership is declining, local branches are withering on the vine, and money is scarce. There is a continuous musical-chair rotation of party offices, telephone numbers, and media spokesmen. Infighting occurs, as recently seen within the UPR (Union for Real Politics) and the KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland), and leaders of the BBWR (Nonparty Bloc for Supporting Reforms) are being reshuffled, some against their will, which leads to long-lasting conflicts. Unity congresses become worthless several days after assurances of friendship forever are given.

The law on political parties is waiting until its turn comes to be updated by the Sejm. The amendments proposed include one providing for more rigorous registration of members and, in return, for financial support from the state budget. Will this restore the health of the Polish party system?

With the exception of the Movement for Rebuilding Poland (ROP), no new political force with prospects of passing the 5-percent vote threshold for admission to the Sejm has emerged in the last three years in this country (based on opinion polls). As for the oldest parties not deriving from the PRL [Polish People's Republic] system, meaning the KPN, the PC (Center Accord), and the ZChN (Christian-National Union), their support has plummeted below the 5-percent threshold. Respondents in opinion polls name at most eight to 12 groupings

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

(including Solidarity, which is not formally a party) and ignore the others. Some of these parties operate locally, but the fundamental purpose of a political grouping, that is, exerting an influence on national issues, is in this case not perceived publicly.

**Clamorous Though Small**

The SdRP (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland), the PSL (Polish Peasant Party), and Freedom Union together have a membership of 250,000, which is many more than the remaining 300 officially registered parties have taken together. The disparities are considerable: Freedom Union has somewhat more than 10,000 members, or only about one-fifteenth of the membership of the PSL and one-fifth of the membership of the SdRP. But these are the biggest parties. Center Accord, which barely four years ago boasted of a membership of 20,000, now has fewer than 10,000 members. The no-longer-existing Liberal-Democratic Congress had in its peak years about 3,000 members and, it appears, established for Polish parties a certain standard that various groupings are approaching from below and, especially, from the top.

Party leaders most often disregard membership size, claiming that it is the extent of influence that counts most. But this is a convenient illusion. Local structures capable of organizing an electoral campaign cannot be replaced even by politicians prominent in the mass media. Aside from a few exceptions, the parties have on the average one member each in each township.

This is really too little. And precisely this is condemning the parties to a desperate search for forms of existence other than local activities, which are hard work but the sole guarantee of continued success. A grouping with a membership of two or three thousand that is not growth-oriented will never become a strong pillar of the political scene.

The small membership of the parties and their extremely weak local chapters grease a tendency toward schisms. The decisions of a party's leadership or of its factions and wings quite often cannot be ratified by party branches for the simple reason that these branches do not exist.

**Poor Proximity to Power**

For these reasons it is so easy to convene an extraordinary congress for recalling a party chairman: Notices are faxed to several cities and the congress is ready. Of course, later its validity is questioned. Thus, if we wonder why it is not possible to determine which of the two RdR's (Movements for the Republic) is the real one, if we do not know whether Jerzy Gwizdz is still the head of the BBWR, and why did the Union for Real Politics have two chairmen, the answer does not necessarily have to be found in the complicated political situation of this country. The reason may be more prosaic: the internal instability of the parties and their small size. It is easier to rock a kayak than an oil tanker. On the other hand, however, the leaders of small groupings can steer them more readily, exercise authoritarian power, identify their parties with their own names, and impose this way of thinking on the mass media. The latest explicit example is the conflict within the KPN. Leszek Moczulski plainly declared that the KPN is where he is; he will therefore convene his own party congress and condemn the "purists" headed by Adam Slomka. The very fact that one can convene one's "own" congress demonstrates that intraparty democracy is a rather abstract concept.

The purpose of political parties is to exercise power or to remain in its vicinity, within a significant opposition having a reach broad enough to occupy important posts. The absence of sufficiently close connection with power affects party structures adversely. This does not just concern the distribution of offices and thereby buying the favor of party colleagues. The absence itself of contact with the most important, the most real problems of the state is pernicious.

**Ideology Is Increasingly Shoddy Merchandise**

Since 1990 some 12 parties have been in power, governing or cogoverning, with as many of them as 10 governing during the first three years, until 1993, while for the last three years the same two groupings have been in power. Out of the coalition of seven parties that had formed Hanna Suchocka's cabinet, only one, Freedom Union, still is represented in the Sejm. Of the parties that had been the base of the Jan Olszewski administration not one has remained in the Sejm! But the return to political reality is difficult and sometimes impossible.

How many people today remember accurately the nature of Alliance for Poland, the Accord of 11 November, or St. Catherine's Convent? At the time these rightist initiatives were depicted as milestones on the road to integrating entire tracts on the right side of the political panorama.

The cost of principled adherence to party platforms is very high and looks like a vicious circle: If the platform is strictly adhered to, that is if the compromises necessary to uniting with other parties are rejected, then that platform cannot be translated into reality at all.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Will There Be No More Changes on the Political Scene?**

Various studies indicate that about 60-70 percent of the Polish public does not feel represented by any existing political party. The remainder are very restrained in giving their support: the leading parties (SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], Freedom Union, PSL) each have 6-10 percent support, while the others (considered in the studies) each have 2-4 percent support.

Thus, although politicians often declare that the country's political spectrum is already saturated and "there will be no other political scene," a majority of the potential electorate feels that it is "not being serviced." Perhaps that is because a majority of our parties continue to advocate the model of a national party attempting to comprise in its platform everything—from the political system of the state to retirement pensions, education, and the mining industry. This reflects some lofty reference to the first "party-predating" ideas of Solidarity's no-longer-existing Citizen's Parliamentary Club, which, following 40 years of totalitarian fasting, wanted to replace the entire party system with itself. If some parties win more votes in elections than might ensue from studies of "representation of interests," that is probably due to intuitive choice, elimination of the least-liked parties, of the radical parties using the language of hate and struggle. There exists a danger that such intuitive choice may too often prove ill-advised and the party to which trust is given is disloyal and does not meet expectations. Thereupon there is only a small step to condemning the party system in its entirety.

**Governing, Assisting, and Other Parties**

What then is the party menu like nowadays, and what will appear on it in the next few years? Experts (including some from the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences) estimate that about 50-60 political parties are active (of course, with varying intensity) in Poland. When composing a list of the parties (from giants to microbes) that in some manner exist on the political scene we stop with the number 30, and not a step more. There are not more than 10 parties that are either governing or "assisting" in fairly close proximity to power.

Ten or perhaps 15 parties aspiring to steer the helm of state even if only for a moment—that is not a very encouraging picture. A state, like a computer or a car, is poorly served by many operators. A two- or three-party system (or at least a two- or three-coalition one, with stable alliances) would decidedly be better. This hardly seems possible, because by now the SLD and the PSL themselves fill this hypothetical vacancy almost completely, while the post-Solidarity parties are opposed to forming a coalition, and especially merging, with these postcommunist groupings. What thus remains is to await some moves from the present-day opposition. It is there that new trends and momentums for creating new parties as well as, especially, for mergers should be expected. The situation is to be improved by the amended law on political parties, and especially by its provision for financing them from the state budget. But will money alone assuage platform conflicts and personal obsessions?

**[Box, p 4]**

Freedom Union is one of the best-organized post-Solidarity parties. It has 10,465 members in 49 voivodship chapters (400 circles). The largest chapters are in Warsaw (1,400 members), Katowice, Poznan, Krakow, Szczecin, Gdansk, Lodz, and Nowy Sacz. But in Biala Podlaska, for example, it has only 37 members. It makes assurances: "Despite everything their performance is outstanding." The Union's main office is in a good Warsaw neighborhood (Aleje Jerozolimskie) and it has not moved from it in the last few years, which is a rarity on our political scene. Its newly renovated office measures 228 square meters in area and is provided with eight computers (a system linked to the Internet is being created), Xerox copiers, a printer (for printing in-house bulletins), along with five telephone lines and one fax line. The Union has eight salaried employees (an accountant, a secretary, a driver, and others) at its main office, while, among others, its chairman, secretary, and deputy are unpaid volunteers. Membership dues are 5 zlotys monthly, and are reduced to 2.5 zlotys for pensioners and students. One-fourth of the dues is transmitted to voivodship chapters. It was Leszek Balcerowicz's ambition to lay good organizational foundations of this party, and it seems that he has accomplished his objective.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Romania: Parties Discuss Arrangements for 16 Jun Ballot**

*AU0706175896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] A new working meeting with the political parties to analyze the stage of the local elections took place at Victoria Palace today. The party delegations were led by Miron Mitrea, Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]; Adrian Sarbu, National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]; Radu Berceanu, Democratic Party [PD]; Anton Niculescu, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]; Valer Suian, Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]; Ion Sassu, Socialist Party of Labor [PSM]; Corneliu Ciontu, Greater Romania Party [PRM]; Stefan Radof, Civic Alliance Party [PAC]; Dan Cristian Ionescu, National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD]; Constantin Avramescu, Social Democracy Party of Romania [PSDR]; Victor Surdu, Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR]; and Valentin Vasilescu, Romanian Ecology Party [PER]. The meeting was also attended by Adrian Nitoiu, chairman of the Central Electoral Bureau [BEC]; Octav Cozmanca, chairman of the Central Technical Commission; Alexandru Radocea, chairman of the National Statistics Commission and secretary of state; and other advisers and experts.

According to the press release issued by the government, a second ballot will be held in 1,727 localities, while the first ballot will be repeated in 334 localities. Repeat elections for county councils will also be held in the Counties of Gorj and Mehedinti. In this respect, preparations are already under way, with the electoral lists being updated, voter slips being printed, the necessary equipment being supplied, and the activities of the polling stations being ensured. Likewise, steps were taken to better involve the radio and television stations and the written press in explaining the voting procedure and stressing the importance of a large electoral turnout.

The representatives of the political parties expressed their concern with ensuring the correctness of the lists of candidates and the electoral signs. They called on the prefect's offices to become more involved in the proper organization of the electoral process and asked for greater media coverage of the technical aspects of the ballot. The polling stations will stay open until 2400 hours [2100 GMT]. They expressed the hope that the deficiencies noted in the first ballot will not be repeated. To this extent, they agreed to adopt concrete measures, including on solving possible protests.

After this working meeting, the BEC chairman and the chairman of the Central Technical Commission held a teleconference with the county electoral commissions, the county technical commissions, and with the regional representatives of the political parties and briefed them on the conclusions drawn from today's meeting. They set concrete tasks, by laying emphasis on the distinct prerogatives of all sides involved in the electoral process. The prefects were called upon to appoint a public servant to each polling station to ensure the proper supply of the stations with materials and articles. The government release also mentions that, in keeping with current legal provisions, the secretaries of the territorial-administrative units from counties, municipalities, towns, and communes are called upon to ensure the smooth unfolding of the electoral process. It was decided that the prefects should instruct the technical commissions and the secretaries of the territorial-administrative units on procedural matters, while the county electoral counties should do the same with the chairmen of the polling stations.

**Romania: Nastase Says Iliescu Will Run as PDSR Candidate**

*AU0806192996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Statement made by PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase after the news conference his party held today in Bucharest, reported by correspondent Victor Caraculacu—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference held by the PDSR [Social-Democracy Party of Romania] today, it was announced that President Ion Iliescu decided this party will open the list of necessary signatures, which will enable him to register his candidacy for another presidential term. Referring to this decision, PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase made the following statement to our radio station.

[Begin Nastase recording] As early as our party's national conference, President Ion Iliescu announced that if he runs for the position of Romania's president in the elections to be held this fall, he will do it exclusively under the colors of our party. In fact, this information was included in a message that he conveyed to the members of our party on that occasion.

Some speculation has been circulating these past few days, or rather it was a press diversion, through which attempts were made to convey the idea that, for certain reasons, President Ion Iliescu will run as an independent candidate. Through his spokesman, Mr. Ion Iliescu has disclaimed this idea. During our party's news conference today we also announced that, starting today, we have launched the lists of signatures to support Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy for the position of Romania's president.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The issue which emblem to use on these lists came up, and we discussed this matter with the president, who agreed that it should be our party's emblem. However, it is also true that President Iliescu has not yet made a definite decision regarding his candidacy. He announced a few times that he will do this—that is, he will make a decision about registering and announcing his candidacy—only after the local elections. Given the fact that the local elections are not over yet, certainly everything is still relative. Nevertheless, we have started the signature-collecting campaign and we are waiting for the conclusion of the electoral campaign, so that President Iliescu can also officially announce his candidacy for the office of Romania's president. However, I repeat, the issue was not under what sign President Ion Iliescu would run for president, if he runs at all, but it was a simple question connected with when he was going to announce his candidacy. This issue was exclusively a matter of time, which, as he had announced, will be after the conclusion of local elections. [end recording]

**Romania: Final Results of Local Election Ballot Released**

*AU0706200096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The final results of the 2 June local elections, included in a communique released by the Central Electoral Bureau [BEC], show that 893 out of a total of 2,954 mayoral mandates have been assigned so far, of which: 368 to the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]; the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 121; the Social Democratic Union [USD] 118; the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] 63; independent candidates 62; the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] 61; the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR] 37; the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] 23; the Greater Romania Party [PRM] 11; the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93] 10; and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] 10. The rest up to 893 was attributed to 10 other political groupings.

Regarding the positions of county councilors, 1,642 out of a total of 1,718 mandates were attributed as follows: 293 CDR; 278 PDSR; 188 USD; 133 UDMR; 91 PSM; 88 PUNR; 68 PRM; 60 PDAR; 56 independents; 53 PAC; and 50 PL'93. The rest up to 1,642 was split among other 48 political parties or alliances. For the allocation of the other 76 county councilor mandates, repeat elections will be held in Gorj and Mehedinti counties.

The total number of elected local councilors is 34,975 out of a total of 39,857. Their distribution per political groupings and alliances is as follows: 8,307 PDSR; 5,562 CDR; 5,222 USD; 2,409 UDMR; 2,133 PSM; 2,068 PDAR; 1,910 PUNR; and 1,505 independent candidates. The rest up to 34,975 was split among other 75 political groupings and alliance.

The second ballot of the local elections will be organized in 1,727 localities and repeat elections in 334 localities, on 16 June 1996.

We remind the listeners that in Bucharest the first ballot was validated in all sectors. The CDR candidate Victor Ciorbea and the PDSR candidate Ilie Nastase will face each other in the 16 June runoff. CDR and PDSR candidates will run in the second ballot for the positions of mayor of Bucharest Sectors 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, while the CDR representative and an independent will compete in Sector 1.

**Romania: Nastase on PDSR Candidates' Performance in Cities**

*AU0906155496 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 5 Jun 96 p 3*

[Interview with Adrian Nastase, executive president of the PDSR, by MEDIAFAX reporters Ema Toader and Cristian Dumitru; place and date not given: "It Is More Important To Learn From Mistakes That Were Made"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Reporter] What is your opinion about the first partial results of local elections in big cities, which indicate that the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], another opposition party, and even the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] candidates are ranking first, while the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] candidates had performed unfavorably.

[Nastase] In very big localities people virtually voted less for local elections and more for the parliamentary elections. Therefore, I believe that elections have been much more politicized because of people's difficulties. In practical terms, the votes of those who came determined to vote against the government counted more than those who had voted for another issue, namely the administration of their towns. Therefore, I believe that there was not a very clear stake in big towns, where the distance between citizen and mayor is not so short as it is in a commune or in a village, where things were much clearer and where our candidates have won in most cases.

[Reporter] What can you say about the involvement of the Government's Local Public Administration Department in organizing the elections?

[Nastase] Also in this case, I believe, it was not very clearly established what the duties of this department are and what the duties of mayors are. Unfortunately,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

many mayors and even local councilors, knowing that they are no more on the list of candidates—most of them even from the opposition—did not get involved at all in organizing these elections. I repeat, the distribution of responsibilities should be seen very clearly to correctly judge the organizational shortfalls.

[Reporter] Will you take any measures in your party about how the PDSR campaign was organized, considering that even in local councils the situation of the PDSR is very poor?

[Nastase] First of all, we are going to wait until the end to see the final results. There are areas where the results are not so good. Certainly, we will draw some conclusions from the way these elections have unfolded and we will decide how to proceed further.

[Reporter] What are your recommendations to PDSR candidate Ilie Nastase for the runoffs in Bucharest? Should he not appear in public debate?

[Nastase] The issue here is not to appear before the press. I believe that he should strive to convey better his message to the electorate through the mass media. He tried to convey directly such a message with the electorate by going to public places. I believe this was a very good move, under a certain aspect, however, now, under the new circumstances, he will have to alter his strategy and I am convinced that he will do it intelligently and effectively.

[Reporter] Will you suggest to him that he do this?

[Nastase] I believe that a broader discussion is needed with his team and, if my viewpoint counts in any way, I will try to formulate it on that occasion.

[Reporter] Does the fact that so far he has not appeared in debates affect the results that he obtained?

[Nastase] Not necessarily. He is beyond the area of sympathy in Bucharest. Our capital is a city that has been for years on end a monopoly of the opposition. Nevertheless, Ilie Nastase cannot depart too much from our performance level, the political sympathy, and from this viewpoint, I believe he has already achieved a lot. To achieve even more, he must adapt his strategy to the new conditions.

[Reporter] Does the Party of Social Democracy of Romania intend to contest local elections in certain situations?

[Nastase] I do not think so. I suspect that there will be certain opposition parties which will contest the elections where they did not win. To contest elections is a deformed way of approaching problems that have cropped up. Our viewpoint is that it is more important to learn from mistakes that were made and try to change certain aspects of the practice of political elections in Romania. We have to build up in time the tactics of local and parliamentary elections, with as few shortfalls and as little stress for the voters as possible to make these election days a holiday for all those who wish to cast their votes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Slovenia: Drnovsek on EU Membership, Government Coalition**

*AU0706155796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a news conference this morning, Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek expressed great pleasure that efforts have borne fruit. He also touched upon some domestic political topics. Here is a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] The prime minister will sign the European association agreement on Monday [10 Jun]. He also said the following:

[Drnovsek] On that occasion I will present Slovenia's formal application for full-fledged membership of the EU.

[Pengov] Slovenia has thus entered the first circle of states that may reckon on full-fledged membership. The relevant ministries have hurriedly been preparing replies to a comprehensive questionnaire sent from Brussels. Drnovsek assesses that Slovenia will quickly continue along the road to full-fledged membership.

Slovenia appreciates the move Great Britain has made, as this was the first exception since the outbreak of the mad cow disease [bovine spongiform encephalopathy—BSE] crisis. The decision demonstrates the very positive attitude London has to Slovenia's EU membership.

The prime minister again pointed to the intensive work needed at home in the sphere of property legislation. If Slovenia wants to be an EU member, it must respect the rules. Article 68 of the Constitution will be amended before the ratification of the association agreement.

And now about other topics. The government coalition is to remain because, in the months until the mandate expires, there will be no point in searching for coalition partners. The experience will perhaps help in reaching coalition agreements after the the elections.

How will relations in the coalition be affected by yesterday's rejection of Dr. Peter Vencel as ambassador to Bonn? The government conveyed the proposal and the Committee decided differently. This is not the first time this has happened, Drnovsek said. In [Former Foreign Minister] Thaler's case, the government's view differed from Parliament's.

What will happen with the post of foreign minister? Dr. Drnovsek: Consultations with parliamentary parties are under way; however, there is still no proposal that would get majority support. Thaler will remain in the post for the time being. It is possible that the post will be taken over by the prime minister in the last three months. [end recording]

**Slovenia: Kucan Discusses Talks With Scalfaro, EU Integration**

*AU0806194196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report on news conference by Slovene President Kucan after meeting with Central European presidents in Lancut on 8 June by Tomaz Gerden—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Journalists—Italian ones, too—were particularly interested in the meeting between Presidents Kucan and Scalfaro. Milan Kucan said that the meeting with the Italian President was free of burdens from the past. According to him, it was not the occurrence of a turnabout that permitted the signing of Slovenia's associate membership in the EU, but merely the removal of some obstacles. The new Italian Government can claim the merit for this, too. Such an improvement could have happened earlier, as the wide spectrum of Italian-Slovene relations was in the past irrationally reduced to the problem of the option-takers [esuli] alone.

President Kucan assessed the meeting of the presidents of the Central European countries in Lancut as being good. In the future the European countries will probably sacrifice a portion of their national sovereignty for the common one, if this will bring more security and better economic atmosphere to them. The formation of a joint Europe will, of course, not be without problems and crises; however, the countries must resolve these problems at home first.

Let us mention that the next meeting of the presidents of the Central European countries will be held in Portoroz in May or early June next year.

Polish President Kwasniewski is scheduled to visit Slovenia by the end of this August. With president Kucan he will primarily discuss the cooperation within CEFTA [the Central European Free Trade Agreement]. German President Herzog was also invited to Slovenia. He will arrive in autumn or next spring.

President Kucan also agreed on regular annual working meetings, similar to those with the Austrian and Hungarian presidents, and with Italian President Scalfaro. At these meetings they will try to resolve any possible problems. The Slovene president also held talks with other statesmen. Let us mention the talks with Hungarian President Goncz, primarily about the upcoming Slovene Defense Minister's visit to this country.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

**Slovenia: Italy's Efforts To Amend Association Accord Noted**

*AU0706192496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prior to the signing of Slovenia's EU Association Agreement on 10 June, two letters will be exchanged: Slovenia's letter to the EU Presidency and the letter of the EU Presidency to Slovenia whose contents are in fact identical. In its letter, Slovenia obligates itself to implement the Spanish compromise and the Fifteen are in fact informally confirming Slovenia's obligation.

Brussels sources today confirmed that Italian representatives recently tried to add to the association agreement also the letter Slovene Foreign Minister Thaler sent to Italian Foreign Minister Dini on 27 May. As the letter contains precise details of the Spanish proposal, Italy would like to add the letter to the agreement as additional guarantee that Ljubljana will really fulfill its promise. According to some assessments here, with the experience of the recent turbulent history of the agreement between Rome and Ljubljana, Rome's distrust of Slovenia would in fact be confirmed. Italy will face opposition on the part of some permanent representatives of the member countries, primarily Germany. According to their interpretation, Thaler's letter may be seen as a bilateral agreement and, objectively speaking, this cannot be the matter of the association agreement which is a multilateral agreement between the Fifteen and Slovenia. The repeated mixing up of bilateral and multilateral matters may be seen by some member countries as a dangerous precedence to which they do not want to agree out of caution.

**Slovenia: Parties on Economic Policy, Confidence in Government**

*AU0406183696 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 29 May 96 p 18*

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana MAG in Slovene in its 29 May edition on page 18 carries the results of an opinion poll it conducted among the heads of the clubs of deputies of the Slovene parliamentary parties. The date and the manner in which the poll was carried out are not specified. The chiefs were asked to reply to the following three questions:

"1. Does your club of deputies support proposed government economic measures? 2. If the State Chamber was taking the confidence vote in the government at this moment, how would your deputies vote? 3. Assess the success story with the points from 1 to 5 [5 being the highest]."

The replies obtained were as follows:

**"Miran Potrc, the United List of Social Democrats**

"1. We must see the measures first, we have not obtained the material yet, and that is why we cannot decide.

"2. Pursuant to the Constitution, the question of no-confidence is linked to the name of the new prime minister-designate. Therefore, we would have to know who the new prime minister-designate is in order to decide. We would definitely support the no-confidence vote if the prime minister-designate was from our party or if an agreement on him was reached with us.

"3. The attempt to ascribe the success story to one party alone is wrong. I, personally, would mark it with minus 3, however, in the absence of a commentary, this figure means nothing.

**"Ivo Hvalica, the Social Democratic Party**

"1. We support any measure that can be realized and is based on a realistic economic assessment; however, I doubt that the proposed measures are of this kind.

"2. In favor of the no-confidence vote. This government has failed on all counts. In one of the embassies, they even asked me how was it possible at all that the government was still standing.

"3. Minus 1. In face of the tacit devaluation of the tolar, the inflation, the unemployment swelling beyond all limits, the privatization deficit, and so forth, there is no success story.

**"Ignac Polajnar, the Christian Democratic Party**

"1. In principle, we agree that something needs to be changed in the economy; however, we will only decide once we have the concrete proposals for changes on the table.

"2. In my opinion, there is no need to discuss (no)confidence at the moment because the government is still functioning more or less normally.

"3. An overall assessment is not possible because there were some very good chapters in this story, but also some very bad ones....

**"Dr. Franc Zagozen, the Slovene People's Party**

"1. The government measures will have to be analyzed, and we will also have to point out what led to the current situation.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"2. In favor of the no-confidence vote. We distrusted the present government on the day of its appointment, already.

"3. A catastrophic one.

**"Tone Persak, the Democratic Party**

"1. Once we see the material, we will be able to decide on how to vote on individual measures.

"2. The question is not relevant because there is no prime minister-designate. Even if we supported the no-confidence motion, the present government would perform all the tasks until the arrival of the new government. Of course, the elections would take place before this, which is why the question is irrelevant.

"3. The success story is questionable. A year ago one could to a degree speak about the success story; at the moment this is threatened, and in a year's time it might transpire that there never was one.

**"Zmago Jelincic, the Slovene National Party**

"1. I cannot produce a breakdown of support for the government until I know what the measures are all about, until Drnovsek outlines his proposal concretely.

"2. Probably in favor of the no-confidence vote.

"3. Minus two.

**"Ivan Verzolak, the Slovene National Democrats**

"1. No.

"2. We support the no-confidence vote.

"3. Three.

**"Andrej Lenarcic, the Independent Group of Deputies**

"1. I cannot speak in the name of all members of the club of deputies because it is very heterogeneous. However, I can state my personal opinion: I would not support the government measures.

"2. Personally, I would support the no-confidence vote.

"3. As regards the fulfillment of promises, I would mark it with minus one, however, as for the fantastically effective phraseology, that is, the marketing stunts, I would give them five."

**Slovenia: Nikolaj Oman's Involvement in Arms Trade Detailed**

*AU0506182296 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 4 Jun 96 p 2*

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Nikolaj Aleksander Oman Involved in Dirty Deeds?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 3 June—An extensive Italian criminal investigation—which started with a wave of arrests last October, while the latest interrogation and the arrests were carried out last Saturday—has unveiled an international money laundering and arms trafficking organization, which reportedly also spread its tentacles into Slovenia.

The international court statements and numerous arrest warrants cover a wide range of operations, linked primarily to the resale of arms, money laundering, and the sale of nuclear substances, in which, apart from others, Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Barcelona Bishop Richard Martia Charles, Somali citizen Felice Maniero, and a Slovene citizen Nikolaj Aleksander Oman were supposedly also involved. The international warrant for the latter has not been issued yet, the Ministry of Internal Affairs says. The ministry has not received any information regarding the action against the international arms merchants. The ministry contacted the Italian police after the first arrests in connection with the money laundering and the illegal arms trade, but they were told that they would be informed on the matter in writing.

Oman was reportedly implicated by last December's testimony by Francesco Elmo, who is imprisoned in Italy, primarily for mediating the sale of counterfeit money—German marks—via a Vatican bank. Elmo says that he spent some time with Oman in Bled in 1994. He described Oman as the link in the arms trade between eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean.

Nikolaj Aleksander Oman in Slovenia features among those under suspicion in connection with the Brnik affair. Among the suspects in the affair—which was transferred from the Koper Prosecutor's Office to Ljubljana last year, to be undertaken by a special task force of prosecutors—also feature Konstantin Dafermas, Janez Jansa, Franci Kosi, Igor Bavcar, and Ludvik Zvonar. Aleksander Oman, who was not available to journalists today, took part in the armament of Slovenia, however, he denied taking part in the resale of arms.

"The ship that brought the equipment for the Slovene police (Haeckler & Koch automatic weapons) was also loaded with 'other equipment' and the same was the case with all other shipments. The arms intended for the police had to end up in their hands or else, in the absence

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of a balance of power between the police and the army, anyone in Slovenia could grab power. In a democratic state these two institutions must watch over one another. The additional cargo alone cannot be the problem now, because the entire shipment was received," Oman said in one of his rare interviews. Oman never wanted to give specific answers to frequent questions about the whereabouts of the Slovene money from the sale of arms to the south, he merely said that the sums in question were big.

Oman who is also the honorary consul of Liberia was born on 28 October 1943 in Podkoren near Kranjska Gora. In the sixties he left for Australia and returned to Slovenia prior to the proclamation of the independence in 1991 and became involved in the purchase of arms for the requirements of our country. Security Information Service documents state that, while monitoring the operative illegal arms smuggling channels, they discovered that Nikolaj Oman was the proprietor of Orbal Marketing Service with its headquarters in Melbourne and that he had been trading regularly with the famous merchant Konstantin Defermas—a Greek owner of Scorpion International Service—for quite some time. Before that, the service in Vienna obtained information that pointed to his activity in the international arms trade and trade with groups and individuals in Slovenia and Croatia.

Among the armament stories, Dafermas featured in the failed kidnapping attempt at Klagenfurt airport, in which some Defense Ministry employees also took part. Years ago the secret service occasionally contacted Nikolaj Oman, only on emigre issues at first, and later also in connection with his alleged contacts with the Australian counterintelligence service and the U.S. CIA. He stressed his loyalty to Slovenia throughout.

Following a brief visit to Slovenia in March 1991, he announced his return to the mother country (he returned in August). Soon after his arrival, he spent three days in one of the unofficial rooms of the Ljubljana Bezigrad police station. There he held talks with one of the leading employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and reportedly received some concrete tasks from him.

The information that the secret service acquired by the end of 1991 through intense monitoring of communications and the monitoring of the activities of Konstantin Defermos confirmed the indications of Nikolaj Oman's involvement in the arms trade, which was why, on 31 January 1992, the service started monitoring (it proposed to listen to his telephone) Nikolaj Oman and did so until his departure for Australia in June 1991.

Oman is the owner of Grimsce Castle [in Bled], where the headquarters of the Liberian consul general are situated, and the Rikli Villa [in Bled]. He also leases Bled Castle. In Australia he owns a diamond mine, a large estate, and a house.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

## Federal

### FRY: Milosevic on Dayton, Foreign Ties, Kosovo

*LD0906181496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1722 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, June 9 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic feels that the emplacement of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina should result in the restoration of ties among the former Yugoslav peoples and their ties with the other nations in Europe and the world.

Speaking for Germany's DER SPIEGEL magazine in an interview released ahead of publication on June 10, Milosevic said that Germany could be a valuable ally of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially in preserving the peace.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Germany can establish highly diverse economic, cultural and political cooperation, he added.

Milosevic said that the German press had in recent years published a lot of false information about developments in former Yugoslavia and biased interpretations of them, which had gone especially to the detriment of Serbia.

Serbia has been pictured as the only or at least the main cause of war in former Yugoslavia, but this is not so, he said.

He went on to say that the history that weighed on the two countries must remain in the past, and not be repeated either for Serbia or for Germany.

They are both European nations and in the same boat on this continent, and the responsibility of the strong and the rich nations lies in helping the others, not in imposing their own life-styles on them, he stressed.

Milosevic commented on the agreement struck with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Belgrade in May about the repatriation of 120,000 asylum-seekers to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from Germany by end 1997.

In this context, he said that all young people who had refused to respond to the army call-up in the early 1990's had been amnestied a few months ago and were free to return.

He said, however, that this pertained only to citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and not to all those frauds who thought they would fare better in Germany if they posed as victims of persecution by "the Serbian dictatorship."

If Germany has wasted money on them, it is not to be pitied, because the authorities must have known quite well that nobody has been driven out of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that nobody has had to run away from any kind of pressure or terror, he added.

Yugoslavia holds no political prisoners, unless those who shoot at police officers and are found in possession of large quantities of fire arms for army use, explosives, ammunitions and the like should be considered as such, Milosevic said.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said that from the outset of the Yugoslav crisis he was for keeping the former federation, which he believed to be in the interest of all the peoples who lived in the area, and when despite everything clashes broke out he was for their peaceful settlement.

Milosevic said the Dayton peace agreement was being successfully implemented first of all because it took into account the formula of equality of all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina which he himself had always advocated.

"The war is over, that is clear to everyone," Milosevic said and added "the people want peace."

Lasting and consolidated peace in Bosnia depends on treating equally the interests of the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats, Milosevic said. "An equal stand towards the three peoples is the key to peace in Bosnia," he said.

He said that war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not attributable to an individual or even a single people and stressed that "responsiblity for the war is borne by all three peoples, and especially great responsiblity is carried by some members of the international community."

"War in Bosnia was waged between three peoples and each of these three peoples had ideologists of war. Each of these ideologists was prodded from outside Bosnia," Milosevic said.

Speaking about the large number of victims and refugees caused by the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia Milosevic said that civil war was not worth the price of a single life.

Regarding his role in the peace process the Serbian president said he was doing everything to contribute to it adding that the United States and Europe were justified in looking upon him as an important partner.

President Slobodan Milosevic views as important the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has survived as a multi-ethnic state and has avoided inter-ethnic strife.

Milosevic said that this was a major achievement in a situation where a large-scale war was flaming in the Balkans.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Speaking about the media campaign waged against Yugoslavia all through the crisis years, he said that nobody could now deny that those who had fought and won a multi-ethnic state—the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—had been branded as nationalists.

The Federal Republic of Yugolavia was from the start branded even as the aggressor and exposed to brutal sanctions at the hands of the international community, he added.

Meanwhile, Milosevic said, those who seceded and created ethnically pure and nationalistic states have been lauded as democrats and have received support and recognition from the international community.

The aggressive nationalism and the creation of ethnically pure states, or rather statelets, with the help of the international community, cannot have anything in common with anything good, with any positive values at the close of the 20th century, he added.

He said he firmly believed that nobody could deny in the future that Europe had acted against its own best interests in the Yugoslav crisis.

Asked what the war had brought the Serbian nation, Milosevic said that it must be borne in mind that the war had been imposed on the Serbs outside Serbia.

The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been for decades one of the republic's three constituent nations under the republic's constitution, he said.

They refused, therefore, to be stripped overnight of the right to decide about their republic and become second-rate citizens in some Jamahiriyah, he said.

in this context, he stressed that the war in the lands of former Yugoslavia had bypassed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that the Bosnian Serbs had achieved the Republika Srpska, their entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Slobodan Milosevic stressed in the interview that he considered the question of the southern province of Kosovo and Metohija to be an internal affair of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which shall not be internationalised.

"I have seen... that Germany, through a public statement of your minister (Klaus) Kinkel, as well as the British, the Americans, the French, the Russians and others also consider this to be our internal affair," Milosevic told DER SPIEGEL.

Emphasising that "Albanians in Yugoslavia are clearly a minority," Milosevic said he did not believe that anywhere in the world a national minority enjoyed the rights of the Albanian minority in Serbia.

"Albanians have their schools, radio and television programmes, at least 20 papers and magazines which are extremely critical, some of them have even published very gross insults, but not a single edition of these papers has ever been banned. Albanians here are free and live in a free land," Slobodan Milosevic said.

### FRY: President Milosevic Criticizes Hague Tribunal

*LD0906201796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1859 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, June 9 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said in an interview to the German weekly DER SPIEGEL that it was clear from the conduct of the international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that it is a "political and not a legal institution."

Emphasising that there was no innocent party in the three-sided civil war in Bosnia Milosevic said "justice can only be done if the same standards apply to all," adding that "unfortunately, the work of the tribunal in The Hague has until now offered no basis for such an impression."

Milosevic said it was Serbia's stand that all war criminals should answer for their crimes and said that "whoever is responsible for (war crimes) in Serbian territory will be brought to justice."

"I do not believe that trials against war criminals from Serbia, if there are to be any, should take place outside Serbia," Milosevic said noting that Serbia started its first war crimes trials two years ago.

He also said that in the country's criminal law war crimes are considered as the gravest criminal acts liable to be punished by death.

### FRY: EU Officials Stress Need To Normalize Relations

*AU0806154996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jun 96*

[Report on news conference by EU Commission President Jacques Santer and Lamberto Dini, chairman of the EU ministerial council, in Belgrade on 8 June, by Jugoslava Zagorac—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zagorac] Italian Minister Lamberto Dini, chairman of the council of EU foreign ministers, emphasized that implementation of the peace agreement was discussed during talks by the two European diplomats with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

[Dini, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] I will convey to you my impressions on the progress that has been achieved. We are looking

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ahead, trusting that all stages of the peace agreement will be wrapped up by the planned deadlines. We concur with President Milosevic that free elections in Bosnia should be realized according to the plan, that is, by 14 September this year.

We have a little more than three months to secure the minimal conditions for holding the free, democratic elections for the new representatives and new authorities in Bosnia. It is very important to safeguard the citizens' freedom of movement and the return of refugees. Although there are numerous problems standing in the way of realizing this task, which appears somewhat unrealistic, there is a lot that can be accomplished through joint efforts. The Organization for European Security and Cooperation will strive to fulfill all the obligations it has undertaken for the preparation and supervision of the forthcoming elections. There is also a strong political desire in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo to assist in the organization of the elections.

Parallel to this process, it is inevitable to continue extending aid to the reconstruction of the whole of Bosnia, to assist in the reconstruction of all its parts.

[Zagorac] Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, in his address to journalists said that the aim of the visit and the topic of the debate were the future relations between the EU and the new countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia:

[Santer, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Our goal is to formulate and apply an original approach that will allow the countries of the region to achieve political stability and lasting peace. The EU is very interested in the stability of this region. The West European countries encountered a similar situation after World War II when they had to overcame a difficult situation of clashes and confrontation, making a transition toward cooperation and rapprochement. All countries of the former Yugoslavia should regulate their relations with each other and with the world. In this process of stabilization, the countries of this region can help themselves the most by establishing infrastructure and economic ties, by promoting trade and respecting human rights, for which the EU is extremely interested, and also by securing freedom of movement.

[Zagorac] The European diplomats have left Belgrade for Skopje. The visit to the Macedonian capital will conclude a two-day mission by the two leading EU officials. On Monday, the emissaries will report on the results of their talks in Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Skopje to the EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg. At the end of the next week a conference of foreign ministers of more than 40 countries that are in some way involved in the Dayton peace process will be held in Florence. At this meeting, the European diplomats Dini and Santer will speak about the results of their visit to the countries of the earlier Yugoslavia. They will examine efforts for the preservation of peace on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia and, as Jacques Santer explained to the reporters this morning, arbiters will also be appointed in Florence, that is, the representatives who will actively monitor the realization of the upcoming stages of the peace accord. The work will run concurrently and in harmony with the conclusions of the conference on regional disarmament.

## Serbia

### Serbia: Markovic Says 'All Sides' Responsible for SFRY Breakup

*AU0906172996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jun 96*

[Report by Dragoslav Kosaric from Ljubljana—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] After several dry years, the Slovene public received Dr. Mira Markovic's interview to the weekly PANORAMA with great interest. When asked how she would assess the current position of the FRY as well as the situation in the entire region of the former Yugoslavia, Dr. Mira Markovic replied that the Dayton accord had facilitated the end of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, and that the relations of the [word indistinct] previously intertwined former Yugoslav peoples was now beginning to be resolved peacefully.

When asked who gained and who lost, Mira Markovic repeated her well-known stance that all Yugoslav peoples and republics were the losers in Yugoslavia's breakup. As for the responsibility for the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Dr. Mira Markovic believes that three factors were responsible for it. Above all, there were the centers of economic and political power outside Yugoslavia, to which the disintegration of Yugoslavia suited for numerous historical, political, geostrategic, and other reasons, just as the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia suited them, too. The second factor was, according to Dr. Mira Markovic, the internal forces, chiefly the nationalist ideologists and their exponents in politics, economy, culture, science, and even sports, who were active within all Yugoslav peoples at the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties. The third factor was the political emigres who had been forced to leave the country after World War II. These were anti-Communists and nationalists. The input of this delayed, emigre retaliation to Yugoslavia's disintegration was very great, Dr. Mira Markovic believes.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

She pointed out that whenever (?a conflict) occurs in an multiethnic country most often all the peoples involved are responsible for it. The responsibility for Yugoslavia's disintegration and the war on its soil is deeply rooted on all sides and very complex, and for that reason not a single tribunal is competent to judge on responsibility. The history and the next generations will pass the judgment on this, Dr. Markovic believes.

Among other things, she stressed that more or less all sides started simultaneously in the conflict that occurred among the Yugoslav peoples. She stated categorically that she would never agree to the theory of somebody starting first. They all started first, Dr. Mira Markovic believes.

When asked by the PANORAMA journalist whether she was satisfied with the FRY and whether this was a democratic country, Dr. Mira Markovic stressed that a civic society has been inaugurated in FRY with the adoption of the Constitution. This Constitution rendered all forms of ownership equal and the market became the decisive corrector of the relations in the economy and the society as a whole. With the development of the private enterprise, Dr. Mira Markovic says, the independent private initiative expanded to enviable proportions.

Speaking about the political pluralism, chief of the Yugoslav Left directorate Dr. Mira Markovic pointed out that 118 political parties had been registered in the latest Serbian elections. She pointed out that not a single country, or very few of them, grant as much space in the press to the opposition. In Serbia alone the opposition has 15 dailies and weeklies which are not used merely for the affirmation of their own or competitive social concepts but are, in the opinion of Professor Markovic, being used for primitive personal attacks on the figures of authorities and their families and to arouse primitive hatred. Mira Markovic believes that regardless of their profile this press does not suffer any sanctions, not even the ones applied in similar cases in the developed civic societies of the modern world.

Mira Markovic assessed in the Slovene weekly PANORAMA that all in all the present Yugoslavia, viewed from a standpoint of the definition of democracy in a modern civic society, is a very democratic society.

At the end, let us add that an extensive interview with Dr. Mira Markovic will be published in her book Odgovor [Answer] which will for the Slovene readers be published by Enotnost publishing house, which, translated into our language, would read Jedinstvo from Ljubljana. Apart from the interest of the Slovene public, the publication of this book in Slovenia will doubtlessly also have political connotations.

**Serbia: Seselj Accuses Draskovic, Djindjic of Treason**

*AU1006115796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 96 p 6*

[Report on an interview with SRS leader Vojislav Seselj by B. Didanovic; place and date not given: "There Is Even a Greater Evil Than the Socialists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a short and almost idyllic cease-fire on the Serb opposition scene, a new wave of mutual insults and serious accusations began a few days ago. Among the myriad of poisonous barbs, most attention was attracted by the accusations of treason made by Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], especially those against his best man [kum], Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], and his current coalition partner, Zoran Djindjic, leader of the Democratic Party [DS]. These statements attracted particular attention among that part of the public with a good memory, which never understood the Radical-Socialist cooperation that was seen once before.

The serious accusations against the main players in the "Partnership for Change" coalition have mostly been seen as a sign that the Radicals will once again "be doing the work of the Socialists" at the next elections.

"That is absolutely impossible," said Vojislav Seselj in an interview for NASA BORBA. He added that the Radicals regard "Slobodan Milosevic as a traitor and nothing has changed in that respect."

"Draskovic's policy is constantly changing. While Milosevic is the one who has betrayed the most in the past two years, he supported him, openly helped him, and they even spoke of a mutual plan," claims the SRS leader. To the comment that he has recently been attacking the other opposition parties more severely than he has the Socialists, Seselj answered that Draskovic started that first by claiming that the Radicals were fascists and comparing him to Hitler.

Apart from saying that potential collaborators with the regime are to be sought on the other side, Seselj recalled that it was the Radicals who had launched the initiative for an united appearance of opposition parties at the beginning of the year.

"Draskovic was waiting to knife us over the first two points. This was because we asked for an agreement to be signed and offered to swear before the patriarch that none of us would enter a coalition with the Socialists after the elections. The second point was that we would not support anything that they [the Socialists] put before

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the Assembly. Therefore, Draskovic is preparing to do deals with the Socialists," concludes Seselj.

Seselj also denied that the Radicals' attacks on Governor Avramovic, which were timed to coincide exactly with the moment when the Socialists had decided to oust him, were "rather suspicious."

"We were the only ones that had been against his election and we had already been attacking him for two whole years, just as we attack all those from the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] establishment. If some sick people from the other opposition parties have the habit of connecting themselves with the refuse of the Socialists, that is their own problem," the Serbian Radical leader said, not retreating from his position.

According to him, there does exist a possibility of cooperation among four opposition parties at this year's elections. "According to our information, there is great agitation within the SPO. It is possible that Draskovic will be replaced in the next month," Seselj predicts and says that "if the SPO returns to its fundamental national and patriotic policy, with which it attracted a great number of members and supporters, we will very easily find a common language. In such a case, we would also come to an agreement with Djindjic. We will pull him out of that embrace of betrayal into which he is being increasingly dragged," he promises.

We received the following answer when we asked what the outcome of the elections would be if there were no sweeping personnel changes in the SPO: "I believe that there is very little chance for us to be the strongest party at these elections. However, I am convinced that we will be at least the second strongest and that we will have many more votes than Djindjic and Draskovic put together."

Seselj emphasized that these would not be crucial elections because "even if the opposition were to win the majority of seats on the Citizens' Council, it could only block the federal authorities, but not establish the authority of the those parties that are now in opposition". "The key clash will be the republic elections and the elections for the presidents of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which will be next year," evaluates Seselj. We asked whether a victory for the Socialists, however, would be psychologically dangerous for the depressed citizens of Serbia, who are already disposed toward the opposition.

"You are assuming that the Socialists are the greatest evil that can befall Serbia," Seselj answered. "But another evil exists, which is much greater, and that is Vuk Draskovic. This is because Milosevic committed his treason under great pressure and was trying to avoid it, although he gave in in the end. But Draskovic is in advance offering to commit the greatest acts of treason, without any regard, without any hesitation."

We asked whether such a great best-man intolerance might be the result of a conflict between the conceit of the leaders.

"What leader's conceit do I have?" answered Seselj with a counterquestion. "A leader's conceit is shown by one who gathers various parties that are not in parliament around himself, just as Vuk Draskovic is doing. He brought in Dusan Mihajlovic [leader of New Democracy] and Vesna Pesic [leader of the Civic Alliance of Serbia] so that he could act as the leader of the opposition. This is what he has made the situation into since the last republic elections. And that is how it will be in the future. He continues to keep Vesna Pesic in tow, and he is prepared for Mihajlovic, Rasim Ljajic [leader of the Party of Democratic Action in Sandzak], and all the rest. We are not. We are only prepared for serious partners.

Such as?—we asked.

"The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] and, under certain conditions, the DS," Seselj said and added: "We also expect personnel changes in the SPO, but there is the danger that Vuk Draskovic will not even call a meeting of his party assembly,because he cannot get a majority in it."

**[Box, p 6]**

**Agree on Cooperation With the DSS as Soon as Possible**

"A coalition with the DSS is possible, but it has not yet been agreed," Seselj said, adding that "before the end of June, the DSS Assembly will meet and choose the leadership of the party. That is when concrete decisions will be made. Our position is that this needs to be taken care of as soon as possible, since there is not much time left until the elections."

**Serbia: Intellectuals Protest Proceedings Against Karadzic**

*LD0906115196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1132 GMT 9 Jun 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 9 (TANJUG)—A group of prominent Serbian intellectuals have asked that The Hague international tribunal discontinue proceedings against (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska [R.S.] President Radovan Karadzic, the Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI said on Sunday.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The proceedings are not based on facts, but on political motives and are aimed against democratic processes in former Yugoslavia, "in particular the territories where Serbs have lived for centuries," said the declaration.

"During the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karadzic did not issue a single order or any other document which could fan hatred in war or call for or incite genocide and ethnic cleansing against the enemies in the war, Muslims and Croats," the daily said quoting parts of the declaration.

"The stabilization of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not possible without respect for the interests of the Serb people in republika Srpska, or without the participation of R.S. President Radovan Karadzic," said the declaration which was signed by 24 Serbian intellectuals.

Among the signatories are 10 members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts—Smilja Avramovic, Kosta Cavoski, Dejan Medakovic, Mihailo Markovic, Milorad Ekmecic, Ljubomir Tadic, Vasilije Krestic, and others.

The declaration further said that, at the initiative of Radovan Karadzic, the "R.S. assembly on Dec. 17, 1992, adopted a declaration on an end to the war, which expressed the will of the Serb people to stop the war and to cooperate with the international community."

**Serbia: Extradition of Officers Dangerous Move for Milosevic**

*AU0906200796 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 p 15*

[Commentary by Slobodan Inic: "Officers as a Burden"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Milosevic's troubles are too big in facing the demand of the international community to extradite the Bosnian-Serb "knight" from Han Pijesak, Ratko Mladic, who seems to be hiding there in the catacombs built in the time of Josip Broz Tito, and the Belgrade-Krajina-Slavonia officer group from the Miloseva Street (Veselin Sljivancanin, Miroslav Radic, and Mile Mrksic). They have been accused of war crimes committed in the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia—Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If Milosevic sends to The Hague this "elite" from the Belgrade General Staff, which carries with it the military legitimation of the Army of Yugoslavia, only with a different formation deployment and service, there is no doubt that that would be interpreted as if he were saving his own life. Not in the sense that the mentioned officer group, which followed Milosevic and Kadijevic [head of former Yugoslav Army], would think that way, but it would be seen as an attempt to put the exclusive blame on the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the present Army of Yugoslavia [sentence as published].

It is widely known that the decisions on how and for which goals the army would be engaged were not made by Mladic or the others from Milosevic's officers' club. The final decision on that came from Kadijevic, Milosevic, and Jovic [last president of former Yugoslavia], as, after all, was testified by Jovic in his book "The last days of the SFRJ [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]."

And now, what an absurdity!—it is Mladic, Sljivancanin, Radic, and Mrksic who should go to The Hague but not (for the time being) Kadijevic, Milosevic, and Jovic. And Milosevic, who first sent them away to commit crimes, should now send them to court, to be tried for those crimes!? As a consolation they should see that, in fact, their extradition to The Hague is the preparation for the "big transport" of Milosevic himself and of comrades Kadijevic and Jovic. What is much more important is that Milosevic is aware of that.

There is no doubt that such an act by Milosevic would contribute to the deepening of the unfavorable attitude of the Army of Yugoslavia toward him because, if Mladic and the famous "Vukovar three" can be extradited, then one day all the others can also be extradited, particularly since 90 percent of them still think as their indicted comrades. That is the interpretation of the attitude of the highest command cadre of the Army of Yugoslavia, which recently debated what should be done in the case of "the most unfavorable outcome," eventually concluding that Yugoslav officers, "even the retired ones," could not be extradited.

The biggest obstacle to that is General Momcilo Perisic himself, head of the General Staff. His case burdens Slobodan Milosevic in two ways, but it also draws the attention of the international community. Because, if Mladic and the "Vukovar group" go, then Perisic, the previous destroyer of Mostar, is also not far from that.

The "class" comrade of Mladic with his post contributes to an even bigger absurdity in the whole case. While some have to go to The Hague because of the crimes they have committed, others, despite the same deeds, remain on their posts as heads of general staffs. Eventually, Perisic will oppose that, if nothing else than for his own sake, because it will be his own turn soon.

The attempt to drag these officers to The Hague, under the slogan "better them than the people," creates additional problems for Milosevic in the Army of Yugoslavia. A sort of "Black Hand" [conspirator organization of Serb officers before World War I] can be formed there—if it does not exist already. And when the army

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in Serbia "loses control," as its whole political history has taught us, it comes to big trouble—primarily for the ruler.

What is the worst, Mladic and the "Vukovar three" could in the case of their extradition to The Hague, for the sake of their own defense, tell all sorts of things, particularly about Milosevic and his role. When the "patriots" find themselves in danger for their own life and when the homeland leaves them, then the real origin of their "patriotism" will emerge. Apis [leader of "Black Hand"] cursed Aleksandar Karadjordjevic [then king of Serbia?] during the investigation and trial. Probably because he had killed another Aleksandar (Obrenovic) [member of rival dynasty] for him, only to be sentenced to death afterward. Serbia, full of murderers!

In the midst of all that, another problem arises for Milosevic. A certain number, and at the beginning of the war maybe the biggest number of the generals of the former JNA belonged, and still belong, to the SK-PJ [Union of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia], a party which is one of the backbones of the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) of Mirjana Markovic [wife of Slobodan Milosevic]. Regardless of how gladly she would sacrifice the generals to save the beloved Cobi [nickname of Milosevic?], she is aware that the inevitable "either-or" concerning the extradition is coming closer and closer.

Alarm in the army regularly produces alarm in the other factor of executive power—the police. Who knows how people in the police will react—people who mostly stem from "Krajinas," for which the indicted generals fought. That questions their own destiny. Because without the army as the background of the state policemen cannot be safe either.

What will Milosevic do in case he fulfills the demands of the international community for extraditing Mladic and the three men from his officers' club—nobody knows that, maybe not even he himself. What is certain is that it is late for his liquidation as a way to destroy the traces and the main perpetrators of crimes, which were products of his policy.

If he extradites them, as the international public demands, he will endanger his position from the inside; if he does not extradite them, he is threatened with the same thing—only from the outside. Finally, it seems that internal and external circumstances have unified against the Serbian butcher.

**Serbia: Commentary Analyzes Meaning of Hague Judge's Visit**

*AU1006121296 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 96 p 2*

[Commentary by Simonida Simonovic: "Not A Word Devoted to Crimes Against Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I fully agreed with Mr. Bozovic that there is no collective guilt for war crimes. There is only individual responsibility ... not all Serbs, Muslims, Croats, or Italians are bad ...."

This was what Antonio Cassese, president of the International Tribunal, said following an (un)expected meeting with Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the FRY Assembly's Chamber of Citizens. This seems to be the only detail on which the guest and all his other interlocutors actually agreed.

Mr. Cassese is the first senior official of the international community, to put it this way, immediately after the Geneva meeting to arrive in Belgrade at lightning speed, which shows the pressures to which the Yugoslav side will be exposed in the coming period, whether subtly or directly. Although it was a short visit, his hosts were doubtlessly acquainted with the reasons for the judge's visit, although, to judge from the reports on the talks, very different conclusions can be drawn about their contents.

According to independent commentaries, Dr. Radoman Bozovic said that he had been rather surprised by Cassese's visit, that is, that he did not know why the judge had come to meet him at all!

Cassese, however, knew very well what he was supposed to be asking Bozovic, although he was not satisfied with the answer. He hoped that "the law on cooperation with The Hague Tribunal had already been passed" and said that "it is bad news that it has not...."

The essence of the prominent guest's remarks did not, however, apply to the readiness in principle for cooperation, but specifically to the law on cooperation with the Tribunal (and the extradition of those indicted), as well as the demand for the surrender of Karadzic and Mladic."

Yugoslav Government members were completely direct in this respect when they recalled at the meeting with Cassese that our criminal code was completely in accordance with international law and that its articles regulate issues of the extradition of possible criminals. There is therefore no need to pass any special law or regulation on cooperation with the Tribunal.

Cassese, however, had obviously been acquainted with the various "internal waves" of several months ago,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

when an intensive debate was held (far from the public eye, however) on whether a special law on the tribunal would be proposed.

It is perfectly clear that, apart from some promises and pressures, the prominent guest was in fact searching exactly for such fissures or at least hints of them. What he really managed to "achieve" will probably be seen very soon. Nevertheless, there is a "refreshing" fact in all this that our government took the opportunity to recall the 1,200 cases crimes against Serbs that have so far been fully processed and submitted to the Tribunal, but have been left without any results. If one is to believe statements on good intentions and on the law being above politics as the basic principle of the Tribunal's work, then the next move on investigating crimes against Serbs would have to be made by Cassese himself.

Confidence is a two-way street and Belgrade has already shown sufficient good will by agreeing to allow the Tribunal to open an office.

**Serbia: Avramovic Accepts Post With NEDELJNI TELEGRAF**

*AU0506130196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0951 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Jun—Dragoslav Avramovic, until recently governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, has accepted the post of chairman of the NEDELJNI TELEGRAF Board of Directors.

Pursuant to a decision made by Momcilo Djorgovic, the founder of the weekly, a three-member board of directors was founded on 31 May of this year. In addition to Avramovic and Djorgovic, chief editor Dragan Belic is also a member.

According to NEDELJNI TELEGRAF, Avramovic said that he hoped that the weekly would become "the greatest weekly because it will only publish the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, without fear, insults, and sensationalism."

## Kosovo

**Kosovo: Milosevic Expected To Present Solution for Kosovo**

*LD0706193796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1818 GMT 7 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 7 Jun (SRNA)—At the request of approximately 50,000 Serbs from Kosovo, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is to visit Pristina on 22 June, to present a platform for the resolution of the Kosovo issue, Momcilo Trajkovic, a member of the Serb Resistance Movement, told a news conference today.

Trajkovic said that no dialogue between the Serbs and Albanians was possible until a consensus within the Serb nation was reached, and that the Kosovo issue could not be resolved without Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

## *SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION*

**U.S. Government Customers**

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

**Non-Government Customers**

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.